A stop for a minor traffic violation, particularly one punishable only by a fine like failing to wear a motorcycle helmet under a city ordinance, does not inherently constitute a lawful custodial arrest that justifies a subsequent warrantless search incidental to arrest; evidence obtained from such an illegal search is inadmissible.

The case arose from a routine traffic stop where a police officer flagged down the petitioner for driving a motorcycle without a helmet, a violation of a Naga City ordinance.

• On March 10, 2003, at around 3:00 AM, PO2 Emmanuel Alteza flagged down petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong in Naga City for driving a motorcycle without a helmet, violating City Ordinance No. 98-012.
• PO2 Alteza invited the petitioner to the nearby police sub-station to issue a citation ticket.
• While the citation was being prepared by PO2 Alteza and SPO1 Rayford Brillante, PO2 Alteza noticed the petitioner appeared uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket pocket.
• Alerted, PO2 Alteza told the petitioner to empty the contents of his pocket, suspecting he might have a weapon.
• The petitioner complied, revealing a metal container, two cellphones, scissors, and a Swiss knife.
• PO2 Alteza asked the petitioner to open the metal container.
• Upon the petitioner opening the container, PO2 Alteza saw a cartoon cover and something beneath it.
• Following PO2 Alteza's instruction, the petitioner spilled the container's contents onto a table, revealing four plastic sachets: two empty and two containing suspected shabu.
• Petitioner was subsequently arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

• The search and seizure of the alleged shabu was invalid as it was not preceded by a lawful arrest.
• Being flagged down for a traffic violation (punishable by fine only under the ordinance) did not constitute an arrest.
• Petitioner did not consent to the search conducted upon him.
• The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the police officer cannot be relied upon.
• The integrity and evidentiary value of the seized specimen were compromised.
• The petitioner's guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

• The petitioner was lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto for violating City Ordinance No. 98-012 (driving without a helmet).
• The subsequent search was valid as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
• The petitioner voluntarily acceded to the police officer's instruction to empty his pockets and open the container, implying consent to the search (as argued implicitly through the lower courts' findings).
• The prosecution evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Was the petitioner lawfully arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation?
• Was the warrantless search conducted by the police officer, which yielded the alleged shabu, valid?
• Is the evidence (shabu) obtained from the search admissible?
• Was the petitioner's guilt for illegal possession of dangerous drugs proven beyond reasonable doubt?

• The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was not lawfully arrested merely for committing a traffic violation; being flagged down and waiting for a citation ticket does not equate to being under custodial arrest, especially since the violation was punishable only by a fine under the ordinance and R.A. 4136 generally requires only license confiscation, not arrest.
• The Court determined there was no intent by the officer to arrest the petitioner for the traffic violation prior to the search; going to the station was merely for convenience in issuing the ticket.
• Consequently, the warrantless search could not be justified as incidental to a lawful arrest because no lawful arrest occurred beforehand.
• The Court found no valid consented search, stating consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and proven by clear evidence, which was absent; petitioner being "told" to empty his pockets in a police station environment does not constitute valid consent.
• The search did not qualify as a "stop and frisk" as this is limited to a protective pat-down for weapons based on reasonable suspicion, not a general exploratory search for evidence, and the officer's request went beyond this scope.
• The evidence (shabu) was not in "plain view" as it was concealed inside a metal container in the petitioner's pocket.
• Since the warrantless search was illegal, the seized shabu constituted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and was inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule of the Constitution.
• Without the inadmissible drug evidence, the corpus delicti of the crime was absent, leading to the petitioner's acquittal.

