he Supreme Court will not assess damages arising from an injunction issued by it in a certiorari proceeding; such damages, if any, must be claimed and proven in the court trying the main action where the merits of the case are ventilated, as certiorari is limited to reviewing jurisdictional errors and does not involve a "final trial" on the merits for the purpose of assessing damages under Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The underlying dispute involved an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance (CFI) where Constancio Joaquin sought to compel the issuance of a cockpit license and obtained a mandatory injunction. Godofredo B. Herrera, the Municipal President, then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court challenging the CFI's jurisdiction. During this certiorari proceeding, a member of the Supreme Court issued an injunction restraining Joaquin from operating his cockpit. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed Herrera's certiorari petition and dissolved the injunction.

• A decision was previously rendered by the Supreme Court dismissing an application for a writ of certiorari filed by Godofredo B. Herrera.
• During the pendency of that certiorari proceeding, one of the members of the Supreme Court issued an injunction restraining respondent Constancio Joaquin from operating his cockpit.
• This injunction was granted upon the presentation of an undertaking by Herrera, conditioned that he would pay Joaquin all such damages as Joaquin might sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that Herrera was not entitled thereto.
• After the dismissal of the certiorari application and dissolution of the injunction, the respondents in the certiorari proceeding (Judge Alberto Barretto and Constancio Joaquin) filed a motion asking the Supreme Court to assess the damages Joaquin allegedly sustained (P33,000) due to the injunction.
• The original action in the Court of First Instance, which led to the certiorari, was a mandamus case where Joaquin sought a cockpit license and obtained a mandatory injunction to operate.

• (As inferred from the Court's majority ruling, reflecting Herrera's position against the motion for damages) The Supreme Court should not assess damages arising from an injunction issued in a certiorari proceeding because certiorari is not an "action" in the sense contemplated by Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure for damage assessment.
• (As inferred) Certiorari proceedings are limited to issues of jurisdiction and do not involve an examination of the merits of the underlying case, which would be necessary to properly determine if damages are due and their extent.
• (As inferred) Assessing damages in the Supreme Court could lead to conflicting outcomes if the Court of First Instance, after a trial on the merits, finds that the enjoined party (Joaquin) was not entitled to the right he claims (e.g., the cockpit license).
• (As inferred) The proper venue for claiming damages is the court trying the main action (the Court of First Instance), which has cognizance of the "final trial" on the merits.

• (As movants for damages, Barretto and Joaquin, argued or implied) The Supreme Court, having issued the injunction that caused damage, and having taken an undertaking for such damages, is the proper court to assess these damages, especially since the certiorari petition was dismissed, indicating the petitioner was not entitled to the injunction.
• (As movants) Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the assessment of damages upon obligations like the injunction bond, and this should apply.
• (As movants) They suffered substantial damages (P33,000 claimed by Joaquin) due to being wrongfully restrained from operating the cockpit by the Supreme Court's injunction.

• Whether the Supreme Court should take cognizance of a proceeding to assess damages sustained by a party due to an injunction issued by one of its members in a certiorari proceeding, after that certiorari proceeding has been dismissed and the injunction dissolved.
• Whether a certiorari proceeding is an "action" within the meaning of Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such that the Supreme Court would be "the court trying the action" for the purpose of assessing damages on an injunction bond.

• The Supreme Court denied the respondents' motion for assessment of damages and remanded the parties to the Court of First Instance for the vindication of their rights, if any.
• The Court reasoned that certiorari is not an "action" within the sense used in the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to injunctions and the assessment of damages (specifically Section 170).
• Certiorari is limited in its issuance to cases involving jurisdictional defects and never ventilates the merits of a cause; its final judgment does not touch the merits.
• To assess damages intelligently, the Court would need to adjudicate the merits of the underlying cause (i.e., whether Joaquin was entitled to the cockpit license), which is beyond the scope of certiorari.
• The Supreme Court, in a certiorari proceeding, is not "the court trying the action" which has cognizance of the "final trial" as contemplated by Section 170 for damage assessment.
• Allowing the Supreme Court to assess damages could lead to embarrassment if the Court of First Instance, after a trial on the merits, subsequently finds that the enjoined party had no right to the activity enjoined, meaning no actual damage was suffered from being prevented from doing something they had no right to do.

• Nature of Certiorari — Certiorari is a special remedy limited to reviewing and correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by a lower tribunal; it does not inquire into the correctness of the decision on its merits. The Court applied this by stating that since certiorari does not touch the merits of the underlying cause, the Supreme Court cannot properly assess damages resulting from an injunction issued in such a proceeding, as this would require an examination of the merits.
• Assessment of Damages for Wrongful Injunction (Section 170, Act No. 190) — This section provides that upon final trial, the amount of damages to be awarded upon an injunction bond shall be ascertained by the court trying the action and included in the final judgment. The Court held this inapplicable to damage assessment by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding because certiorari is not the "action" or "final trial" on the merits contemplated by the statute.

• "Certiorari being limited in its issuance to cases involving jurisdictional defects can never be a proceeding in which the merits of a cause are ventilated."
• "In certiorari this court touches no question but one of law and makes no adjudication which in any sense affects the merits of the action or proceeding in the inferior court. In that sense, therefore, it is not an action."
• "It is apparent, therefore, that, before this court can determine intelligently and properly the question of damages resulting from an injunction, it must have before it for adjudication the merits of the cause. The merits never being before the court in a proceeding for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, no damages can be assessed by this court in that proceeding."
• "This court is not, in certiorari proceedings, 'the court trying the action' which has cognizance of the 'final trial.'"

• Blanco vs. Ambler (3 Phil. Rep., 358) — Cited to illustrate that the Supreme Court adopted a different practice for certiorari (order to show cause) compared to mandate and prohibition (ordinary action form), supporting the argument that certiorari is not an "action" in all senses, particularly the sense used in Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Beech vs. Crossfield (12 Phil. Rep., 555) — Referenced to show that pleadings in certiorari, like a demurrer to an order to show cause, differ from typical actions, further supporting the view that certiorari lacks essential features of an "action" that deals with the merits of a case.

• Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), Sections relating to injunctions (general reference) — Referenced for the provision that an injunction bond is conditioned on the plaintiff paying damages if it is finally decided they were not entitled to the injunction. The Court found these provisions, particularly on damage assessment, not directly applicable to the Supreme Court in certiorari.
• Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), Section 170 — This section states that damages on an injunction bond shall be ascertained by the court trying the action upon final trial and included in the final judgment. The Court held that the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding is not "the court trying the action" for this purpose.

• Trent, J. — Argued that the Court should entertain the claim for damages because the injunction was decreed wrongfully issued. He contended that the majority opinion directly contradicted prior Supreme Court decisions in Somes vs. Crossfield (9 Phil. Rep., 13) and Macatangay vs. Municipality of San Juan de Bocboc (9 Phil. Rep., 19), where the Court did assess damages in certiorari proceedings. Justice Trent asserted that certiorari is an "action" under the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1) and that Rule 34 of the Rules of Court mandates that certiorari follow the procedure of ordinary actions. He criticized the distinction made by the majority between certiorari and other special remedies like mandamus and prohibition regarding damage assessment, arguing that none of them reach the ultimate merits of the underlying controversy. He highlighted practical difficulties and potential injustice in remanding the party to a separate action for damages and emphasized that the respondent Joaquin had a court-determined right (via mandatory injunction from CFI) to operate his cockpit, the interference with which by the Supreme Court's injunction caused damage that should be assessed in the same certiorari action.