A publication containing truthful information about criminal cases filed against a public figure, even if it tends to cause dishonor or discredit, is not libelous if it was not published with actual malice—that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not—as such publication falls within the bounds of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression concerning matters of public interest.

The case arose from a criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba, a broadcast journalist with programs on radio stations DYLA and DYFX in Cebu City, which aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. The complaint was against Segundo Lim, who paid for an advertisement, and Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing, the editor-publisher of the Sunday Post, a weekly newspaper circulated in Bohol, Visayas, and Mindanao, where the advertisement was published.

• On October 13, 1991, Segundo Lim caused the publication of a one-page paid advertisement in the Sunday Post, a weekly newspaper edited and published by petitioner Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing.
• The advertisement, titled "REQUEST FOR PUBLIC SERVICE," was addressed to "RADIOMAN CHOY TORRALBA, STATION DYFX, CEBU CITY."
• The text requested Torralba to enlighten Lim regarding the disposition of criminal cases found in the blotter of the Cebu City Police Department, listing cases against "CIRSE 'CHOY' TORRALBA" for Malicious Mischief (pending arrest), Estafa (pending arrest), and Serious Physical Injuries (provisionally dismissed).
• The advertisement also included a newspaper clipping with a picture of a person with a blotted-out face being arrested for Estafa, and another clipping identifying "BUSINESSMAN CHOY TORRALBA" being served an arrest warrant, followed by a clearer picture of Torralba being arrested.
• The advertisement questioned if Torralba was the same person in the clippings and pictures.
• Cirse "Choy" Torralba, the complainant, was a broadcast journalist handling two radio programs in Cebu City, aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao.
• Torralba claimed the publication was designed to degrade and malign him, placing him in public contempt and ridicule, asserting he had been acquitted or the cases were settled.
• The information published, regarding the existence and status of the criminal cases and Torralba's arrest, was confirmed as true by Torralba himself during trial, although he stated the cases were terminated or he was acquitted.

• The lower courts' finding of guilt infringes upon his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press, especially as an editor-publisher and member of the fourth estate.
• The lower courts failed to appreciate the defense of self-defense, as Lim (who paid for the ad) claimed Torralba was making scurrilous attacks against him and his family over the airwaves, and the ad was a response.
• The publication was not libelous because the information contained therein was true and concerned matters of public interest, given Torralba's status as a media practitioner.
• The prosecution failed to prove actual malice, which is required for libel convictions involving public figures or matters of public concern.

• The publication was indeed libelous as it imputed discreditable acts to Torralba, tending to cause him dishonor, discredit, and contempt.
• Malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation (prima facie malice).
• Torralba's status as a mediaman does not insulate him from libel charges, and publication of calumny against public officers or candidates is a dangerous offense.
• Self-defense is not a valid justification because the retaliation (the advertisement) went beyond explaining what was previously said and became an independent act of uttering scurrilous language.
• The truth of the publication does not negate libel if there is no good intention and justifiable motive for making it.

• Whether the published advertisement containing information about criminal cases filed against the complainant, a broadcast journalist, is libelous.
• Whether the complainant, Cirse "Choy" Torralba, is a public figure.
• If the complainant is a public figure, whether the publication was made with actual malice.
• Whether truth is a defense in a libel charge involving a public figure, and if Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (presumption of malice unless good intention and justifiable motive are shown) applies.

• The petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court, as regards petitioner Guingguing, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing is ACQUITTED of the charge of libel.
• The Court held that the complainant, Cirse "Choy" Torralba, as a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao, is a public figure.
• For a public figure to successfully sue for libel, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made with actual malice – knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or not.
• The prosecution failed to prove actual malice. The information published in the advertisement, regarding the criminal cases filed against Torralba and his arrest, was essentially true, as admitted by Torralba himself during trial.
• Truthful statements regarding a public figure, especially those concerning matters of public record and relevant to their public persona (like a radio commentator's integrity), are protected by the constitutional guarantee of free expression.
• Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which presumes malice in defamatory imputations unless good intention and justifiable motive are shown, must be construed in light of free expression guarantees. For public figures, the "actual malice" standard implies that a true statement is not libelous, and the exercise of free expression on public affairs and figures constitutes "justifiable motive."
• The intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator, by publishing true information, falls under the mantle of good motives and justifiable ends, protected by Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

