Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, series of 2010, is unconstitutional because the DOJ has no authority under the Constitution or any existing law, including the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292), to issue an administrative circular that restricts the fundamental constitutional right to travel by creating mechanisms like Watchlist Orders (WLOs) and Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) based solely on the pendency of a preliminary investigation.

Prior to 2010, the DOJ issued Circular No. 17 (1998) governing HDOs and Circular No. 18 (2007) governing WLOs for persons with cases pending preliminary investigation or review. In May 2010, Acting DOJ Secretary Agra issued DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating and revising the rules on HDOs, WLOs, and Allow Departure Orders (ADOs), expressly repealing the previous circulars. Subsequently, criminal complaints for plunder, malversation, graft, and electoral sabotage were filed against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo, and former PAGCOR officials led by Efraim Genuino, leading to the issuance of WLOs and an HDO against them under the authority of DOJ Circular No. 41 by then DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima.

• On May 25, 2010, the DOJ issued Circular No. 41, consolidating rules on HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs, repealing prior circulars.
• Following her presidency, several criminal complaints (plunder, malversation, graft, electoral sabotage) were filed against GMA before the DOJ and the DOJ-COMELEC Joint Committee.
• Pursuant to Circular No. 41, DOJ Sec. De Lima issued WLO No. 2011-422 (Aug 9, 2011, later amended Sep 6, 2011) against GMA, implemented by the Bureau of Immigration (BI) via WLO No. ASM-11-237.
• DOJ Sec. De Lima issued WLO No. 2011-573 (Oct 27, 2011) against GMA and her husband, Miguel Arroyo, based on electoral sabotage complaints.
• GMA requested an Allow Departure Order (ADO) under Circular No. 41 to seek medical treatment abroad for hypoparathyroidism and a bone disorder, submitting medical abstracts and travel details.
• After referral to DOH Sec. Ona, who visited GMA and noted she was recuperating reasonably well, Sec. De Lima denied GMA's ADO application (Nov 8, 2011), citing medical discrepancies, lack of urgency, non-medical travel purposes, uncertain return, and lack of extradition treaties with some destinations.
• Criminal complaints (Malversation, Plunder, Anti-Graft) were filed against Efraim Genuino, Erwin Genuino, and Sheryl Genuino-See related to PAGCOR funds; DOJ Sec. De Lima issued HDO No. 2011-64 (Jul 22, 2011) against them under Circular No. 41. Their request to lift the HDO was denied.
• Petitioners GMA and Miguel Arroyo (Nov 8, 2011) and the Genuinos filed separate petitions assailing the constitutionality of Circular No. 41 and the WLOs/HDO issued against them.
• The Supreme Court issued a TRO (Nov 15, 2011) enjoining the enforcement of Circular No. 41 and the WLOs against the Arroyos, subject to conditions (cash bond, legal representative, reporting whereabouts).
• The Arroyos complied with the TRO conditions but were prevented by BI officials from boarding their flight at NAIA on the evening of Nov 15, 2011, upon Sec. De Lima's instructions.
• An information for electoral sabotage was filed against GMA with the Pasay RTC (Nov 18, 2011), and a warrant for her arrest was issued.
• The COMELEC dismissed the complaint against Miguel Arroyo, leading the DOJ to lift WLO No. 2011-573 against him (Nov 21, 2011).
• The Genuino petition (G.R. No. 197930) was later consolidated with the Arroyo petitions.

• DOJ Circular No. 41 is unconstitutional as it infringes upon the fundamental right to travel guaranteed under Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution.
• The DOJ Secretary lacks the authority to issue rules restricting the right to travel, as such power is not delegated by any specific law.
• The restriction on travel can only be imposed by a court order or by law in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, none of which applies to the mere pendency of a preliminary investigation.
• The specific WLOs and HDO issued against them pursuant to the unconstitutional Circular No. 41 are null and void.
• The denial of GMA's application for an ADO was arbitrary and constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Respondents' defiance of the Supreme Court's TRO constituted gross disobedience and contempt.

• The petitions have become moot and academic due to the expiration of WLO No. 2011-422, the lifting of WLO No. 2011-573 against Miguel Arroyo, and the filing of an information against GMA which vests jurisdiction in the trial court.
• DOJ Circular No. 41 is a valid exercise of the DOJ's rule-making power under the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292), necessary for the effective administration of the criminal justice system, specifically the investigation and prosecution of offenses.
• The right to travel is not absolute and can be regulated; the Circular provides reasonable restrictions to prevent subjects of investigation, especially those who pose a high flight risk, from evading legal processes.
• The issuance of the TRO was improper as petitioners failed to show a clear legal right, and it would cause irreparable injury to the State by potentially allowing petitioners to flee.
• The filing of the information against GMA constitutes a supervening event warranting the lifting of the TRO.
• The power to issue HDOs/WLOs is analogous to the Court's power to regulate travel of its employees or the conditions imposed on bail.

