The Court's February 15, 2011 Resolution, upholding the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, is affirmed, as the petitioners' procedural arguments regarding finality and jurisdiction, and substantive arguments regarding violations of the Constitution (Art. X, Secs. 6 & 10) and the Equal Protection Clause, are without merit; the prior judgment declaring the laws unconstitutional had not attained finality due to timely filed and entertained motions.

Congress enacted 16 individual Republic Acts ("Cityhood Laws") converting specific municipalities into cities, incorporating exemption clauses that excused them from the P100 million income requirement established by R.A. No. 9009, which had amended the Local Government Code (LGC). These municipalities had cityhood bills pending before R.A. No. 9009's enactment. The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), representing existing cities, challenged these laws as unconstitutional for violating the LGC requirement that cityhood criteria be uniform and stated within the LGC itself, and for violating the equal protection clause. This led to a protracted legal battle involving multiple, conflicting Supreme Court rulings on the laws' validity, culminating in the February 15, 2011 Resolution upholding the laws, which petitioners sought to reconsider in the motion addressed by this present Resolution.

• Congress enacted sixteen specific Republic Acts (the "Cityhood Laws") aimed at converting sixteen municipalities into component cities.
• Each Cityhood Law contained an exemption clause, allowing the concerned municipality to be converted into a city despite not meeting the P100 million average annual income requirement mandated by Republic Act No. 9009, which had amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code (LGC).
• The sixteen respondent municipalities had cityhood conversion bills pending in the 11th Congress, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9009 on June 30, 2001, which significantly increased the income requirement from P20 million (under the original LGC) to P100 million.
• Attempts by the House of Representatives to pass Joint Resolutions explicitly exempting these municipalities from the R.A. 9009 requirement failed to gain Senate approval.
• Subsequently, individual conversion bills for the respondent municipalities, containing the specific exemption clauses, were filed, deliberated upon, and unanimously passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, eventually becoming the Cityhood Laws.
• The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), along with the City of Calbayog and Jerry P. Treñas (as taxpayer), filed petitions challenging the constitutionality of these sixteen laws.
• The Supreme Court issued several conflicting rulings: initially declaring the laws unconstitutional (Nov 18, 2008), denying reconsideration (Mar 31, 2009), denying a second MR on a tie-vote and ordering entry of judgment (Apr 28, 2009), then reversing itself to declare the laws constitutional (Dec 21, 2009), reversing again to declare them unconstitutional (Aug 24, 2010), and finally reversing once more to uphold their constitutionality (Feb 15, 2011).
• This final reversal (Feb 15, 2011) prompted the petitioners to file the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, which is the subject of the present Resolution.

• The Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to promulgate the February 15, 2011 Resolution because its earlier judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional had become final and executory following the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration, thus invoking res judicata and the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
• The Court's February 15, 2011 Resolution contravened the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant Supreme Court issuances concerning prohibited pleadings (second MR) and the finality of judgments.
• The sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they violate Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that criteria for the creation of cities must be established in the Local Government Code itself, not through separate individual statutes containing exemptions.
• The Cityhood Laws violate Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause by granting preferential treatment to the sixteen respondent municipalities, exempting them from the generally applicable P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, thereby discriminating against other municipalities and existing cities that comply or complied with the prevailing criteria.
• The creation of these sixteen cities under lower income requirements violates the right of existing local governments (cities) to a just share in the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment - IRA), as it increases the number of cities sharing the fixed 23% allocation for cities, thereby diluting the share of each existing city.
• The P100 million income requirement is not arbitrary or difficult to comply with, as evidenced by other municipalities that successfully met this criterion and were converted into cities after R.A. 9009.