• Warrantless Arrest (in flagrante delicto): Defined as an arrest made when a person commits, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the officer's presence. The Court ruled this did not apply because a minor traffic violation punishable by fine only does not automatically justify a custodial arrest; the standard procedure is citation/license confiscation.
• Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest: A recognized exception to the warrant requirement, allowing a search of a person lawfully arrested and the area within their immediate control. The Court held this inapplicable because the prerequisite lawful arrest was absent at the time of the search.
• Consented Warrantless Search: An exception where a person voluntarily waives their right against unreasonable searches. The Court emphasized the high standard for proving valid consent (clear, convincing, specific, intelligent, unequivocal, voluntary) and found it unmet, as mere passive compliance to police instruction in a coercive environment is insufficient.
• Stop and Frisk Search (Terry Stop): A limited protective search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous. The Court ruled the search exceeded this limited scope, as the officer demanded the emptying of pockets and opening of a container, not just a pat-down for weapons.
• Plain View Doctrine: Allows seizure of illegal items discovered inadvertently by an officer who has a right to be where they are, provided the item's illegal nature is immediately apparent. The Court found this inapplicable as the shabu was concealed inside a container and not immediately apparent.
• Exclusionary Rule (Fruit of the Poisonous Tree): Constitutional principle (Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3(2)) that evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Court applied this rule to exclude the illegally seized shabu, leading to acquittal.
• Definition of Arrest: The taking of a person into custody so they may answer for an offense, involving actual restraint or voluntary submission. The Court determined that being stopped for a traffic citation did not meet this definition under the circumstances.
• Waiver of Right Against Illegal Arrest vs. Admissibility of Evidence: The Court reiterated that failure to timely object to the legality of an arrest does not constitute a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during that illegal arrest/search.

• "Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."
• "First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested."
• "Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter."
• "Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion."
• "While the rule [stop and frisk] normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons."
• "The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
• "...a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest."

• Berkemer v. McCarty (468 U.S. 420 (1984)): Cited extensively to establish that a routine traffic stop is generally temporary, brief, and public, more analogous to a "Terry stop" than a formal arrest, and does not automatically trigger Miranda rights unless the detention escalates to the functional equivalent of arrest.
• Knowles v. Iowa (525 U.S. 113 (1998)): Cited to support the ruling that issuing a traffic citation does not justify a full search of the vehicle or person; the rationales for search incident to arrest (officer safety, evidence preservation) are diminished in a citation context.
• Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 (1968)): Referenced in relation to the "stop and frisk" doctrine, emphasizing its limited scope as a protective search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion.
• People v. Saludes (452 Phil. 719 (2003)): Cited for the principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.
• People v. Milado (462 Phil. 411 (2003)): Cited for the definition and elements required for an arrest (intent to arrest, intent of arrestee to submit).
• Morales v. Enrile (206 Phil. 466 (1983)): Cited regarding the constitutional rights of a person under arrest, including the right to be informed of the reason for arrest and constitutional rights (Miranda warnings).
• People v. Bolasa (378 Phil. 1073 (1999)): Cited for listing the instances of valid warrantless searches.
• People v. Macalaba (443 Phil. 565 (2003)): Cited implicitly regarding the "plain view" doctrine's requirement that the evidence be immediately apparent.
• Caballes v. Court of Appeals (424 Phil. 263 (2002)): Cited for the stringent requirements for proving valid consent to a warrantless search and the factors to consider.
• People v. Sy Chua (444 Phil. 757 (2003)): Cited regarding the limited nature of a "stop and frisk" search.
• People v. Lapitaje (445 Phil. 729 (2003)): Cited for the rule that waiver of an illegal arrest does not waive the inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence.
• Valdez v. People (G.R. No. 170180, 538 SCRA 611 (2007)): Cited for the importance of upholding constitutional rights against unreasonable searches even in the enforcement of laws.
• People v. Martinez (G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010): Cited to affirm that inadmissible evidence (corpus delicti) precludes conviction.

• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 2: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 3(2): The exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of Section 2.
• Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), Section 11: Provision defining and penalizing illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
• Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section 29: Procedure for confiscation of driver's license for traffic violations.
• Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 1: Definition of arrest.
• Rules of Court, Rule 45: Procedure for Petition for Review on Certiorari.
• Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual (PNPM-DO-DS-3-1 dated March 2010), Section 7(m): Procedure for flagging down vehicles, requiring issuance of a TCT/TVR for traffic violations.
• Naga City Ordinance No. 98-012: Local ordinance violated by the petitioner (requiring motorcycle helmets), noted as being punishable by fine only.