A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, but it can be the basis for recovering damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code if the promise was made in a fraudulent and deceptive manner to entice a woman into sexual congress (moral seduction), thereby causing willful injury to her honor and reputation in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

The case arose from a romantic relationship between Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian medical student residing in Dagupan City, and Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year-old Filipina working at a luncheonette. Baksh courted Gonzales and promised to marry her, which led her to live with him with her parents' consent. The dispute began when Baksh later repudiated his promise, prompting Gonzales to file a suit for damages based on the alleged fraudulent promise and the resulting injury to her honor.

• Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year-old single Filipina, alleged that Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian medical student, courted her and proposed marriage.
• Gonzales accepted his proposal on the condition that they would get married after the end of the school semester in October of that year.
• Baksh visited Gonzales's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their consent for the marriage.
• In August 1987, Gonzales began living with Baksh in his apartment in Dagupan City with the approval of her parents, who believed a marriage was forthcoming.
• Subsequently, Baksh's attitude towards Gonzales changed; he began to maltreat, threaten, and eventually repudiated their marriage agreement.
• During a confrontation with a barangay captain, Baksh stated he would not marry Gonzales and claimed he was already married to someone in Bacolod City.
• Gonzales, who was a virgin before living with Baksh, filed a complaint for damages, claiming she was seduced by the fraudulent promise of marriage, which caused her moral suffering and damaged her reputation.

• Petitioner Baksh argued that he never proposed marriage to Gonzales and did not commit any moral wrong or injury that would make Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable.
• He claimed that as a foreigner and an Iranian Moslem, he was not familiar with Filipino customs and that his failure to marry, even if promised, was excusable due to his upbringing which allows for multiple wives.
• He contended that Gonzales should also be at fault for consenting to a live-in arrangement, and therefore, the principle of pari delicto should apply, barring her from recovering damages.
• He asserted the general legal principle that a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.

• Respondent Gonzales claimed that she was a virgin of good moral character who was deceived by Baksh's fraudulent protestations of love and promise to marry.
• She argued that this promise was the proximate cause for her surrendering her virtue and agreeing to live with him.
• She maintained that Baksh's actions were contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy, causing her grave moral damage and injury to her reputation, thus making his conduct actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court should review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
  • Whether the doctrine of pari delicto is applicable to the case.

• Procedural:
  • The petition was denied. The Supreme Court held that it is not its function to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts, as a petition for review on certiorari is limited to questions of law. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the case fell under any of the recognized exceptions where a factual review is warranted.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that while a breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, damages are recoverable under Article 21 of the Civil Code if the promise was a fraudulent device to seduce the woman. The Court found that Baksh's promise was not made in good faith and was merely a ploy to satisfy his lust. This act of moral seduction, being contrary to morals and good customs, constitutes a willful injury for which he is liable for damages. The Court also rejected the petitioner's pari delicto argument, stating that the respondent was not in equal fault; she was a victim of moral seduction and thus merely in delicto, which does not preclude relief, especially where one party's consent was procured by fraud.

• Breach of Promise to Marry — The Court reiterated the general rule that a breach of promise to marry, by itself, is not a legally actionable wrong. However, it clarified that this rule does not prevent recovery of damages if the breach is attended by other acts that are independently tortious under the Civil Code, such as the fraudulent seduction in this case.
• Moral Seduction under Article 21 — This doctrine holds that when a man's promise to marry is used as a fraudulent, deceptive, or subtle scheme to entice a woman to surrender her virtue, his actions are considered contrary to morals and good customs. This constitutes a tort under Article 21, and the resulting injury to the woman's honor and reputation is compensable, not for the breach of promise itself, but for the willful and fraudulent act.
• Pari Delicto Doctrine — This principle, meaning "in equal fault," provides that parties to an illegal or wrongful contract cannot seek relief from the courts. The Supreme Court ruled it was inapplicable here because the parties were not in equal fault. Gonzales was the victim of fraud and seduction, making her the less guilty party, while Baksh's actions were the primary cause of the wrong.

• "In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter."

• De Jesus vs. Syquia — Cited as the established precedent that a breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se.
• Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals — Referenced to distinguish the current case. In Hermosisima, damages were denied because the woman was older, more experienced, and the sexual relations were born out of mutual lust rather than moral seduction.
• Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals — Referenced to distinguish the facts. Recovery was denied in Tanjanco because the prolonged intimate relationship was deemed voluntary and based on mutual passion, lacking the element of deceit or enticement essential for seduction.
• Batarra vs. Marcos — Cited by the petitioner for the pari delicto defense, but the Court found it inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
• Mangayao vs. Lasud — Cited to support the non-application of the pari delicto rule where the fault of the parties is not equivalent, particularly when one party is more intelligent or educated than the other.

• Article 19, Civil Code — Referenced to emphasize the petitioner's blatant disregard for the principles of acting with justice, giving everyone his due, and observing honesty and good faith.
• Article 21, Civil Code — This is the central legal basis for the ruling. It provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
• Article 1412(1), Civil Code — This article on the pari delicto rule was cited by the petitioner but was held by the Court to be inapplicable.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — This procedural rule was cited to explain the limitation of the Supreme Court's review to questions of law, thereby upholding the factual findings of the lower courts.