• The Court retained jurisdiction as the prior judgment had not achieved finality due to timely filed motions (including the motion questioning the effect of the tie-vote denial and the subsequent motion regarding the June 2, 2009 clarification) which the Court entertained, preventing the application of res judicata and immutability.
• The Court acted within its procedural rules, effectively permitting the filing of subsequent motions by acting upon them, thus the second MR was not ultimately treated as a prohibited pleading in this context.
• The Cityhood Laws embody the clear and unmistakable legislative intent of Congress to exempt the respondent municipalities from the R.A. 9009 income requirement, recognizing that their conversion bills were pending prior to its enactment.
• The exemption clauses within the Cityhood Laws function as express amendments to R.A. No. 9009 and, by necessity, the LGC, specifically for these sixteen municipalities, reflecting a valid exercise of legislative power.
• The respondent municipalities constitute a distinct class based on the historical fact of having pending cityhood bills before the LGC amendment, justifying the differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.
• The P100 million income requirement introduced by R.A. 9009 was arguably arbitrary, lacking empirical basis, and its strict application would hinder countryside development, contrary to the LGC's objectives, further justifying the exemptions.
• The impact on the IRA share is a consequence of the LGC's allocation formula (Section 285) and the valid creation of new LGUs, not an unconstitutional infringement of rights.

• Whether the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to promulgate the February 15, 2011 Resolution due to the alleged finality of its November 18, 2008 Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
• Whether the principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments precluded the Court from issuing the February 15, 2011 Resolution upholding the Cityhood Laws.
• Whether the sixteen Cityhood Laws violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution by establishing criteria for cityhood outside the Local Government Code.
• Whether the sixteen Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause and Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution by exempting the respondent municipalities from the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009.
• Whether the sixteen Cityhood Laws violate the constitutional right of local governments to a just share in national taxes.

• The Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with finality.
• The Court possessed jurisdiction to issue the February 15, 2011 Resolution. The November 18, 2008 Decision did not attain finality because timely motions were filed by respondents challenging subsequent resolutions (specifically the denial based on a tie-vote and the June 2, 2009 clarification). The Court's actions in entertaining these motions effectively prevented the judgment from becoming final and executory.
• The doctrines of res judicata and immutability of final judgments are inapplicable because the controversy had not been resolved with finality prior to the February 15, 2011 Resolution, given the continuous proceedings and the Court's handling of the pending incidents.
• The Cityhood Laws do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. The Court found compelling evidence of legislative intent (from deliberations and the express exemption clauses) to exempt these specific municipalities whose bills were pending before R.A. 9009. These exemption clauses were interpreted as effectively amending R.A. 9009 and the LGC for these specific municipalities, thereby satisfying the constitutional requirement through legislative action.
• The Cityhood Laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause or Article X, Section 6. The respondent municipalities form a valid class distinct from others due to having pending cityhood bills before R.A. 9009's enactment. The Court found this classification reasonable and germane to the purpose of ensuring fairness given the timing of the LGC amendment, and also questioned the non-arbitrariness of the P100M requirement itself.
• The Cityhood Laws do not violate the right to a just share in national taxes. Section 285 of the LGC governs the IRA allocation based on fixed percentages and formulas. Any change in the amount received by individual cities due to an increase in the total number of cities is a necessary consequence of the LGC's allocation mechanism, not a constitutional violation caused by the valid creation of new cities through the Cityhood Laws.

