The Court held that a petition challenging the constitutionality of laws must satisfy the stringent requirements for judicial review, including the existence of an actual case or controversy and legal standing, neither of which petitioner Falcis possessed, thus warranting the dismissal of the petition without ruling on the substantive issue of the constitutionality of the Family Code's definition of marriage.

The case arose from petitioner Falcis's challenge to the Family Code's provisions (Articles 1 and 2) defining marriage as a union exclusively between a man and a woman, which effectively prohibits same-sex marriage in the Philippines. Falcis, identifying as a homosexual man, sought judicial intervention to invalidate these provisions and related articles on grounds of alleged violations of fundamental constitutional rights, despite not having personally applied for and been denied a marriage license.

• Petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis), identifying himself as an open and self-identified homosexual, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 directly with the Supreme Court.
• The petition sought to declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code unconstitutional for defining marriage as solely between a man and a woman, and consequently nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) regarding homosexuality/lesbianism as grounds for annulment/legal separation.
• Falcis admitted during oral arguments that he did not have a partner he wished to marry and had never applied for, nor been denied, a marriage license by the respondent Civil Registrar General or any local civil registrar.
• LGBTS Christian Church, Inc., Reverend Cresencio Agbayani, Jr., Marlon Felipe, and Maria Arlyn Ibañez (petitioners-intervenors) filed a Petition-in-Intervention, adopting Falcis's arguments and reliefs.
• Petitioners-intervenors Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibañez alleged they were denied a marriage license on August 3, 2015, but sought the same relief as Falcis (declaration of unconstitutionality) rather than a writ of mandamus for license issuance.
• Fernando P. Perito filed an Answer-in-Intervention opposing the petition on procedural and religious grounds.
• Attys. Reyes, Gatdula, Montes, and Policarpio III (intervenors-oppositors) also intervened, opposing the petition based on lack of justiciability, religious freedom, and separation of powers.
• Falcis was found guilty of direct contempt for improper attire and lack of preparation during the preliminary conference.
• Falcis, his co-counsels, and intervenor-oppositor Perito failed to file their required memoranda on time after the oral arguments, leading to a show-cause order for indirect contempt.

• Falcis argued that a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was the proper remedy, citing grave abuse of discretion in the enactment of the Family Code's Articles 1 and 2.
• He claimed the requisites for judicial review were met: an actual case existed due to the law's "normative impact" on him as a homosexual; he had legal standing based on his identity and alleged injury to his plans to settle down; the issue was raised at the earliest opportunity; and constitutionality was the lis mota.
• He asserted direct recourse to the Supreme Court was justified by the transcendental importance of the issues and the lack of need for factual determination.
• Falcis contended that Articles 1 and 2 violate fundamental rights: the right to due process and equal protection, the right to decisional and marital privacy, and the right to found a family according to religious convictions.
• He argued that strict scrutiny should be the test applied, asserting that the protection of marriage (Article XV, Section 2, Constitution) is the compelling state interest, not solely heterosexual relationships, and procreation is not an essential marital obligation.
• Alternatively, he argued the provisions fail even the rational basis test as there is no substantial distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples regarding marriage capacity.
• He claimed the Family Code denies civil recognition to religious weddings of denominations believing in same-sex marriage, violating religious freedom and equal protection compared to Catholics and Muslims.
• Petitioners-in-Intervention adopted Falcis's arguments, adding they had an actual case due to being denied a marriage license and legal standing (including third-party standing for LGBTS Church).
• Petitioners-in-Intervention also used Christian theology arguments to support same-sex marriage and claimed the lack of civil recognition for their ceremonies violated equal protection.

• The Civil Registrar General (CRG), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued the Petition should be dismissed for lack of actual case or controversy and lack of legal standing, stating Falcis sought an advisory opinion and failed to show direct injury.
• The OSG contended Falcis availed of the wrong remedy (Rule 65) and failed to implead Congress, the body responsible for the legislative policy being challenged.
• The OSG argued the issues were political questions regarding the policy definition of marriage, best left to Congress.
• The OSG maintained that the Constitution itself contemplates opposite-sex marriage (citing Art. XV, Sec. 2, etc.) and thus the Family Code provisions are constitutional.
• Intervenor Perito argued the Petition had procedural defects (non-compliance with Rule 65 requirements) and Falcis failed to show specific injury or discrimination.
• Perito claimed Falcis was estopped from questioning the Family Code (effective since 1987) and cited the Christian Bible against same-sex marriage.
• Intervenors-Oppositors argued the Court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of requisites for justiciability and asserted their own standing based on religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage.
• Intervenors-Oppositors contended that granting the petition would constitute judicial legislation, violating separation of powers, and that the Family Code's definition is a valid exercise of legislative power.
• They argued there was no violation of equal protection (substantial differences exist) or liberty, and that children's welfare constitutes a compelling state interest justifying the limitation.