• Freedom of Speech and Press — A constitutional guarantee (Section 4, Article III, Constitution) that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press. The Court emphasized that this freedom is essential in a democracy and protects even unsophisticated or critical expression, especially concerning public figures and matters of public interest. It was applied to shield the petitioner from libel, as the publication concerned a public figure and contained true information relevant to public discourse.
• Actual Malice Rule (New York Times v. Sullivan standard) — For a public official or public figure to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct or public persona, he must prove that the statement was made with "actual malice" – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The Court adopted this standard, finding that the complainant was a public figure and the prosecution failed to prove the petitioner published the advertisement with actual malice, as the information was true.
• Public Figure Doctrine — A person who, by their accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in their doings, affairs, and character, has become a "public personage." This includes media practitioners. The Court classified the complainant, a broadcast journalist, as a public figure, thereby requiring the application of the actual malice standard.
• Truth as a Defense in Libel — While historically truth was not always a defense, particularly if not published with good motives and for justifiable ends, in the context of public figures and matters of public concern, if the statements are essentially true, no conviction for libel can be had, especially if actual malice is not proven. The Court found the published information to be true and related to the public's interest in the complainant's character, thus negating libel.
• Presumption of Malice (Article 354, Revised Penal Code) — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. The Court ruled that this provision, when applied to public figures complaining of libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression and the actual malice standard. The exercise of free expression regarding public figures and public affairs constitutes "justifiable motive."

• "The liberty of the press is indeed essential. Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the freeness of speech." - Benjamin Franklin (cited by the Court)
• "For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (citing Vasquez v. Court of Appeals)
• "Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection."
• "We hold that this provision [Article 354, RPC], as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Court's precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous."
• "The advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal is mandated."

• New York Times v. Sullivan — Referenced extensively as the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the "actual malice" standard for libel actions brought by public officials (and later extended to public figures). Its principles regarding robust public debate and protection for even erroneous statements made without actual malice were central to the Court's reasoning.
• Garrison v. Louisiana — A U.S. Supreme Court case that extended the New York Times "actual malice" standard to criminal libel actions and discussed the declining justification for criminal libel laws, especially concerning criticism of public officials.
• Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts — A U.S. Supreme Court case that expanded the "actual malice" test to cover public figures, not just public officials. This was relevant as the complainant was deemed a public figure.
• Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong — A Philippine Supreme Court case cited for its definition of a "public figure," which the Court used to determine that the complainant, a broadcast journalist, fell into this category.
• Borjal v. Court of Appeals — A Philippine Supreme Court case where the definition of a public figure from Ayer was expressly applied, warranting the application of the actual malice test. This case reinforced the application of the public figure doctrine and actual malice standard in Philippine jurisprudence.
• Vasquez v. Court of Appeals — A Philippine Supreme Court case explicitly affirming the adoption of the New York Times actual malice rule in the Philippines, stating that even if a defamatory statement is false, no liability attaches if it relates to official conduct unless actual malice is proven.
• Adiong v. COMELEC — A Philippine Supreme Court case where the Court cited New York Times and adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, even including vehement and sharp attacks on government and public officials.

• Section 4, Article III, Constitution of the Philippines — "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press..." This was the fundamental constitutional provision underpinning the Court's decision to acquit, emphasizing the importance of free expression, especially concerning public figures and matters of public interest.
• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." This article provides the statutory definition of the crime petitioner was charged with.
• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — States that "every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown..." The Court interpreted this provision in light of constitutional free speech guarantees and the actual malice standard for public figures, holding that truth and justifiable motive (like informing the public about a public figure) negate libel.
• Article 10, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — Cited to show the international trend towards protecting freedom of expression, even for ideas that "offend, shock or disturb," particularly concerning the press and public interest matters.