Material cannot be proscribed as obscene unless it is "utterly without redeeming social importance," and the "contemporary community standards" by which obscenity is judged are those of the nation as a whole, not a particular local community; furthermore, the Supreme Court has an obligation to make an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the material is constitutionally protected.

The case arose from the criminal prosecution of a movie theater manager in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, for exhibiting a film deemed obscene under state law. This occurred during a period of significant legal debate and development regarding the definition of obscenity and the extent of First Amendment protection for expressive materials, particularly those dealing with sex.

• Nico Jacobellis was the manager of a motion picture theater in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.
• He was convicted on two counts: one for possessing and one for exhibiting an allegedly obscene French film titled "Les Amants" ("The Lovers").
• The conviction was under Ohio Revised Code (1963 Supp.), § 2905.34, an obscenity statute.
• Jacobellis was fined $500 on the first count and $2,000 on the second, with a workhouse sentence if fines were unpaid.
• The film "Les Amants" depicts a woman bored with her marriage who becomes involved with a young archaeologist.
• The State's objections to the film centered almost entirely on an explicit love scene in the last reel.
• The film had received favorable reviews in some national publications and was considered among the best films of its year by at least two national critics.
• It had been shown in approximately 100 larger U.S. cities, including Columbus and Toledo, Ohio.

• The motion picture "Les Amants" is not obscene and is therefore protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of freedom of expression.
• The state courts improperly found the film obscene, thereby depriving Jacobellis of his constitutional rights.
• The determination of obscenity should not be left to the unbridled discretion of local communities or juries without independent constitutional review.
• A national standard, rather than varying local standards, should apply in determining whether material is obscene under the Constitution.

• The motion picture "Les Amants" is obscene under Ohio law and the standards established in Roth v. United States.
• The state courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court, correctly determined the film to be obscene based on contemporary community standards.
• The state has a legitimate interest in proscribing obscene materials to protect public decency.
• The conviction did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments because obscenity is not protected speech.

• Whether the motion picture "Les Amants" is obscene and therefore not entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
• Whether the Supreme Court must make an independent constitutional judgment on the obscenity of material, or defer to lower court findings.
• Whether "contemporary community standards" for judging obscenity refer to local community standards or a national standard.
• Whether a work can be proscribed as obscene if it is not "utterly without redeeming social importance."

• The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio was reversed.
• (Plurality opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.): The film "Les Amants" is not obscene and is constitutionally protected.
• The Court must make an independent constitutional judgment as to whether material is obscene, as this implicates constitutional law.
• The Roth test for obscenity ("whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest") is reaffirmed.
• Obscenity is excluded from constitutional protection only because it is "utterly without redeeming social importance." Material with literary, scientific, artistic, or other social importance is protected.
• The constitutional status of material does not turn on a "weighing" of social importance against prurient appeal; it must be "utterly" without social importance to be proscribed.
• Material must go "substantially beyond customary limits of candor" to be obscene.
• "Contemporary community standards" are those of the Nation as a whole, not of a particular local community, to ensure uniform application of First Amendment protections.
• While states have an interest in protecting children, this does not justify total suppression of material for adults. Since this conviction was for exhibition to the public at large, it must be reviewed under the strict standard for constitutional protection.
• The film "Les Amants," when viewed, does not meet the standard for obscenity.

• Freedom of Expression (First Amendment, applied via Fourteenth Amendment) — This doctrine protects speech and press from government abridgment. The Court reiterated that motion pictures are within this guarantee, but obscenity is not. The core of the case was determining if the film fell into the unprotected category of obscenity.
• Obscenity (Roth Test) — Defined as material where "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court applied this test, emphasizing that material must also be "utterly without redeeming social importance" and go "substantially beyond customary limits of candor."
• Independent Constitutional Judgment — The principle that appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, must independently review the facts in cases involving fundamental constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression, rather than deferring to lower court findings on "constitutional facts." The Court affirmed its duty to make such an independent judgment on whether the film was obscene.
• Contemporary Community Standards — A component of the Roth test for obscenity. The plurality opinion clarified that these standards are national, not local, to prevent varying levels of constitutional protection across different communities and to avoid restricting national access to materials based on the standards of the most restrictive locality.
• Utterly Without Redeeming Social Importance — A crucial element for classifying material as obscene, as established in Roth. The Court emphasized that if material has any literary, artistic, scientific, or other form of social importance, it cannot be deemed obscene, and this is not a "weighing" test against prurient appeal.
• Hard-Core Pornography (Stewart, J., concurring) — While not a formal doctrine adopted by the plurality, Justice Stewart's concurrence stated his view that criminal obscenity laws are constitutionally limited to "hard-core pornography." He used this as his personal standard for judging the film.

