An action for breach of a promise to marry is not a valid basis for recovering moral damages under Philippine law, as Congress deliberately omitted provisions from the Civil Code that would have sanctioned such claims.

The case originated from an intimate relationship between Soledad Cagigas, a 36-year-old former teacher, and Francisco Hermosisima, an apprentice pilot nearly ten years her junior. Their relationship led to Cagigas becoming pregnant. Hermosisima promised to marry her but subsequently married another woman. Cagigas filed a suit for acknowledgment of their child, support, and moral damages for the broken promise. The lower courts granted the moral damages, framing the petitioner's actions as a form of seduction, which prompted the petitioner to elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.

• Soledad Cagigas, born in 1917, was a teacher and later an insurance underwriter, who was approximately ten years older than petitioner Francisco Hermosisima.
• The two were regarded as engaged, and in 1953, they engaged in sexual intercourse in the petitioner's cabin on board a ship where he worked as an apprentice pilot.
• In February 1954, Cagigas informed Hermosisima that she was pregnant, at which point he promised to marry her.
• Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954.
• On July 24, 1954, Hermosisima married another woman, Romanita Perez.
• On October 4, 1954, Cagigas filed a complaint for acknowledgment of the child, support, and damages.
• Hermosisima admitted paternity and his willingness to provide support but denied having promised marriage prior to the pregnancy.

• Moral damages are not recoverable for a breach of promise to marry under the current Civil Code.
• The legislative intent was to make breach of promise to marry a non-actionable wrong, as evidenced by the congressional elimination of the Code Commission's proposed articles on the matter.
• The petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, given the complainant's age, maturity, and the fact that she was ten years his senior when their intimacy began.
• The complainant "surrendered herself" to the petitioner because she was "overwhelmed by her love" for him, not because of deceit or seduction.

• Moral damages are recoverable because the petitioner's actions constituted seduction.
• The Court of Appeals argued that the petitioner's "seductive powers" overwhelmed the complainant, causing her to yield to his sexual desires despite her age and self-control.
• This alleged seduction makes the petitioner liable for moral damages under Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

• Procedural Issues:
  • N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether moral damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry under Philippine law.
  • Whether the petitioner's actions constituted "seduction" as contemplated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which would justify an award of moral damages.

• Procedural:
  • N/A
• Substantive:
  • No, moral damages are not recoverable for a breach of promise to marry. The Court held that the Philippine Congress, in deliberating the new Civil Code, explicitly rejected the Code Commission's proposals to make breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong. The legislature's clear intent was to prevent the filing of such actions, often referred to as "balm suits," which are susceptible to abuse.
  • No, the petitioner's actions did not constitute seduction under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. The Court clarified that the "seduction" mentioned in that article refers to the crime punishable under Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which were not present in this case. Furthermore, the Court found no moral seduction, pointing to the complainant's maturity, education, and the significant age gap where she was older, concluding that she acted out of love rather than as a victim of deceit. Consequently, the award of moral damages was eliminated, while the other awards for support and actual damages were affirmed.

• Legislative Intent — The Court emphasized that the clear and manifest intent of the legislature is controlling. It examined the Congressional records showing the deliberate removal of the Code Commission's proposed articles that would have made a breach of promise to marry actionable for moral damages. This legislative choice to not sanction such suits was deemed definitive.
• Seduction under Article 2219 of the Civil Code — The Court interpreted the term "seduction" in this provision, which allows for moral damages, not as a broad concept of moral persuasion but specifically as the crime of seduction defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Since the facts of the case did not constitute the crime of seduction, Article 2219 could not be used as a basis for awarding moral damages.

• Quote — "The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States."

• De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866) — This case was cited as the established precedent before the new Civil Code, holding that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, except for the recovery of money or property advanced on the faith of such promise. The Court in Hermosisima affirmed that this rule remains in force due to Congress's decision not to legislate otherwise.

• Civil Code, Article 2219, paragraph 3 — This provision, which allows for moral damages in cases of "seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts," was invoked by the Court of Appeals to justify its award. The Supreme Court rejected its application by narrowly interpreting "seduction" to mean the crime under the penal code.
• Revised Penal Code, Articles 337 and 338 — The Supreme Court referred to these articles to define the crime of seduction, highlighting that its elements were absent in the case, thus negating the applicability of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
• Proposed Civil Code, Articles 56-65 — The Court cited these unenacted articles to show what the Code Commission had intended regarding betrothal and breach of promise. Their elimination by Congress was the primary basis for the Court's ruling that no cause of action for moral damages exists for a broken marriage promise.