Public figures and public officials may not recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature or parody without showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.

Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally recognized minister and political commentator, was the subject of an advertisement "parody" published in petitioner Hustler Magazine, a nationally circulated publication known for its often-offensive content. The parody was modeled on a popular Campari Liqueur ad campaign that featured celebrities discussing their "first time." This case arose from Falwell's lawsuit against Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, seeking damages for the distress caused by this publication.

• Hustler Magazine published an advertisement "parody" in its November 1983 issue, featuring respondent Jerry Falwell's name and picture, titled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time."
• The parody was modeled after actual Campari Liqueur advertisements that interviewed celebrities about their "first times" (sampling Campari), playing on a sexual double entendre.
• The Hustler parody depicted Falwell in a fictitious "interview" stating his "first time" was a drunken, incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.
• The parody portrayed Falwell and his mother as drunk and immoral and suggested Falwell was a hypocrite who only preached when drunk.
• A disclaimer in small print at the bottom of the page read: "ad parody—not to be taken seriously."
• The magazine's table of contents also listed the ad as "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody."
• The jury found that the ad parody could not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated."
• Falwell, a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public affairs, was conceded to be a "public figure."

• Petitioners (Hustler Magazine, Inc., et al.) argued that the "actual malice" standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, requiring proof that a statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, must be met for a public figure to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
• Petitioners contended that because the jury found the ad parody did not describe actual facts, it was an opinion protected by the First Amendment and could not form the basis for an emotional distress claim without meeting the actual malice standard.
• Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the outrageousness of the publication alone was sufficient to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, regardless of whether it contained a false statement of fact made with actual malice.

• Respondent (Jerry Falwell) argued that the State's interest in protecting its citizens from intentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficient to allow recovery, even for public figures, when speech is patently offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury.
• Respondent contended that the "actual malice" standard applicable to defamation claims was not required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, particularly when the speech could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts.
• Respondent asserted that the critical issue for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was whether the ad's publication was sufficiently "outrageous," and the jury found that it was.

• Whether a public figure may recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the publication of an ad parody that is offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury, but which could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved, without showing that the publication also contains a false statement of fact made with "actual malice."

• The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that public figures cannot recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of a caricature or parody without showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact made with "actual malice."
• The Court reasoned that the First Amendment's protection of free speech in the realm of public debate and concerning public figures is paramount, and an "outrageousness" standard for emotional distress claims is inherently subjective and would allow juries to impose liability based on their tastes or views, thereby chilling speech on public matters.
• Since the jury found the ad parody was not reasonably believable as fact, Falwell could not show it contained a false statement of fact, let alone one made with actual malice; therefore, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress failed.

• First Amendment Free Speech — A constitutional right protecting the free flow of ideas and opinions, especially on matters of public interest and concerning public figures, even if such speech is offensive, caustic, or unpopular. The Court applied this doctrine to shield the ad parody from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress absent a showing of a false statement of fact made with actual malice, emphasizing that robust political debate will inevitably produce speech critical of public figures.
• Actual Malice Standard — A standard requiring that, for a public official or public figure to recover damages in a defamation action, they must prove the defendant published a false statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. The Court extended this standard, requiring a false statement of fact made with actual malice, to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by public figures arising from parodies or caricatures.
• Public Figure Doctrine — A legal principle holding that individuals who have achieved pervasive fame or notoriety, or who voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn into a particular public controversy, are considered "public figures" for First Amendment purposes. In this case, Falwell was undisputedly a public figure, which subjected his claim to the heightened First Amendment protections afforded to speech about such individuals, including the application of the actual malice standard to his emotional distress claim.
• Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) — A tort that allows recovery for severe emotional distress caused by another's intentional or reckless conduct that is extreme and outrageous and offends generally accepted standards of decency and morality (as defined under Virginia law in this case). The Court limited the application of this tort in the context of public figures and speech on public matters by requiring the additional showing of a false statement of fact made with actual malice, to prevent the tort from being used to suppress protected speech.
• Marketplace of Ideas — A rationale for freedom of expression based on an analogy to the economic concept of a free market, holding that the truth will emerge from the competition of ideas in free, transparent public discourse. The Court invoked this concept to underscore the importance of protecting even offensive speech to ensure a robust public debate, reasoning that suppressing speech based on "outrageousness" would undermine this principle.

• "In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,' i. e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true."
• "'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression."
• "At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."
• "The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea."
• "Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth."
• "[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection."

• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) — Referenced as establishing the "actual malice" standard for defamation claims by public officials (and later extended to public figures). The Court in Hustler adapted this standard, requiring a false statement of fact made with actual malice for public figures' IIED claims based on parodies, to provide "breathing space" for First Amendment freedoms.
• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) — Cited for the proposition that the First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a "false idea" and that falsehoods, while valueless, are inevitable in free debate. This supported the Court's reluctance to allow liability for a parody not reasonably believable as fact.
• Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (decided with Associated Press v. Walker) — Referenced for extending the New York Times "actual malice" standard to public figures, which was relevant as Falwell was a public figure.
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) — Cited for its holding regarding "fighting words" as a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. The Court distinguished the ad parody in Hustler from such unprotected speech.
• FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) — Referenced for the principle that "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking" speech is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances. However, the Court found the "outrageousness" standard for IIED too subjective and dangerous to free speech in the context of public discourse about public figures.
• Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974) — Cited by the Court of Appeals (and noted by the Supreme Court) for outlining the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Virginia law.
• Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) — Justice Holmes' dissent was quoted for its articulation of the "marketplace of ideas" theory, supporting the protection of even unpopular ideas.
• NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) — Cited for the principle that speech does not lose its protected character simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action, reinforcing the idea that adverse emotional impact alone is insufficient to justify restricting speech.

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — This amendment was central to the Court's decision, as it protects freedom of speech, particularly concerning public figures and matters of public concern, and limits the ability of states to impose liability through tort law (like IIED) in ways that would chill such speech.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — This amendment makes the protections of the First Amendment applicable to the states. The case involved a state law tort claim (IIED under Virginia law) being limited by federal constitutional principles.

• Justice White — Justice White concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the Court of Appeals' decision penalizing the publication of the parody could not be squared with the First Amendment. However, he stated that the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan had "little to do with this case" because the jury had found that the ad parody contained no assertion of fact, distinguishing his reasoning slightly from the majority's direct application of a New York Times-like standard to the IIED claim.