Statutes prohibiting marriage solely on the basis of racial classifications violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the freedom to marry is a fundamental right and racial classifications are subject to the most rigid scrutiny and must serve a permissible state objective independent of racial discrimination.

The case arose within the context of Virginia's long-standing statutory scheme aimed at preventing interracial marriages, rooted in historical practices dating back to the colonial period and solidified by the Racial Integrity Act of 1924. At the time of the litigation, Virginia was one of 16 states still enforcing such anti-miscegenation laws, which reflected historical doctrines of white supremacy and racial purity.

• In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, a Black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, both residents of Virginia, were married in the District of Columbia.
• Upon returning to Virginia, they established residence in Caroline County.
• In October 1958, a grand jury indicted them for violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages under Va. Code §§ 20-58 and 20-59.
• On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, suspended for 25 years on the condition they leave Virginia and not return together for that period.
• The trial judge's opinion explicitly stated a belief in racial separation ordained by God.
• After residing in the District of Columbia, the Lovings filed a motion in the state trial court in November 1963 to vacate the judgment, arguing the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
• When the state court delayed, they filed a class action in federal district court in October 1964.
• The state trial court denied the motion to vacate in January 1965.
• The Lovings appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which upheld the constitutionality of the statutes but modified the sentence.
• The Lovings did not dispute their racial classifications under the Virginia statutes (Mrs. Loving as "colored," Mr. Loving as "white").

• The Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they rested solely upon distinctions drawn according to race.
• The statutes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing upon the fundamental liberty and right to marry.
• The statutes were designed to maintain White Supremacy, as evidenced by the statutory scheme focusing only on prohibiting whites from marrying non-whites, and thus lacked a legitimate purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination.

• The Virginia statutes did not constitute invidious racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause because they applied equally, punishing both the white and Black participants in an interracial marriage to the same degree (the "equal application" theory).
• Historical evidence surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested the Framers did not intend to invalidate state anti-miscegenation laws.
• Marriage is traditionally subject to state regulation under the State's police power and the Tenth Amendment, and the Court should defer to the state legislature's judgment regarding the potential wisdom of discouraging interracial marriages.
• The state had a legitimate purpose in preserving the racial integrity of its citizens and preventing the "corruption of blood."

• Does Virginia's statutory scheme prohibiting marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
• Does Virginia's statutory scheme prohibiting marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

• Yes, Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes violate both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Under the Equal Protection Clause, racial classifications are inherently suspect and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny"; the mere "equal application" of a law containing racial classifications does not immunize it from this scrutiny.
• The Court found that Virginia's statutes had no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination; their clear purpose was to maintain White Supremacy, which is not a permissible state objective.
• Under the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry is recognized as a fundamental personal right essential to liberty; denying this freedom based on racial classifications is directly subversive of the principle of equality central to the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives citizens of liberty without due process.
• The Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Pace v. Alabama regarding "equal application" as a defense for statutes discriminating based on race in intimate relationships.
• The convictions of the Lovings were reversed.

• Equal Protection Clause (Fourteenth Amendment): Defined as prohibiting states from denying any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Applied here to invalidate Virginia's statutes because they rested solely on racial classifications designed to maintain White Supremacy, failing the "most rigid scrutiny" test required for such classifications.
• Due Process Clause (Fourteenth Amendment): Defined as prohibiting states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Applied here to find that the Virginia statutes deprived the Lovings of liberty, specifically the fundamental right to marry, based on unsupportable racial classifications.
• Fundamental Right to Marry: Identified as one of the "basic civil rights of man," essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness and fundamental to existence and survival. The Court held that the freedom of choice to marry cannot be restricted by invidious racial discriminations under the Constitution.
• Strict Scrutiny: The standard of judicial review applied to laws involving suspect classifications (like race) or fundamental rights. The Court applied this standard, requiring Virginia to show its anti-miscegenation laws were necessary to accomplish a permissible state objective independent of racial discrimination, a burden Virginia failed to meet.
• Invidious Racial Discrimination: Defined as discrimination based on race that is arbitrary, irrational, and constitutionally prohibited. The Court found Virginia's laws constituted such discrimination, as their sole purpose was racial classification and maintenance of White Supremacy.

• "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents... The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix." (Quoting the state trial judge).
• "The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States."
• "[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations..."
• "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification."
• "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."
• "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."
• "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
• "Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."

• Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S. E. 2d 749 (1955): Cited as the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' previous decision upholding the anti-miscegenation laws based on preserving "racial integrity" and preventing "corruption of blood," doctrines rooted in White Supremacy.
• Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883): Cited by Virginia to support the "equal application" theory. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected Pace's reasoning, stating it represented a limited view of Equal Protection that had not withstood subsequent analysis.
• McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964): Cited multiple times to reject the "equal application" theory from Pace and to affirm that Equal Protection requires examining whether classifications are arbitrary and invidious. Also cited for Justice Stewart's concurrence stating criminality cannot depend on the actor's race.
• Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888): Cited to acknowledge that marriage is a social relation subject to state police power, but also cited alongside Skinner to affirm marriage as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
• Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923): Cited to show that state powers to regulate social relations (like education or marriage) are not unlimited and are subject to Fourteenth Amendment constraints.
• Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942): Cited to establish marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to existence and survival, reinforcing the Due Process claim.
• Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943): Cited for the principle that distinctions based solely on ancestry are "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
• Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944): Cited for establishing that racial classifications, especially in criminal statutes, must be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny."
• Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954): Cited regarding the inconclusive nature of historical debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's intended effect on specific issues like segregation or miscegenation laws.
• Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961): Cited collectively to support the principle that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate state-sponsored racial discrimination.
• Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959): Cited as examples of cases involving non-racial classifications where the Court deferred to legislative wisdom under a rational basis review, distinguishing them from the strict scrutiny required for racial classifications.

• Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Section 1): Cited as the primary basis for the challenge, specifically its Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
• Virginia Code § 20-58 ("Leaving State to evade law"): One of the statutes the Lovings were convicted under, criminalizing leaving the state to marry interracially with intent to return and cohabit.
• Virginia Code § 20-59 ("Punishment for marriage"): The statute defining the felony penalty (1-5 years imprisonment) for interracial marriage (miscegenation).
• Virginia Code § 20-57 ("Marriages void without decree"): Statute automatically voiding marriages between a white person and a "colored person."
• Virginia Code § 20-54 ("Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white persons'"): Statute defining "white person" narrowly and prohibiting their marriage to non-whites (with a specific exception related to minimal American Indian ancestry).
• Virginia Code § 1-14 ("Colored persons and Indians defined"): Statute defining "colored person" based on ascertainable Negro blood.
• Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Mentioned as part of Virginia's argument that marriage regulation is reserved to the states, an argument the Court found unpersuasive against Fourteenth Amendment commands.