A Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the liberty protected by the Constitution includes the right for adults to engage in private, consensual homosexual activity without government intervention; consequently, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, is overruled.

The case arose within the legal and social context of state laws criminalizing sodomy, often referred to as "crimes against nature" or "deviate sexual intercourse." Seventeen years prior, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court had upheld a Georgia sodomy law applied to homosexual conduct, finding no fundamental right to engage in such activity. Since Bowers, legal and social perspectives continued to evolve, with many states repealing their sodomy laws or ceasing enforcement against private, consensual adult conduct, and subsequent Court decisions like Romer v. Evans casting doubt on laws motivated by animus towards homosexuals.

• Officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in Houston, Texas, responding to a reported weapons disturbance.
• Upon entering the apartment of petitioner John Geddes Lawrence, the officers observed Lawrence and another adult man, petitioner Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act (described in the complaint as deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex).
• Lawrence and Garner were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged with violating Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a), which criminalized engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.
• Petitioners challenged the statute's constitutionality but were convicted upon entering pleas of nolo contendere and fined.
• The conduct occurred entirely within the privacy of Lawrence's home between two consenting adults.

• Petitioners argued their convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection because it criminalized sexual intimacy for same-sex couples but not identical behavior for different-sex couples.
• Petitioners contended their convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violated their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Petitioners asserted that the Court's prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld a similar Georgia sodomy law, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

• Respondent (Texas) argued the statute was constitutional, relying on Bowers v. Hardwick as controlling precedent establishing that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
• Texas contended the law furthered a legitimate state interest in promoting morality and preserving traditional moral values.
• Texas likely argued (as inferred from the dissent and O'Connor's concurrence) that the law did not violate Equal Protection because it targeted specific conduct (deviate sexual intercourse between same-sex individuals) rather than discriminating against homosexuals as a class, and that promoting morality provided a rational basis for the distinction.

• Whether petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
• Whether petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Whether Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), should be overruled.

• The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• The Court reasoned that the liberty protected by the Constitution encompasses personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, education, and also extends to private, consensual sexual activity between adults.
• The Court found that the petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their private conduct without government intervention, as the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest that could justify its intrusion into their personal and private lives.
• The Court explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, finding its historical premises regarding sodomy laws flawed, its framing of the issue too narrow, and its holding inconsistent with the Court's broader understanding of liberty and subsequent decisions like Casey and Romer.
• While acknowledging the petitioners' Equal Protection arguments (and Justice O'Connor's concurrence based on Equal Protection), the majority based its holding primarily on the Due Process Clause to address the substantive validity of the law and the precedent of Bowers directly.

• Substantive Due Process: This doctrine holds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights and liberties from government interference, regardless of the procedures used. The Court invoked it to establish that the liberty interest protected includes the right of adults to make choices about their private, consensual intimate conduct and relationships in their own homes, finding the Texas law infringed this liberty without a legitimate state justification.
• Right to Liberty/Privacy: Building on precedents like Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey, the Court affirmed that "liberty" under the Due Process Clause extends beyond spatial bounds and protects personal autonomy, including intimate choices central to personal dignity and identity. It applied this concept to conclude that criminalizing private consensual homosexual conduct demeans the lives of homosexual persons and infringes upon their protected liberty.
• Stare Decisis: This principle requires courts to follow precedent. The Court acknowledged its importance but stated it is not an "inexorable command." It justified overruling Bowers by citing its erosion by subsequent cases (Casey, Romer), flaws in its reasoning and historical analysis, lack of significant societal reliance on its holding, and contradiction with evolving legal and international understanding of liberty rights.
• Rational Basis Review (Applied/Modified): While not explicitly invoking strict scrutiny (as Bowers was not overruled on the ground that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right in the traditional sense), the Court's analysis concluded the Texas statute failed even a basic rationality test under the Due Process Clause. It held that the law advanced no legitimate state interest sufficient to justify intrusion into the personal and private lives of individuals, effectively rejecting moral disapproval alone as a legitimate state interest in this context.
• Equal Protection Clause (Discussed/O'Connor's Concurrence): This clause prohibits states from denying any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Justice O'Connor, concurring, found the Texas law violated Equal Protection under rational basis review because it targeted homosexuals as a class based on moral disapproval, which is not a legitimate state interest. The majority acknowledged this argument but chose to base its decision on Due Process to address the core issue of criminalizing the conduct itself and to overrule Bowers.

• "The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."
• "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice."
• "'These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.'" (quoting Casey)
• "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."
• "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."
• "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." (quoting Casey)
• "As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."

• Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): Overruled by this decision; previously upheld a Georgia sodomy law against a Due Process challenge, finding no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
• Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992): Cited for reaffirming the substantive component of liberty under the Due Process Clause, its definition of liberty related to personal autonomy and intimate choices, and its analysis of stare decisis factors relevant to overruling precedent.
• Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996): Cited as a key post-Bowers case that cast doubt on Bowers by striking down, under the Equal Protection Clause, class-based legislation directed at homosexuals motivated by animus.
• Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Cited as a starting point for modern substantive due process/privacy analysis regarding intimate conduct, invalidating a law banning contraceptive use by married couples.
• Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972): Cited for extending the right to make decisions regarding contraception (and implicitly, privacy in sexual matters) to unmarried individuals, stating "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion..."
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): Cited as part of the line of cases establishing substantive due process protection for fundamental personal decisions affecting destiny (in Roe's case, abortion).
• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) & Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923): Mentioned as earlier cases containing broad statements about the reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause (related to education and upbringing).
• County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): Cited for the proposition that history and tradition are starting points, but not ending points, for substantive due process analysis, and recognizing an "emerging awareness" of liberty protections.
• Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981): Cited as an example where the European Court of Human Rights found laws prohibiting private consensual homosexual conduct invalid under the European Convention, contradicting the premise in Bowers that such claims were insubstantial in Western civilization.
• Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991): Cited for the principle that stare decisis is not an "inexorable command."

• U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV (Fourteenth Amendment): Specifically the Due Process Clause (basis for the primary holding) and the Equal Protection Clause (basis for petitioners' alternative argument and O'Connor's concurrence).
• Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003): The specific Texas "Homosexual Conduct" statute declared unconstitutional.
• Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(1) (2003): Definition of "Deviate Sexual Intercourse" under Texas law.
• Texas Constitution, Art. 1, § 3a: State equal protection provision initially invoked by petitioners.
• Model Penal Code § 213.2 (ALI): Referenced as influential in the movement to decriminalize private consensual sexual conduct, noting its recommendation against such criminal penalties in 1955.
• European Convention on Human Rights: Mentioned in relation to the Dudgeon case, showing international legal trends differing from Bowers.