• Whether the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or controversy reviewable by the Court? (Procedural)
• Whether petitioner Falcis has legal standing to challenge the Family Code based on his self-identification as a member of the LGBTQI+ community? (Procedural)
• Whether the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the original Petition? (Procedural)
• Whether the doctrine of transcendental importance warrants overlooking the procedural defects? (Procedural)
• Whether a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy? (Procedural)
• Whether the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? (Procedural)
• (Substantive issues, not reached by the Court) Whether Articles 1 and 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code are unconstitutional for violating the rights to life and liberty, due process, equal protection, and religious freedom by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples?

• The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the Petition and the Petition-in-Intervention for lack of merit based on procedural grounds.
• The Court found no actual case or controversy existed because Falcis never applied for a marriage license and was never denied one; his alleged injury based on the law's "normative impact" or his future plans was speculative and insufficient. The mere existence of a law does not automatically create a justiciable controversy.
• The Court ruled Falcis lacked legal standing (locus standi) as he failed to demonstrate a direct and personal injury resulting from the enforcement of the challenged articles. His claimed inability to find a partner or impaired relationships was not a legally recognized injury directly caused by the Family Code.
• The Court held that a facial challenge was improper as the case did not primarily involve freedom of speech; facial challenges are generally disfavored and used sparingly.
• The Court determined that Falcis violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by bringing the case directly to the Supreme Court despite the presence of factual issues (e.g., capacity of same-sex couples to raise children, existence of discrimination, tenets of petitioners-intervenors' religion) that required reception of evidence, a task for which trial courts are better equipped.
• The Court found that the proper remedy for Falcis's challenge, given the lack of breach or violation affecting him, would have been a petition for declaratory relief filed with the Regional Trial Court, not a Rule 65 petition with the Supreme Court.
• The Court ruled that the Petition-in-Intervention, filed by the same counsel (Falcis), could not cure the fatal defects of the original petition, particularly the lack of an actual case, and appeared to be a "sly, tardy stratagem."
• The invocation of transcendental importance could not override the fundamental requirements of justiciability (actual case, standing) or excuse the violation of the hierarchy of courts, especially when factual issues are involved.
• The Court declined to rule on the substantive constitutionality of same-sex marriage due to the petition's profound procedural deficiencies, emphasizing the need for a proper case with a concrete factual backdrop.
• Falcis, his co-counsels (Angeles, Guangko, Maranan), and intervenor-oppositor Perito were found guilty of indirect contempt for failing to comply with the Court's order to file memoranda, and were fined or reprimanded/admonished.

• Judicial Review: The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. The Court reiterated the requisites: (1) actual case or controversy, (2) legal standing, (3) raised at the earliest opportunity, and (4) constitutionality as the lis mota. The Court dismissed the case for failure to meet requisites (1) and (2).
• Actual Case or Controversy: A conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. It requires existing facts, not speculation or contingency, and ripeness (direct adverse effect on the petitioner). The Court found none, as Falcis had no partner, never applied for a license, and suffered no direct injury from the Family Code's existence.
• Legal Standing (Locus Standi): A personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act challenged. The Court ruled Falcis lacked standing due to the absence of direct injury; his generalized grievances or speculative future harms were insufficient. Third-party standing invoked by intervenors was also found lacking proper basis.
• Facial Challenge: Allows a litigant to challenge a law's validity based on its potential impact on others not before the court, typically restricted to cases involving freedom of expression to prevent a "chilling effect." The Court held this doctrine inapplicable as the primary rights allegedly violated were not free speech, and facial challenges are generally disfavored, especially outside the free speech context.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Requires that recourse must first be made to lower-ranked courts before seeking relief from higher courts. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only for pure questions of law or under exceptional circumstances. The Court found this doctrine violated because the petition raised underlying factual questions necessitating trial, making direct SC recourse improper.
• Transcendental Importance: An exception sometimes invoked to relax the rule on standing, but the Court clarified (citing Gios-Samar) that it does not excuse non-compliance with the hierarchy of courts when factual issues exist, nor does it cure the lack of an actual case or controversy.
• Separation of Powers: The principle that divides governmental powers among co-equal branches. The Court invoked this to emphasize judicial restraint, noting that defining marriage is primarily a legislative policy matter and the judiciary should avoid "judicial legislation" or ruling on policy wisdom, especially absent a clear constitutional breach demonstrated in a proper case.
• Constitutional Avoidance: The principle that courts should avoid ruling on constitutional issues unless strictly necessary for case disposition. The Court applied this by dismissing the case on procedural grounds without tackling the substantive constitutionality of the Family Code provisions.
• Contempt of Court: Disobedience to or disrespect towards a court or interference with the orderly administration of justice. Falcis was found guilty of direct contempt (improper decorum) and later, along with his counsels and Perito, indirect contempt (failure to comply with court order to file memoranda).

