A Filipino citizen's absolute and permanent allegiance to the legitimate government of the Philippines is not suspended or abrogated by enemy occupation, and consequently, such a citizen can be prosecuted for treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code for acts of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the enemy committed during said occupation.

The case arose in the aftermath of World War II, specifically following the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. During this period, some Filipino citizens were alleged to have collaborated with the Japanese forces. Anastacio Laurel was one such individual accused of treason for acts committed during the occupation.

• Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino citizen, was prosecuted for the crime of treason, defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
• The alleged treasonous acts consisted of adhering to the enemy (Japanese forces) and giving them aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
• Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his prosecution.

• The sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was suspended during the Japanese occupation.
• Consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens to the legitimate government was also suspended during the occupation.
• A Filipino citizen could not commit treason against the Philippine government during the Japanese occupation because of the suspended allegiance.
• There was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic, which affected the applicability of treason laws for acts committed during the Commonwealth period under Japanese occupation.

• A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to their government or sovereign, which is not abrogated or severed by enemy occupation.
• The sovereignty of the legitimate government (de jure) is not transferred to the occupier and remains vested in the legitimate government.
• What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, but not sovereignty itself or the allegiance owed by citizens.
• Treason, as defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, could be committed against the national security of the legitimate government even during enemy occupation.
• The change in the form of government from Commonwealth to Republic did not affect the prosecution of treason committed against the same sovereign people.

• Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto were suspended during the Japanese occupation.
• Whether a Filipino citizen could be prosecuted for the crime of treason for acts committed during the Japanese occupation.
• Whether the proclamation of the Philippine Republic effected a change of sovereignty that would absolve the petitioner from prosecution for treason committed during the Commonwealth era.

• The Supreme Court denied the petition for habeas corpus.
• The Court ruled that a citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to their government, which is not abrogated by enemy occupation; this is distinct from the temporary allegiance a foreigner owes.
• Sovereignty of the de jure government is not transferred to the occupier and remains vested in the legitimate government; it cannot be suspended, though its exercise might be.
• Consequently, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance; citizens remain bound by their allegiance to their legitimate government even during enemy occupation.
• Political laws prescribing reciprocal rights and duties between the government and citizens are suspended during occupation as they relate to the ousted government and are inapplicable to the occupant, but Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, concerning treason against the national security of the legitimate government, remains applicable because inhabitants are still bound by their allegiance.
• The occupant has no power to repeal or suspend the law of treason essential for preserving the allegiance owed by inhabitants to their legitimate government.
• The change from Commonwealth to Republic did not affect the prosecution for treason, as it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people.

• Absolute and Permanent Allegiance — This is the unqualified and enduring obligation of fidelity and obedience a citizen owes to their government or sovereign. The Court applied this by stating that such allegiance is not abrogated or severed by enemy occupation, and it persists even when the legitimate government is ousted from control, distinguishing it from the temporary allegiance owed by a foreigner.
• Sovereignty — This refers to the supreme power which governs a body politic or society. The Court held that sovereignty of the legitimate government is not transferred to the occupier during enemy occupation and cannot be suspended, although the exercise of sovereign rights may be. It remains vested in the legitimate government.
• Suspended Allegiance (Rejected Doctrine) — This is the theory, argued by the petitioner, that allegiance to the legitimate government is suspended during enemy occupation. The Court explicitly rejected this, stating there is "no such thing as suspended allegiance," as it would be inconsistent with the nature of absolute and permanent allegiance and the non-transferability of sovereignty.
• Suspension of Political Laws during Enemy Occupation — Political laws, which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation because they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government and are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant. However, the Court clarified that Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code (treason) remained applicable because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the legitimate government.
• Change of Sovereignty (as affecting prosecution for treason) — The Court ruled that the transition from the Philippine Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines did not constitute a change of sovereignty that would affect the prosecution of treason committed during the Commonwealth period. The offense was against the same government and the same sovereign people.

