This case involves a petition for mandamus and prohibition filed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family seeking to compel the respondents (government officials) to issue them travel documents and enjoin the implementation of President Corazon Aquino's decision barring their return to the Philippines from exile in Hawaii. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the President possesses the residual power under the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses' return in the interest of national security and public welfare, and that the President did not act with grave abuse of discretion in exercising this power given the factual circumstances threatening national stability.
Primary Holding
The President of the Philippines possesses unenumerated residual powers, implicit in the grant of executive power, which include the authority to bar the return of a citizen to the country if deemed necessary for the paramount interests of national security and public welfare, subject only to judicial review for grave abuse of discretion.
Background
Following the "People Power" Revolution in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed as President and forced into exile in Hawaii. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency amidst significant political instability, including coup attempts by Marcos loyalists and military factions, communist insurgency, secessionist movements, and severe economic difficulties attributed to the previous regime. As Marcos lay dying in Hawaii, he expressed his wish to return to the Philippines, a prospect President Aquino firmly opposed due to perceived threats to national stability and recovery efforts.
History
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Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed directly with the Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Facts
- Ferdinand E. Marcos, deposed President, and his family were in exile in Hawaii following the 1986 People Power Revolution.
- The Aquino administration faced significant threats to stability, including coup attempts, communist insurgency, secessionist movements, and economic hardship.
- Documented efforts by the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country existed.
- Marcos, reportedly on his deathbed, signified his wish to return to the Philippines.
- President Aquino, citing national security and public safety concerns, decided to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
- The Marcoses filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to order the issuance of travel documents and to prohibit the enforcement of the President's ban.
- The Court received briefings from the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the National Security Adviser regarding the factual bases for the President's decision.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- The right of Filipino citizens to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the Constitution's provisions on liberty of abode and the right to travel (Art. III, Sec. 6).
- International law, specifically the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 12), guarantees the right to return to one's country.
- The President lacks the power to impair the liberty of abode (only courts can) or the right to travel (requires specific legislation).
- The President's power is limited to those explicitly enumerated in the Constitution (invoking inclusio unius est exclusio alterius).
- The determination of whether the Marcoses' return poses a danger to national security is a justiciable question, not a political one.
- Assuming the President has the power, due process requirements (finding of clear and present danger, notice, hearing) were not met.
- Respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in implementing the ban.
Arguments of the Respondents
- The core issue is whether the Marcoses have the right to return in the face of the President's determination that their return endangers national security and public safety, which constitutes a non-justiciable political question.
- The President possesses the power to bar the Marcoses' return based on the state's prime duty to protect the people (Art. II, Secs. 4 & 5) and inherent executive powers related to national security.
- The right to return is not absolute and must yield to the more primordial right of the state to security and safety.
- The President's decision is supported by international precedents where deposed dictators were barred from returning.
- Executive power vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1) is not limited to specifically enumerated powers but includes residual powers necessary for the governance and protection of the state.
- Factual bases exist demonstrating that the Marcoses' return poses a serious threat to national stability and economic recovery.
Issues
- Does the President of the Philippines have the constitutional power to prohibit the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines?
- Is the President's decision to bar the Marcoses' return a political question beyond judicial review?
- Assuming the President has the power, did she act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding to bar the Marcoses' return?
Ruling
- The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in barring the Marcoses' return.
- The Court ruled that the President possesses certain residual or unstated powers inherent in the office, beyond those explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, which include the power to protect the general welfare, encompassing the authority to prohibit the return of citizens whose presence is deemed a threat to national security and public safety.
- While acknowledging the right to return as distinct from the right to travel and protected under international law against arbitrary deprivation, the Court found the President's decision was not arbitrary but based on factual assessments of threats to national stability, economic recovery, and documented destabilization efforts linked to the Marcoses.
- The Court held that while the 1987 Constitution broadened the scope of judicial review to include determining grave abuse of discretion, the President's decision, being grounded on existing factual bases related to national security, did not constitute such abuse, thus warranting judicial deference to the executive determination in this instance.
Doctrines
- Residual Powers of the President: The Court affirmed that the grant of "executive power" in the Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 1) is not limited to the specific powers enumerated therein but includes residual, unenumerated powers necessary for the President to fulfill the duties of the office, particularly the duty to protect the state and promote the general welfare. This doctrine was applied to justify the President's power to bar the Marcoses' return for national security reasons, even without explicit legislative authorization.
- Political Question Doctrine (Limited Scope under 1987 Constitution): While acknowledging that some questions are beyond judicial review, the Court stated that the 1987 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 1) limits the doctrine by empowering courts to determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch. Applied here, the Court asserted jurisdiction to review the President's decision for grave abuse but ultimately deferred because factual bases were found, distinguishing it from a purely political, non-justiciable issue.