• Immutability of Final Judgments: The principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The Court held this doctrine did not apply because the series of timely motions and the Court's actions on them prevented the initial judgment from attaining true finality before being overturned.
• Res Judicata: The rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. The Court found this inapplicable due to the lack of finality of the prior judgment.
• Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Court reaffirmed its power to review its own rulings through timely motions for reconsideration and to interpret its procedural rules, holding that it retained jurisdiction throughout the complex series of motions and reversals.
• Legislative Intent: The primary rule of statutory construction seeking to ascertain and give effect to the purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute. The Court heavily relied on the discerned intent of Congress (from deliberations and explicit text) to exempt the 16 municipalities as the basis for upholding the Cityhood Laws.
• Statutory Construction (Amendment by Exemption): The interpretation that a later specific law containing an express exemption effectively amends a prior general law (the LGC as amended by R.A. 9009) for the entities covered by the exemption. The Court applied this to reconcile the Cityhood Laws with Article X, Section 10.
• Equal Protection Clause: The constitutional guarantee requiring that all persons or things similarly situated be treated alike. The Court found no violation, ruling that the 16 municipalities constituted a distinct, validly classified group based on pending legislation before R.A. 9009, justifying the differential treatment (exemption).
• Constitutional Supremacy (vis-a-vis LGU Creation): Article X, Section 10 requires cityhood criteria to be in the LGC. The Court squared this with the Cityhood Laws by interpreting the exemptions within them as legislative acts that effectively modified the LGC's criteria for these specific cases, thus indirectly complying with the constitutional mandate through Congress's plenary power.
• Just Share in National Taxes (Art. X, Sec. 6): The right of LGUs to an equitable share in national taxes. The Court interpreted this in conjunction with LGC Sec. 285, holding that the "just share" is determined by the LGC's formula, and fluctuations due to the lawful creation of new LGUs do not violate this right.
• Liberal Interpretation of Procedural Rules: Implicitly applied by the Court in its decision to entertain motions beyond the first Motion for Reconsideration, citing the need to resolve the case on its merits and correct perceived errors, especially given the tie-vote situation and subsequent clarifications.

• "However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading."
• "...the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play."
• "The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009."
• "Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses."
• "While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth."
• "We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009."

• Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153 (Oct. 25, 2006): Cited in the procedural history discussion regarding the argument about the effect of an equally divided vote on a motion for reconsideration, referencing C.J. Puno's separate opinion.
• Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 (Dec. 18, 2008); Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. Nos. 183591 et al. (Oct. 14, 2008); Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 (Oct. 15, 2007); David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (May 3, 2006); Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774 (May 27, 2004): Cited collectively in footnote [23] to support the general principle that the Court may disregard technicalities under extraordinary circumstances to render just and equitable relief.
• Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142 (Mar. 31, 1973): Cited in Justice Carpio's Dissenting Opinion, referencing Justice Zaldivar's dissent therein to argue against the notion of "substantial compliance" with constitutional requirements in the context of the Cityhood Laws.

• 1987 Constitution:
  • Article X, Section 6 (Right of LGUs to a just share in national taxes)
  • Article X, Section 10 (Requirement that criteria for LGU creation be established in the Local Government Code)
• Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 - LGC):
  • Section 285 (Manner of Allocation of Internal Revenue Allotment - IRA)
  • Section 286 (Automatic Release of IRA Shares)
  • Section 450 (Requisites for Creation of a City - specifically as amended by R.A. 9009)
  • Section 452 (Requirements for Highly Urbanized Cities)
  • Section 453 (Duty of the President to Declare Highly Urbanized Status)
• Republic Act No. 9009: (Act amending Section 450 of the LGC, increasing the income requirement for cityhood to P100 Million)
• The 16 Cityhood Laws: (Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491) - Cited as the subject matter of the case.
• Rules of Court:
  • Rule 51, Section 10 (Entry of judgments and final resolutions)
  • Rule 52, Section 1 (Period for filing motion for reconsideration)
  • Rule 52, Section 2 (Rule against second motion for reconsideration - discussed and interpreted)
• Other Legislative Acts:
  • House Joint Resolution No. 29 (11th Congress) / Joint Resolution No. 1 (12th Congress) (Failed attempts to exempt municipalities)
  • R.A. No. 9387 (Conversion of Navotas into HUC) - Cited by petitioners/dissent as example.
  • R.A. No. 9388 (Conversion of San Juan into HUC) - Cited by petitioners/dissent as example.
  • R.A. No. 9264 (City of Sta. Rosa); R.A. No. 9723 (City of Dasmariñas); R.A. No. 9740 (City of Biñan) - Mentioned as examples of cities created under the P100M requirement.