The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols in Metro Manila, as detailed in Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/2000. The IBP argued this violated civilian supremacy, constituted military incursion into civilian functions, and was unjustified by any emergency. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that while the IBP lacked direct legal standing, the Court would address the issues due to their transcendental importance. The Court held that the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in exercising his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, that such deployment did not violate the civilian supremacy clause or the civilian character of the PNP, as the Marines were merely assisting the PNP under PNP leadership.
Primary Holding
The President's exercise of the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a discretionary power vested by the Constitution, and while subject to judicial review for grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not substitute its judgment for the President's determination of the necessity for such action unless a clear showing of arbitrariness or lack of factual basis is established by the petitioner.
Background
In response to an alarming increase in violent crimes such as robberies, kidnappings, and carnappings in Metro Manila, the President verbally ordered the PNP and the Philippine Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. This directive was subsequently formalized through a Memorandum and implemented via Letter of Instruction 02/2000, establishing "Task Force Tulungan."
History
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President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued a verbal directive for joint PNP-Marines visibility patrols.
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PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) detailing Task Force Tulungan.
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President confirmed his directive in a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000.
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On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.
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On 25 January 2000, the Supreme Court required the Solicitor General to file a Comment.
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On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
Facts
- Due to an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Joseph Estrada ordered the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Philippine Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/2000, detailing the conduct of these joint patrols under "Task Force Tulungan," led by the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
- The LOI specified that criminal incidents were perpetrated by ordinary criminals and organized syndicates, some including active/former police/military personnel whose capabilities exceeded those of local police alone.
- The President, in a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000, confirmed his directive, invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, to improve peace and order through increased police patrols augmented by the AFP.
- The President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence, stating the deployment was temporary.
- Selected areas for deployment included Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations, and NAIA/Domestic Airport.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- The deployment of the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution as no emergency situation obtains to justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work, derogating Article II, Section 3.
- The deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military into a civilian function (law enforcement), derogating Article XVI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
- The deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government.
- By militarizing law enforcement in Metro Manila, the administration is unwittingly making the military more powerful than it should be under the Constitution.
- The IBP, as the official organization of Filipino lawyers, has the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, giving it standing to question the deployment.
Arguments of the Respondents
- The petitioner (IBP) has no legal standing to file the petition.
- The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny as it involves a political question.
- The organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, featuring a team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
- The President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is not subject to judicial review.
Issues
- Whether or not the petitioner (IBP) has legal standing to file the petition.
- Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling out the armed forces (Marines) to assist the PNP is subject to judicial review, or if it is a political question.
- Whether or not the calling of the armed forces (Marines) to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
Ruling
- The IBP failed to sufficiently show legal standing as it did not demonstrate a direct and personal injury; however, the Court exercised its discretion to take cognizance of the case due to the transcendental importance of the constitutional issues raised.
- The President's power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion is a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom by the Constitution. While the Court can review for grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner failed to show that the President's decision was totally bereft of factual basis. The Court found sufficient factual basis for the President's action, citing the rise in violent crimes and recent bombings.
- The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor infringe on the civilian character of the police force. The Marines' participation is limited to assisting the PNP, with the PNP remaining in charge and overall command. The LOI circumscribes the Marines' authority, and they are briefed by police on patrol procedures. This constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement and mutual support, not military supremacy.
Doctrines
- Locus Standi (Legal Standing) — A personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. The IBP failed to show such direct injury, as its general duty to uphold the rule of law is too broad. However, the Court relaxed this rule due to the transcendental importance of the issues.
- Judicial Review — The duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable rights and to determine grave abuse of discretion by any branch of government. The Court affirmed its power to review the President's exercise of Commander-in-Chief powers for grave abuse of discretion, even if the power itself is discretionary.
- Political Question Doctrine — Refers to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch. The Court held that the President's calling-out power, while discretionary, is not entirely beyond judicial review when grave abuse of discretion is alleged, especially under the expanded judicial power defined in the 1987 Constitution.
- Commander-in-Chief Powers (Calling-Out Power) — The President's power under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion whenever it becomes necessary. The Court affirmed this as a discretionary power of the President, the necessity for which is primarily for him to determine, but this discretion is not absolute and can be reviewed for grave abuse.