- State's Duty to Protect the People: Citing Article II, Sections 4 and 5, the Court emphasized the government's primary duty to serve and protect the people and maintain peace and order. This duty formed the basis for the President's power and obligation to take actions, like barring the Marcoses' return, deemed necessary for national security and welfare.
- Right to Return to One's Country: The Court recognized this right as distinct from the rights to liberty of abode and travel (Art. III, Sec. 6), considering it a generally accepted principle of international law and part of Philippine law (Art. II, Sec. 2). However, it held this right is not absolute and can be restricted non-arbitrarily, such as when the President determines, with factual basis, that a citizen's return poses a serious threat to national security.
- Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances: The Court reiterated the principle but emphasized the system of checks and balances, allowing the judiciary (under Art. VIII, Sec. 1) to review executive actions for grave abuse of discretion, thereby checking, but not supplanting, executive power within its sphere.
Key Excerpts
- "The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated."
- "It would not be accurate, however, to state that 'executive power' is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it."
- "The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people."
- "Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty 'to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.' [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide."
- "When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion... If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned..."
- "The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights... but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being 'arbitrarily deprived' thereof [Art. 12 (4).]"
Precedents Cited
- Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139): Cited for the principle of separation of powers and the allocation of powers among the three branches of government under the Constitution.
- Ocampo v. Cabangis (15 Phil. 626): Cited to support the idea that a grant of power (legislative, judicial, or executive) implies a grant of all powers of that type, subject only to constitutional limitations.
- Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands (277 U.S. 189): Cited (including Justice Holmes' dissent) in the discussion of the nature of executive power, particularly the view that powers not legislative or judicial are executive.
- Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 79690-707, Oct. 7, 1988): Referenced to illustrate that even preferred constitutional rights (like free speech) are not absolute and subject to limits based on public interest.
- Kent v. Dulles (357 U.S. 116) and Haig v. Agee (453 U.S. 280): Mentioned as leading US cases on the right to travel (specifically passport issuance) but distinguished as not directly applicable because the core issue here is the distinct right to return to one's country, not the general right to travel.
- Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448): Cited as the basis for the standard of judicial review adopted in Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, allowing courts to check for grave abuse of discretion in executive actions (like suspending habeas corpus), rather than completely abstaining due to the political question doctrine.
Provisions
- 1987 Constitution:
- Article II, Section 1 (Sovereignty resides in the people)
- Article II, Section 2 (Generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land)
- Article II, Section 4 (Prime duty of Government to serve and protect the people)
- Article II, Section 5 (Maintenance of peace and order, protection of life, liberty, property, promotion of general welfare)
- Article III, Section 1 (Due process and equal protection)
- Article III, Section 6 (Liberty of abode and right to travel, with limitations)
- Article VI, Section 1 (Legislative power vested in Congress)
- Article VII, Section 1 (Executive power vested in the President)
- Article VII, Sections 14-23 (Specific powers of the President, e.g., control, execution of laws, appointments, commander-in-chief, pardons, treaties, budget)
- Article VIII, Section 1 (Judicial power, including duty to review for grave abuse of discretion)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):
- Article 13(1) (Freedom of movement and residence within a state)
- Article 13(2) (Right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):
- Article 12(1) (Liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence within a state)
- Article 12(2) (Freedom to leave any country, including one's own)
- Article 12(3) (Permissible restrictions on rights in 12(1) and 12(2))
- Article 12(4) (No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country)
- House Resolution No. 1342: Mentioned as evidence that members of the Legislature recognized the President's power to bar the return, as they were appealing to her discretion to allow it.
Notable Concurring Opinions
- Fernan, C.J. — (The main decision states "Fernan, C.J., see separate concurring opinion." However, the provided text does not contain the text of this concurring opinion. Assuming it was available, it would be summarized here. Without the text, a summary is not possible from the provided document.) If the text of the concurring opinion is not in the provided document, then N/A. Based on the provided text only: N/A.
Notable Dissenting Opinions
- Padilla, J. — Argued that the core issue is a conflict between an individual Filipino's constitutional right to return and the government's power to bar such return for national security, which is a justiciable question. Believed the right to travel includes the right to return. While acknowledging police power can restrict travel for national security, he found respondents failed to present sufficient factual bases or "hard evidence" to justify negating Marcos's right to return, deeming the government's apprehensions more speculative than real and controllable. He emphasized the need for the Court to uphold specific constitutional rights against general claims of national security and drew a parallel to the denial of Benigno Aquino Jr.'s right to return in 1983.
- Paras, J. — Dissented on grounds of compassion and questioned the sufficiency of evidence proving a genuine threat to national security. Stated that the Armed Forces failed to prove the danger with "hard evidence," relying on "sheer speculation." He found it incredible that one man and his family could arouse an entire country to rise in morbid sympathy. Proposed allowing Marcos to return under house arrest in Ilocos Norte, with conditions for burial, to uphold fundamental human rights, national discipline, and human compassion.