• "Judicial wisdom is, in large part, the art of discerning when courts choose not to exercise their perceived competencies. In this case, this Court unanimously chooses the path of caution."
• "Given the factual context of this case, this Court declines, for now, to grant the broad relief prayed for in the Petition."
• "This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to answer all of life's questions. No question, no matter how interesting or compelling, can be answered by this Court if it cannot be shown that there is an 'actual and an antagonistic assertion of rights by one party against the other in a controversy wherein judicial intervention is unavoidable.'"
• "Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory opinions."
• "Facts are the basis of an actual case or controversy. To reiterate, 'there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.'"
• "The history of erasure, discrimination, and marginalization of the LGBTQI+ community impels this Court to make careful pronouncements—lest it cheapen the resistance, or worse, thrust the whole struggle for equality back to the long shadow of oppression and exclusion."
• "Petitioner's supposed 'personal stake in the outcome of this case' is not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing."
• "Transcendental importance is not a life buoy designed to save unprepared petitioners from their own mistakes and missteps. Its mere invocation is not license to do away with this Court's own rules of procedure."
• "Public interest lawyering demands more than the cursory invocation of legal doctrines, as though they were magical incantations swiftly disengaging obstacles at their mere utterance. Public interest advocacy is not about fabricating prestige."
• "Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is not the case that presents the clearest actual factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires."

• *Magallona v. Executive Secretary (2011) / Araullo v. Executive Secretary (2014): Cited by petitioner to justify Rule 65 remedy; Court implicitly distinguished or found reliance misplaced due to lack of actual case/standing here.
• *Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections (2010): Cited extensively by petitioner (quoting Justice Puno's separate opinion) and the Court. Referenced for acknowledging historical discrimination against LGBTQI+ community, but Court noted it withheld ruling on homosexuals as a suspect class due to insufficient evidence, a point relevant to Falcis's unsubstantiated claims.
• *Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals (1997): Cited by petitioner to argue procreation is not essential to marriage; Court did not engage substantively.
• *Belgica v. Ochoa (2013) / Araullo v. Aquino III (2015): Cited regarding the existence of an actual case or controversy where challenged laws/funds were operational, contrasting with the lack of immediate threat or operation against Falcis.
• *Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa (2014): Cited regarding the application of facial challenges beyond free speech to other fundamental rights in Philippine jurisdiction, but Court found facial challenge improper here.
• *Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (2010): Cited to emphasize that possibility of abuse or obscure allegations are insufficient; an actual act or sufficient facts are needed for judicial review.
• *David v. Arroyo (2006) / Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice (2014): Cited regarding the nature and limitations of facial challenges, emphasizing they are "strong medicine" generally disfavored and primarily applicable to free speech issues due to the "chilling effect."
• *Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (2008) / Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government (2016): Cited regarding ripeness and the limits of judicial review, contrasting the MOA-AD case (imminent signing, constitutional overhaul) with the present case's lack of immediacy and the need for legislative action in other cited cases.
• *Angara v. Electoral Commission (1936): Foundational case cited for defining judicial review, its limits (actual cases, lis mota), and the presumption of constitutionality.
• *Estrada v. Desierto (2001) / Tañada v. Cuenco (1957): Cited regarding the political question doctrine and the expanded scope of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 1).
• *Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre (2000): Cited by petitioner regarding ripeness upon mere enactment of a law; Court found it inapplicable here due to lack of direct injury/standing and the nature of the remedy sought.
• *Lozano v. Nograles (2009): Cited regarding ripeness requiring actual injury and the caution against abusing liberal standing rules ("cerebral deficit" quote).
• *Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (2015): Cited regarding the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the exception for transcendental importance.
• *Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications (2019): Heavily relied upon by the Court to clarify that transcendental importance does not excuse violation of the hierarchy of courts when factual questions are involved.
• *White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (2009): Cited regarding requisites for third-party standing; Court found petitioners-intervenors failed to meet these.
• *De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda... (2017): Cited to rule that a petition-in-intervention cannot create an actual case or controversy if the main petition lacks one.
• *Obergefell v. Hodges (US 2015): Mentioned in the separate concurring opinion of Justice Jardeleza as context for US approach to same-sex marriage, highlighting the factual record developed in lower courts, contrasting with Falcis's petition.

