A state regulation requiring public school pupils to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony, on pain of expulsion, is within the scope of legislative power and does not violate the religious freedom guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when applied to children whose sincere religious beliefs forbid such obeisance.

The case arose during a period of increasing international tension leading up to World War II, where national unity was a significant concern. The Gobitis family, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, believed that saluting the flag was a form of idolatry, violating biblical commands. This belief clashed with a Minersville, Pennsylvania, School Board resolution requiring all students and teachers to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony.

• Lillian Gobitis (aged twelve) and William Gobitis (aged ten) were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the national flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.
• The local Board of Education required this participation from both teachers and pupils.
• The Gobitis family were Jehovah's Witnesses, and their religious beliefs, based on their interpretation of the Bible (specifically Exodus, Chapter 20), taught that saluting the flag was forbidden as an act of bowing down to a graven image.
• Due to compulsory school attendance laws in Pennsylvania and their expulsion, the Gobitis children were denied a free public education, and their parents had to enroll them in private school, incurring financial burden.
• Walter Gobitis, their father, brought suit on behalf of his children and himself to enjoin the school authorities from continuing to require participation in the flag-salute ceremony as a condition for school attendance.

• The Minersville School District argued that its resolution requiring pupils to salute the flag was lawfully adopted and the expulsion of the children was within its power and authority.
• The expulsion did not violate any right under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
• The requirement to salute the flag was a legitimate means to instill patriotism and foster national unity, essential for national security.
• Religious convictions do not relieve an individual from obedience to an otherwise valid general law not aimed at promoting or restricting religious beliefs.
• The act of saluting the flag is a secular ceremony with no religious implications and does not prevent a pupil from acknowledging the sovereignty of God.

• The Gobitises argued that compelling participation in the flag salute ceremony violated their rights under Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, specifically their freedom of religion and conscience.
• They contended that their refusal was based on a sincere conscientious religious belief that saluting the flag was a violation of God's law as stated in the Bible, specifically the prohibition against idolatry.
• The individual alone is privileged to determine what they shall or shall not believe, and the law should not compel an act that directly conflicts with such deeply held religious convictions.
• Expelling children from school for adhering to their religious conscience was cruel and unusual and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law.
• The purpose of instilling patriotism could be achieved through other means that do not infringe upon religious freedom.

• Does a state regulation requiring public school pupils to participate in a daily flag salute ceremony, on pain of expulsion, violate the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to children whose sincere religious beliefs forbid such an act?
• Is the state's interest in fostering national unity and patriotism sufficient to justify compelling a flag salute from individuals whose religious convictions prohibit it?
• What is the appropriate scope of judicial review when balancing claims of religious freedom against the state's authority to prescribe educational programs aimed at promoting civic values?

• The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the state's requirement for pupils to participate in the flag salute ceremony was constitutional.
• The Court reasoned that the flag is a symbol of national unity, which is the basis of national security and the preservation of all liberties, including religious liberty.
• Legislatures and local school authorities have the right to select appropriate means to foster national unity and patriotism in public schools, and the judiciary should not interfere with such choices unless they are wholly without basis.
• Religious convictions do not relieve an individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The freedom to follow conscience has limits within a society.
• The Court deferred to the legislative judgment that the flag salute is an effective means of promoting national cohesion, stating it is not the Court's role to act as a "school board for the country" or to determine educational policy.
• Exempting individuals based on religious scruples could undermine the effectiveness of the program and introduce difficulties in school discipline.