• Whether the consolidated petitions present a justiciable controversy, or if they have become moot and academic due to supervening events.
• Whether Department of Justice Circular No. 41, series of 2010, is constitutional.
• Whether the Department of Justice has the authority to issue circulars restricting the constitutional right to travel.
• Whether former Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima is guilty of contempt for defying the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court.

• The Court ruled that the petitions present a justiciable controversy and are not moot, applying exceptions to the mootness rule: there is a grave violation of the Constitution, the issue involves paramount public interest, it requires formulation of controlling principles, and the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• The Court declared DOJ Circular No. 41, series of 2010, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and all issuances pursuant to it NULL and VOID.
• The right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right protected under Article III, Section 6, which can only be impaired "in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as maybe provided by law."
• DOJ Circular No. 41 is merely an administrative issuance, not a law enacted by Congress.
• The DOJ lacks the legal authority to issue rules restricting the right to travel. The cited provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) are general grants of power (policy declaration, investigation, prosecution, general rule-making) and do not constitute the specific legislative delegation required to curtail a fundamental right, failing the completeness and sufficient standard tests for valid delegation.
• The power to issue HDOs is inherently judicial, linked to a court's power to maintain jurisdiction over an accused in a criminal case, or must be explicitly provided by law based on constitutional grounds.
• The DOJ cannot invoke police power as justification, as this power is primarily lodged in the legislature and requires a valid delegation through law; furthermore, the restriction imposed by the Circular does not meet the constitutional criteria (national security, public safety, public health).
• The Circular's vagueness regarding HDOs/WLOs and its grant of broad discretion to the DOJ Secretary violate due process.
• The Court deferred the resolution of the contempt charge against former Secretary De Lima, ordering it to be redocketed and addressed in a separate proceeding to ensure fairness and thorough deliberation.

• Right to Travel (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution): This doctrine establishes the liberty to travel as a fundamental right, subject to impairment only upon lawful court order (for liberty of abode) or by law concerning national security, public safety, or public health (for right to travel). The Court emphasized that "as maybe provided by law" requires an explicit legislative enactment, not mere administrative regulation, to restrict travel.
• Judicial Review: The Court reaffirmed its power to review the constitutionality of acts of other branches of government. It applied exceptions to the mootness doctrine (grave constitutional violation, paramount public interest, requires guiding principles, capable of repetition yet evading review) to justify ruling on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 despite supervening events like the filing of information against GMA.
• Delegation of Legislative Power: For an administrative agency's rules to be valid, the delegation of power must come from a law that is complete in itself and sets a sufficient standard. The Court found that E.O. 292 did not provide a valid delegation for the DOJ to restrict the right to travel.
• Administrative Rule-Making Power: Administrative agencies can issue rules to implement existing laws (filling in details), but cannot issue rules that contradict the Constitution or statutes, expand their powers beyond the enabling law, or curtail fundamental rights without explicit legislative authority. DOJ Circular No. 41 exceeded this power.
• Police Power: Defined as the State's inherent power, primarily legislative, to enact laws promoting general welfare. The Court ruled the DOJ cannot unilaterally wield police power to restrict travel; it requires legislative delegation and must adhere to constitutional limits (lawful subject, lawful means, reasonableness, constitutionality).
• Supremacy of the Constitution: The Constitution is the highest law, and any law or administrative issuance conflicting with it is null and void. DOJ Circular No. 41 was struck down for violating Article III, Section 6.
• Separation of Powers: The DOJ, an executive agency, usurped legislative power by creating restrictions on a fundamental right without a law and judicial power by issuing HDOs/WLOs akin to court orders.
• Hierarchy of Rights: Fundamental rights under the Bill of Rights take precedence over the State's power to prosecute. The Court stressed that prosecutorial objectives cannot justify violating constitutional rights.
• Inherent Powers of Courts: Courts possess inherent powers necessary for the administration of justice, including issuing HDOs against accused persons under their jurisdiction to ensure their presence, distinct from the DOJ's claimed authority.
• Due Process: The vagueness of DOJ Circular No. 41, particularly the lack of clear standards and distinction between HDOs and WLOs, was deemed violative of due process for failing to provide fair notice and leaving excessive discretion to officials.