• 1987 Constitution: Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (Judicial Power, incl. grave abuse clause); Art. XV, Sec. 1 (State recognition of family); Art. XV, Sec. 2 (Marriage as inviolable social institution); Art. II, Sec. 12 (Sanctity of family life); Art. III, Sec. 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection); Art. III, Sec. 5 (Religious Freedom); Art. VII, Sec. 18 (Review of martial law proclamation - mentioned re: political question).
• Family Code (E.O. No. 209): Art. 1 (Definition of marriage: man and woman); Art. 2 (Essential requisites of marriage); Art. 46(4) (Homosexuality/Lesbianism as fraud for annulment); Art. 55(6) (Homosexuality/Lesbianism as ground for legal separation); Numerous other articles detailing rights and obligations within marriage (Arts. 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 84, 91, 96, 98, 103, 106, 111, 116, 124, 145, 146, 152, 154, 155, 158, 164, 194, 198, 211, 220, 225, 226).
• Civil Code: Art. 8 (Judicial decisions form part of legal system); Arts. 305, 308 (Funeral arrangements); Arts. 370, 371, 373 (Use of surnames); Art. 886, 887, 897, 900, 995, 999 (Succession); Art. 362 (Admonition of delinquent children).
• Revised Penal Code: Art. 11(2) (Defense of spouse); Art. 13(5) (Mitigating - vindication of spouse); Art. 15 (Alternative circumstance - relationship); Art. 20 (Exempt accessories); Art. 246 (Parricide); Art. 247 (Exceptional circumstances); Art. 266-B (Rape penalties); Art. 266-C (Effect of pardon in rape); Art. 332 (Exemption - theft, etc. between spouses); Art. 333 (Adultery); Art. 334 (Concubinage); Art. 344 (Prosecution of private crimes); Art. 349 (Bigamy).
• Rules of Court: Rule 65, Secs. 1 & 2 (Certiorari and Prohibition); Rule 63, Sec. 1 (Declaratory Relief); Rule 19, Sec. 1 (Intervention); Rule 3, Sec. 4 (Spouses as parties); Rule 71 (Contempt); Rule 110, Sec. 5 (Prosecution of criminal actions); Rule 130, Sec. 22 (Marital disqualification); Rule 130, Sec. 24 (Marital privileged communication); Rule 131, Sec. 3 (Disputable presumptions - marriage, co-ownership).
• Republic Act No. 11313: Safe Spaces Act (addresses transphobic/homophobic slurs).
• Republic Act No. 11166: Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act (non-discrimination policy).
• Republic Act No. 7170: Organ Donation Act.
• Republic Act No. 8552: Domestic Adoption Act.
• Republic Act No. 8043: Inter-Country Adoption Act.
• Republic Act No. 10963: TRAIN Law (amends National Internal Revenue Code - taxation of spouses).
• Republic Act No. 8282 / 1161: Social Security Act (benefits, dependents).
• Republic Act No. 8291 / P.D. 1146: GSIS Act (benefits, dependents).
• Republic Act No. 10801: OWWA Act (dependents).
• Republic Act No. 7192: Women in Development and Nation Building Act.
• Republic Act No. 8369: Family Courts Act.
• Republic Act No. 7875: National Health Insurance Act (dependents).
• Republic Act No. 10607: Amended Insurance Code (insurable interest).
• Republic Act No. 10084: Retirement benefits for constitutional commission members.
• Republic Act No. 910 / 9946: Retirement benefits for Judiciary members.
• Republic Act No. 6963: Benefits for police/military killed in duty.
• Republic Act No. 9049: Medal of Valor benefits.
• Republic Act No. 10699: National Athletes and Coaches Benefits Act.
• Republic Act No. 6713: Code of Conduct for Public Officials (SALN).
• Republic Act No. 7438: Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained... (visitation rights).
• Republic Act No. 9505: Personal Equity and Retirement Account (PERA) Act.
• Republic Act No. 8239: Philippine Passport Act.
• Republic Act No. 11035: Balik Scientist Act.
• Republic Act No. 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Republic Act No. 9165: Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (contempt).
• Republic Act No. 8187: Paternity Leave Act.
• Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 17 (Fidelity to client); Canon 18 (Competence and diligence); Rule 18.02 (Adequate preparation).