- Civilian Supremacy over the Military — A constitutional principle (Article II, Section 3) that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Court found no violation, as the Marines were deployed to assist the PNP, under PNP leadership and control, for a civilian law enforcement purpose, not to supplant civilian authority.
- Civilian Character of the PNP — A constitutional principle (Article XVI, Section 5(4)) that the PNP shall be civilian in character. The Court ruled that the deployment of Marines to assist the PNP, without incorporating them into the PNP, does not destroy the PNP's civilian character.
- Transcendental Importance — A doctrine allowing the Court to take cognizance of a case despite the petitioner's lack of direct legal standing if the issues raised are of paramount public interest and significance. This was applied to allow the IBP's petition to be heard on its merits.
- Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others. The Court noted that while the Constitution provides for congressional and judicial review of the suspension of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law, it does not explicitly provide for such review of the calling-out power, implying a broader discretion for the President in the latter, though still subject to review for grave abuse.
- Grave Abuse of Discretion — A capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The Court found no such abuse by the President.
Key Excerpts
- "When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own."
- "In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis."
- "The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement."
- "Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst."
Precedents Cited
- Marcos v. Manglapus — Cited for the President's power to keep the peace, not limited to commander-in-chief powers in emergencies, but also attending to day-to-day peace and order.
- Tañada v. Cuenco — Cited for the definition of political questions as those which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people or delegated with full discretionary authority to other branches.
- Baker v. Carr — Cited for the classic formulation of factors indicating a political question.
- Lansang v. Garcia — Distinguished, as the review of the calling-out power is different from the review of suspension of habeas corpus or martial law, where the Constitution explicitly provides for review of factual basis. (Justice Mendoza's opinion refers to it for the requirement of proof for exercising commander-in-chief powers).
- Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government — Cited for the definition of legal standing and the Court's discretion to set aside this procedural technicality for issues of transcendental importance.
- Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr. — Cited for the principle that a party's standing is a procedural technicality that the Court may set aside due to the importance of the issues raised.
- Bissonette v. Haig — Cited in relation to the US Posse Comitatus Act to discuss standards for permissible military involvement in civilian law enforcement, finding no violation even under those stricter standards.
- Angara v. Electoral Commission — Cited in Justice Mendoza's opinion for the principle that judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies and to the constitutional question raised.
Provisions
- Constitution, Article VII, Section 18 — The President's Commander-in-Chief powers, including the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. This was the primary basis for the President's action and the Court's analysis of its validity.
- Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 — Defines judicial power, including the duty to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by any branch of government. This was the basis for the Court's power to review the President's action.
- Constitution, Article II, Section 3 — States that civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military and the AFP is the protector of the people and the State. The IBP alleged violation of this, but the Court found none.
- Constitution, Article XVI, Section 5(4) — Provides that no member of the armed forces in active service shall be appointed to a civilian position and that the PNP shall be civilian in character. The IBP alleged violation, but the Court found none, stating the Marines were assisting, not appointed to civilian posts or destroying PNP's civilian character.
- Rules of Court, Rule 139-A, Section 2 — Mentioned in relation to the IBP's fundamental purpose, which the Court found alien to the issues of Marine deployment, thus weakening its claim to standing based on its organizational mandate alone.
Notable Concurring Opinions
- Justice Puno — Argued that the President's exercise of the "calling out power" is subject to judicial review to determine compliance with constitutional parameters (necessity, and to prevent/suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion), and is not a political question. He emphasized that the 1987 Constitution expanded judicial review to prevent past abuses where the political question doctrine was used to shield executive acts from scrutiny.
- Justice Vitug — Concurred with the dismissal, stating that while the Court has the power to determine grave abuse of discretion by other branches, the President's act of calling on the AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols, an executive prerogative, did not constitute such grave abuse of discretion warranting Supreme Court intervention.
Notable Dissenting Opinions
- Justice Mendoza (Concurring and Dissenting) — Concurred that the IBP lacked standing. Dissented from dismissing the petition on other grounds, arguing that judgment on substantive constitutional issues should await an actual case with parties showing "injury in fact." He stressed the need for evidence on the effect of military presence, as the President's power to call out armed forces is subject to the limitation that it is required in the interest of public safety, which requires proof. He advocated for a "Fabian policy" of prudence due to the lack of a real, earnest, and vital controversy.