• "The test for obscenity is 'whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'" (Brennan, J., quoting Roth)
• "A work cannot be proscribed unless it is 'utterly without redeeming social importance,' and hence material that deals with sex in a manner that advocates ideas, or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be held obscene and denied constitutional protection." (Brennan, J.)
• "The 'contemporary community standards' by which the issue of obscenity is to be determined are not those of the particular local community from which the case arises, but those of the Nation as a whole." (Brennan, J.)
• "We have applied that standard to the motion picture in question... and we conclude that it is not obscene within the standards enunciated in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, which we reaffirm here." (Brennan, J.)
• "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." (Stewart, J., concurring)
• "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding." (Brennan, J.)

• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 — Cited as the controlling precedent for the definition of obscenity and the principle that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. The Court reaffirmed and elaborated upon the Roth test.
• Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 — Referenced for the holding that motion pictures are within the ambit of constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
• Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 — Cited by Justice Brennan for Justice Harlan's opinion pointing out the "intolerable consequence" of a local community standard for obscenity, and for the requirement that material must be "patently offensive."
• Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 — Cited to support the Court's duty of independent review in First Amendment cases and to argue against varying constitutional limits of free expression with state or local lines.
• Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 — Referenced to illustrate the chilling effect that localized obscenity standards could have on the dissemination of constitutionally protected material.
• Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 — Cited for the proposition that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas may not be branded as obscene. Also cited by Justice Black for his view against censorship.
• Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35; One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 — Cited as examples where the Court made an independent constitutional judgment on the facts to determine if material was constitutionally protected.
• Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 — Cited for the principle that the adult population cannot be reduced to reading only what is fit for children, in the context of discussing state interests in protecting minors.

• Ohio Revised Code (1963 Supp.), § 2905.34 — The state obscenity statute under which Jacobellis was convicted. Its application to the film "Les Amants" was the central issue.
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Guarantees freedom of speech and press. Its protections were invoked by Jacobellis, arguing the film was protected expression.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Makes the First Amendment's guarantees applicable to the states through its Due Process Clause. This was the basis for applying federal constitutional standards to the Ohio state law and conviction.
• American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (May 4, 1962), § 251.4 — Referenced by Justice Brennan as supporting the requirement that material "goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation" to be deemed obscene, and its advocacy for a national standard.

• Justice Black (joined by Justice Douglas) — Concurred in the reversal, reiterating his absolute position that the First Amendment (made applicable to states by the Fourteenth) prohibits any conviction for exhibiting a motion picture, as it abridges freedom of the press. He opposed the Court acting as a "Supreme Board of Censors."
• Justice Stewart — Concurred in the judgment, stating his view that criminal obscenity laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are constitutionally limited to "hard-core pornography." He famously stated, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that."
• Justice Goldberg — Joined Justice Brennan's opinion fully but also wrote a separate concurrence. He emphasized that the love scene in "The Lovers" was fragmentary and fleeting. He also reiterated the principles from Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, stating that freedom of expression by motion pictures is the rule, and there was no justification in this case for making an exception.

• The Chief Justice (Warren, joined by Justice Clark) — Dissented, arguing for the continued viability of the Roth test and believing that "community standards" in Roth meant local, not national, standards, as a provable national standard is elusive. He advocated for deferring to lower court judgments on obscenity if there is "sufficient evidence," rather than the Court making an independent de novo judgment in every case and acting as an "ultimate censor." He also suggested considering the "use to which various materials are put" (e.g., commercial exploitation, display to children) in determining obscenity.
• Justice Harlan — Dissented, maintaining his previously expressed view that states have greater latitude in determining what is bannable as obscene than the Federal Government. He would apply a "rationality" test to state actions, prohibiting them only from banning material that, taken as a whole, has not been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat sex in a fundamentally offensive manner. He believed Ohio acted within permissible limits.