Primary Holding
An acting appointee to a public office does not have the legal standing (cause of action) to file a quo warranto petition against a newly appointed individual to that same office. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the new appointments.
Background
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed several individuals to the NAPOLCOM, including General as an acting commissioner. Near the end of her term, she appointed Urro, de Guzman, and Escueta as permanent commissioners. General questioned these appointments, claiming they violated the ban on midnight appointments.
History
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September 20, 2004: Imelda C. Roces appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
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January 25, 2006: Roces reappointed.
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September 2007: Roces dies.
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July 21, 2008: Luis Mario General appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner; Eduardo U. Escueta appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
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March 5 & 8, 2010: Appointment papers of Urro, De Guzman and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
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March 9, 2010: Escueta takes oath of office.
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March 19, 2010: Congratulatory letters issued to Urro, De Guzman, and Escueta.
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March 22, 2010: General furnished copy of congratulatory letters.
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March 25 & April 27, 2010: Urro and De Guzman take their oaths.
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July 30, 2010: Executive Order No. 2 issued, revoking midnight appointments.
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General files Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari/Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court renders decision dismissing the petition.
Facts
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1.
General was appointed as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
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2.
President Arroyo appointed Urro, de Guzman, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners near the end of her term.
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3.
General argued that these appointments were "midnight appointments" and thus unconstitutional.
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4.
Executive Order No. 2, issued by President Aquino III, defined and revoked midnight appointments.
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5.
General filed suit to be reinstated and to oust Urro.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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1.
General argued that he was entitled to serve the unexpired term of his predecessor (Roces).
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2.
He claimed that his appointment was "regular," not temporary, despite what his appointment paper stated.
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3.
He asserted that even if his appointment was temporary, his termination was invalid because Urro's appointment was made during the prohibited period.
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4.
He assailed the validity of de Guzman and Escueta's appointments as also violating the ban on appointments.
Arguments of the Respondents
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1.
Escueta's inclusion in the petition was an error because his appointment, acceptance, and assumption of office occurred before the ban.
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2.
General was not a real party-in-interest because he was an acting appointee and could be removed at any time.
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3.
The constitutional ban prohibits making appointments, not accepting them; the respondents' appointments were made before the ban took effect.
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4.
The appointments were not for influencing elections or partisan reasons.
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5.
They requested a TRO against E.O. No. 2 and consolidation with other similar cases.
Issues
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1.
Did General have the legal standing (cause of action) to file a quo warranto petition against Urro?
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2.
Was General's appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner valid?
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3.
Did the appointments of Urro, de Guzman, and Escueta violate the constitutional ban on midnight appointments? (However, this issue was not decided by the Court)
Ruling
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1.
The Supreme Court dismissed General's petition. It held that since General was only an acting appointee, he did not have a clear right to the office and thus lacked the cause of action necessary to bring a quo warranto suit. The Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the appointments were valid "midnight appointments," because the case could be decided on the issue of General's standing.
Doctrines
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1.
Lis Mota: The case must be decided on the narrowest grounds possible; constitutional questions should be avoided if the case can be resolved otherwise.
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2.
Cause of Action for Quo Warranto: To bring a quo warranto action in one's own behalf, the individual must demonstrate a clear right to the office in dispute.
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3.
Nature of Acting Appointment: An acting appointment is temporary and revocable at any time by the appointing authority.
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4.
Estoppel: A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity and acts under that appointment for a significant time cannot later claim the appointment was permanent.
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5.
Presidential Power of Appointment: The power to appoint is inherently executive, and limitations on this power are strictly construed.
Precedents Cited
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1.
Dominador R. Aytona v. Andres V. Castillo, et al.: Cited regarding midnight appointments, but ultimately not applied because the Court decided the case on standing.
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2.
In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela, et al.: Same as above.
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3.
Arturo M. de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.: Same as above.
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4.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora: Outlined requisites for judicial review.
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5.
Sotto v. Commission on Elections: Highlighted that the Court should avoid resolving any constitutional issue if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.
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6.
People v. Vera: Reiterated the presumption of validity accorded to the executive and legislative acts of other government branches.
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7.
Marohombsar v. Court of Appeals: Defined types of appointments.
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8.
Achacoso v. Macaraig: Defined purpose and nature of acting or temporary appointment.
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9.
Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.: Recognized the validity of temporary appointments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on a staggered basis.
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10.
Cabiling v. Pabualan: Indicated that the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments.
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11.
Nacionalista Party v. Bautista: Nullified the acting appointment issued by the President to fill the office of a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
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12.
Topacio v. Ong: Cited regarding requirements for a successful petition for quo warranto.
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13.
Castro v. Del Rosario, et al.: Reiterated that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office.
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions
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1.
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution: Pertains to the prohibition against midnight appointments.
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2.
Republic Act No. 6975 (Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990): Discusses the structure, powers, and functions of the NAPOLCOM, including the terms of office for commissioners.
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3.
Republic Act No. 8551: Amended R.A. 6975, retained much of NAPOLCOM structure.
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4.
Executive Order No. 2 (issued by President Aquino III): Defined and revoked midnight appointments.
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5.
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987): Section 17 discusses the power to issue temporary designation.
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6.
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court: Governs quo warranto proceedings.