• "Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign..."
• "Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier..."
• "...the sovereignty vested in the titular government... cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty..."
• "...as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;"

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) — Cited to support the principle that sovereignty of the de jure government is not transferred to the occupier and that political laws are suspended during military occupation.
• Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285) — Referenced for the same principles as Co Kim Cham regarding the non-transfer of sovereignty and the suspension of certain political laws, and that crimes against national security like treason, which bear relation to the legitimate government, are not suspended as against the legitimate government.
• Carlisle vs. United States (21 Law. ed., 429) — Cited for the definition and nature of absolute and permanent allegiance owed by a citizen, contrasted with the temporary allegiance of a foreigner.
• United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246, 253) — Discussed in relation to the suspension of the "exercise of the rights of sovereignty" versus the suspension of sovereignty itself, with the Court noting that if Rice implied suspension of sovereignty itself, it's obsolete post-Hague Regulations of 1907.
• Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202) — Cited for the principle that the question of sovereignty is a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments conclusively binds the judiciary.

• Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code — This article defines and penalizes the crime of treason. Its applicability to acts committed during the Japanese occupation against the legitimate Philippine government was the central issue affirmed by the Court.
• Hague Regulations (Articles 23, 44, 45, and 52) — Referenced as recognizing, by necessary implication, the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in an occupied territory. Article 43 was cited regarding the transfer of authority to govern to the occupant.
• Constitution of the Philippines, Article II, Section 1 — ("Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.") Cited to establish that the Commonwealth was a sovereign government, albeit with limitations, and that sovereignty ultimately resides in the Filipino people.
• Constitution of the Philippines, Article XVI, Section 2 — (Continuance of existing laws unless inconsistent with the Constitution). Cited to show that laws like Article 114 of the RPC continued in force under the Commonwealth Constitution.
• Constitution of the Philippines, Article XVIII — (The Commonwealth and the Republic). Cited to demonstrate that the change from Commonwealth to Republic was a change in name for the same government representing the same sovereign people, thus not affecting treason prosecutions.
• Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, Section I (1) — ("All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States" pending withdrawal of U.S. sovereignty). Cited to show that while there was this allegiance to the U.S., it did not negate the sovereignty of the Filipino people or the possibility of committing treason against the Philippine Commonwealth.

• Perfecto, J. — Argued that treason is a war crime and cannot be committed in peacetime. He emphasized that allegiance to the government was not suspended during enemy occupation, drawing an analogy to a wife's loyalty to her husband. He asserted that sovereignty resides in the people and could not have been suspended. He also rejected the idea that the change to the Republic altered the nature of the offense or the offended party (the Filipino people). He further stated that Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People's Court Act) implicitly affirmed that treason laws were in effect during the occupation.
• Hilado, J. — Concurred with the result but offered different reasons. He argued that Japan, having violated the Briand-Kellogg Pact by waging an aggressive war, could not acquire legitimate power or rights through such illegal occupation. Therefore, rules of international law applicable to justifiable war and occupation did not apply. He maintained that allegiance to the de jure sovereign continues and the occupant is forbidden by international law (Hague Regulations) to compel inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. He also stated that the change to the Republic did not alter the fact that sovereignty resides in the Filipino people, who were the same before and after independence.

• Paras, J. — Argued that all political laws of the Philippines, including treason laws, were suspended during the Japanese occupation, consistent with generally accepted principles of international law and U.S. practice. He cited previous Court statements on the suspension of political laws and proclamations by the Japanese military administration. He contended that inhabitants of an occupied territory owe temporary allegiance to the occupant and are bound by its laws. He heavily relied on United States vs. Rice to argue that U.S. laws were not obligatory in Castine during British occupation, implying Philippine treason laws were similarly inoperative. He also argued that the change of sovereignty to the Republic of the Philippines meant it could not prosecute for treason committed against the former sovereignty of the United States or the Commonwealth government.