Primary Holding

The exercise of eminent domain by an LGU requires an ordinance, as mandated by Section 19 of RA 7160. A resolution is insufficient for authorizing expropriation. Res judicata does not prevent the State or its agents from initiating new expropriation proceedings when public interest demands and all legal requirements are fulfilled.

Background

The Municipality of Parañaque sought to expropriate private property owned by V.M. Realty Corporation for a socialized housing project. The complaint was filed based on a municipal council resolution, not an ordinance. Previously, a similar expropriation case involving the same property had been dismissed with prejudice.

Facts

• 1. The Municipality of Parañaque sought to expropriate two parcels of land owned by V.M. Realty Corporation for a socialized housing project.
• 2. The Municipality issued Resolution No. 93-95, authorizing the filing of an expropriation case. However, it did not pass an ordinance as required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
• 3. The subject property was located in Parañaque and was part of a commercial subdivision. V.M. Realty Corporation contested the expropriation, arguing that the land was not suitable for residential use and was intended for commercial and industrial purposes.
• 4. The expropriation case followed an earlier 1987 case (Civil Case No. 17939), filed by the same Municipality against V.M. Realty Corporation for the same property. The trial court had dismissed this earlier case with prejudice in 1988 due to procedural lapses and failure to prosecute.
• 5. The Municipality argued that this second complaint was necessary to fulfill its mandate to provide socialized housing, a public purpose under RA 7160.
• 6. The trial court dismissed the new complaint on two grounds: (1) The Municipality failed to pass an ordinance as required by law to authorize the expropriation. (2) Res judicata barred the filing of the second case because the first action was dismissed with prejudice.
• 7. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, emphasizing that non-compliance with statutory requirements and the finality of the prior judgment precluded the Municipality's claim.

Arguments of the Petitioners

• 1. A municipal resolution has the same legal effect as an ordinance for initiating expropriation cases.
• 2. Res judicata does not apply when public interest is at stake.

Arguments of the Respondents

• 1. The Municipality did not comply with the requirement under RA 7160 to pass an ordinance.
• 2. The case is barred by res judicata due to the earlier dismissal with prejudice of a prior identical case.

Issues

• 1. Can a resolution substitute for an ordinance in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by an LGU?
• 2. Is the current expropriation action barred by res judicata?

Ruling

• 1. On the need for an ordinance: The Court held that an ordinance is necessary for a valid exercise of eminent domain, as required by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. A resolution is insufficient because it is a mere expression of sentiment or opinion, not law.
• 2. On res judicata: While res judicata applies to specific issues decided in prior cases, it does not permanently bar the State's inherent right to expropriate private property if legal defects are corrected and legal requirements are subsequently met.

Doctrines

• 1. Eminent Domain: The delegated power of eminent domain must strictly follow statutory requirements, including the enactment of an ordinance to authorize LGU action.
• 2. Res Judicata: The principle of res judicata does not prevent new expropriation proceedings if public interest is involved and legal requirements are fulfilled.
• 3. Ordinance vs. Resolution: An ordinance is a legislative enactment with binding force, while a resolution is a temporary expression of sentiment or opinion.

Key Excerpts

• 1. "A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature."
• 2. "The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people."

Precedents Cited

• 1. Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals (222 SCRA 173): Distinguished between the requirements for exercising eminent domain under BP 337 and RA 7160.
• 2. National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 577): Affirmed that the State's power of eminent domain is plenary and not diminished by prior court judgments if subsequent proceedings meet legal requirements.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

• 1. Section 19, RA 7160 (Local Government Code): Requires an ordinance for an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
• 2. Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution: Mandates payment of just compensation for expropriated property.