• "The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is deemed written in every statute and contract. If a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect."
• "The right to travel is part of the 'liberty' of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its citizen."
• "Clearly, under the provision [Art. III, Sec. 6], there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment."
• "To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law."
• "One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts."
• "In the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former."
• "Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is an unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext of dire exigency or urgent necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of powers between the three branches of the government and cannot be upheld."
• "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Department of Justice Circular No. 41 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All issuances which were released pursuant thereto are hereby declared NULL and VOID."

• Silverio vs. Court of Appeals (1991): Referenced for interpreting Article III, Section 6, emphasizing the requirement of a law based on national security, public safety, or public health to restrict travel, and distinguishing the 1987 provision from the 1973 version.
• Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon (1988): Cited as an example where a restriction on travel (deployment ban on domestic workers) was upheld because it was based on a valid exercise of police power delegated by a specific law (Labor Code) for public safety/welfare. Contrasted with the lack of enabling law for DOJ Circular No. 41.
• Leave Division, OAS-OCA vs. Heusdens (2011): Cited to enumerate statutory limitations on the right to travel and to explain the Court's distinct power to regulate the travel of judiciary employees based on its constitutional administrative supervision mandate, which is not analogous to the DOJ's claimed power over ordinary citizens.
• Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (1993) / Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals (1986): Cited to establish that the power to issue HDOs against an accused is an inherent power of the courts, necessary to maintain jurisdiction and enforce bail conditions, distinct from any power claimed by the DOJ.
• Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989): Quoted for the principle that the end does not justify the means when fundamental rights are concerned.
• Allado vs. Diokno (1994): Cited for the doctrine that the Bill of Rights prevails over the State's right to prosecute.
• Ople v. Torres (1998): Cited as precedent where a general law (Administrative Code) was deemed insufficient basis for an executive issuance (A.O. 308 establishing a national ID system) that infringed on a constitutional right (privacy). Analogized to the DOJ's reliance on E.O. 292.
• Evelio Javier vs. COMELEC (1986) / Prof. David vs. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo (2006): Cited as examples where the Court proceeded to rule on cases despite claims of mootness, invoking exceptions like paramount public interest and grave constitutional violations.
• Kant Kwong vs. PCGG (1987) / New York v. O'Neill (1959): Distinguished by the Court; Kwong did not rule on the constitutionality of PCGG's power to issue HDOs, and O'Neill involved a specific state statute compelling witness attendance, unlike the DOJ circular.
• Paderanga vs. Drilon (1991): Cited regarding the nature of preliminary investigation, noting the accused's presence is not indispensable.
• Biraogo v. Truth Commission (2010): Cited as an example where an Executive Order was struck down for violating equal protection, showing limits on executive issuances.
• Ynot v. IAC (1987): Cited as an example where an Executive Order violating due process was invalidated.
• Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo (2008): Cited for the principle that the Constitution protects all citizens equally.

• 1987 Constitution:
  • Article III, Section 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clause)
  • Article III, Section 6 (Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel)
  • Article VIII, Section 1 (Judicial Power)
  • Article VIII, Section 5(5) (Supreme Court Rule-Making Power)
  • Article VIII, Section 5(6) (Supreme Court Administrative Supervision over Courts)
  • Article VI, Section 1 (Legislative Power vested in Congress)
• Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987):
  • Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Declaration of Policy for DOJ)
  • Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Powers and Functions of DOJ, specifically subsections 2, 6, 8)
  • Book IV, Title III, Chapter 2, Section 7 (Powers and Functions of the Secretary of Justice, specifically subsections 3, 4, 9)
  • Book IV, Chapter 11, Section 50 (General Classification of Administrative Issuances - Circulars and Orders)
• Department of Justice Circular No. 41, series of 2010: (The subject of the case, declared unconstitutional) Sections 1, 2, 5, 7 cited to show its scope and restrictive effect.
• Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97: (Guidelines in the Issuance of Hold-Departure Orders) Cited to show the Court limited HDO issuance to RTCs for specific cases, contrary to DOJ Circular No. 41's broader scope.
• Republic Act No. 9369: (Amending election laws, including provisions on electoral sabotage) Relevant as the basis for complaints against GMA.
• Republic Act No. 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996): Section 4 cited as an example of a specific law granting authority (to DFA) to restrict/cancel passports under certain conditions (national security, public safety, public health).
• Other Statutes (mentioned indirectly via Heusdens case): R.A. No. 9372 (Human Security Act), R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act), R.A. No. 8042 as amended by R.A. No. 10022 (Migrant Workers Act), R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act), R.A. No. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act).