• Police Power / Legislative Power of States — The inherent power of a government to exercise reasonable control over persons and property within its jurisdiction in the interest of the general security, health, safety, morals, and welfare except where legally prohibited. The Court held that the flag salute requirement was within the scope of legislative power to foster national unity, deemed essential for the well-being of society.
• Freedom of Religion (First Amendment, applied via Fourteenth Amendment) — The constitutional right to practice one's religion, or no religion, without government interference, and the prohibition of government establishment of religion. The Court acknowledged this right but found it was not absolute and could be subordinated to compelling state interests like national unity, especially when the law was general and not specifically targeting religion.
• National Unity as a Legitimate State Interest — The concept that the government has a valid interest in fostering a sense of shared identity, purpose, and loyalty among its citizens. The Court emphasized that "national unity is the basis of national security" and that the flag salute was a permissible means chosen by the legislature to achieve this "binding tie of cohesive sentiment."
• Judicial Restraint / Deference to Legislative Judgment — The principle that courts should hesitate to strike down laws or actions of the legislative or executive branches, particularly in areas where those branches have specialized knowledge or discretionary authority, unless the action is clearly unconstitutional. The Court stated it could not "exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures" regarding educational programs promoting patriotism and should not "overrule the local judgment."
• Secular Regulation Rule (implied) — The idea that a generally applicable law with a secular purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally burdens a particular religious practice. The Court viewed the flag salute as a secular ceremony aimed at fostering patriotism, not at promoting or inhibiting religion, and thus religious objections did not warrant exemption.

• "A grave responsibility confronts this Court whenever in course of litigation it must reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority. But when the liberty invoked is liberty of conscience, and the authority is authority to safeguard the nation's fellowship, judicial conscience is put to its severest test."
• "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs."
• "National unity is the basis of national security."
• "We live by symbols. The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution."
• "To stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our national life in the setting of the common school as a lawless inroad on that freedom of conscience which the Constitution protects, would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence."
• "But the courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy. It is not our province to choose among competing considerations in the subtle process of securing effective loyalty... So to hold would in effect make us the school board for the country."

• Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 — Referenced to support the principle that religious liberty under the Constitution does not exclude legislation of general scope not directed against particular sects, and that conscientious objections do not always relieve individuals from obedience to such laws (e.g., compulsory military training at state universities).
• Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 — Cited for the proposition that religious convictions do not excuse individuals from compliance with general laws (in that case, anti-polygamy laws).
• Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 — Similar to Reynolds, cited to show that religious freedom does not protect actions deemed contrary to public order or general law.
• Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 — Cited to illustrate that exertion of political authority (e.g., military draft) can be sustained even against religious objections.
• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 — Distinguished. While Pierce affirmed the right of parents to direct their children's education (including sending them to private religious schools) against a state law compelling public school attendance, the Court here found it a "very different thing" for the Court to censor legislative choices about curriculum content within public schools aimed at fostering national attachment.
• Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 — Quoted for its description of the flag as a symbol of national power, freedom, government by consent, liberty regulated by law, and security.
• Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 — Contrasted with the current case. The Court noted that denying legislatures the right to select means for national unity (like flag salutes) is a different problem than subordinating the ugliness of littered streets to free expression via handbills.
• Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 — Cited for the principle that the legislature, no less than courts, is committed to the guardianship of liberties, implying deference to legislative judgment.

• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — The liberty protected by this amendment (incorporating First Amendment freedoms) was the central constitutional provision at issue. The respondents claimed the flag salute infringed upon their religious liberty and due process rights. The Court held the regulation consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Though not directly applicable to states at its inception, its principles of religious freedom are absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The core of the Gobitis' claim was the infringement of their free exercise of religion.
• Exodus, Chapter 20 (Bible) — Specifically verses 3, 4, and 5, which prohibit having other gods and making or bowing down to graven images. This was the scriptural basis for the Gobitis children's refusal to salute the flag, which they considered a form of idolatry.

• Mr. Justice Stone — Argued that the judgment should be affirmed, emphasizing that the state was coercing children to express a sentiment violating their deepest religious convictions. He contended that the law did more than suppress free speech or prohibit free exercise; it compelled an affirmation contrary to belief. While constitutional guarantees are not absolute, the state's interest in fostering patriotism through this specific compulsion did not outweigh the fundamental rights to freedom of speech, religion, and personal liberty. He suggested that there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism without compelling an affirmation that violates religious conscience. Justice Stone highlighted that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect minorities from the will of the majority and that legislative judgment should be subject to careful scrutiny when fundamental rights are infringed, especially those of "discrete and insular minorities." He believed the inconvenience to school discipline was not momentous enough to outweigh freedom from compulsory violation of religious faith.