Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause, the due process clause, or constitute an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted by Congress in 2004 as a landmark law defining and criminalizing various forms of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by intimate partners (husbands, former husbands, partners, etc.), providing protective measures like protection orders, and outlining duties of government officials in responding to VAWC complaints. The law was a response to the high prevalence of domestic violence against women in the Philippines, often committed by their intimate partners, and aimed to address the historically unequal power relations between men and women. This case arose when a husband, subjected to Temporary Protection Orders under RA 9262, challenged the law's fundamental validity before the courts.

• Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under RA 9262 against her husband, petitioner Jesus Garcia, for herself and their minor children before the RTC of Bacolod City.
• Rosalie alleged physical abuse (grabbing, shaking causing bruises, hitting lips causing bleeding), emotional, psychological, and economic violence stemming from petitioner's marital infidelity with a bank manager (admitted by petitioner).
• Petitioner was described as dominant, controlling, jealous, isolating Rosalie from friends, trivializing her ambitions, and demanding absolute obedience.
• Petitioner allegedly also physically abused their daughter Jo-Ann for revealing his text messages to his paramour.
• Rosalie attempted suicide due to the emotional and psychological turmoil; petitioner allegedly fled instead of helping her.
• Petitioner allegedly threatened Rosalie with deprivation of custody and financial support if she pursued legal action, stating she wouldn't get a single centavo.
• Petitioner controlled the family businesses (three corporations) with significant income and benefits, while Rosalie received only a P20,000 monthly salary from one corporation, though household expenses paid via credit card (covered by the corporation) were around P200,000 monthly.
• Petitioner forbade Rosalie from accessing business information after she confronted him about the affair.
• The RTC issued an initial TPO on March 24, 2006, ordering petitioner's removal from the conjugal home, staying away, no contact, surrender of firearms, payment of support, no dissipation of assets, accounting of funds, and posting a bond.
• The TPO was subsequently amended, renewed, and extended multiple times with modifications, addressing issues like vehicle use, support amounts, return of belongings, and further alleged harassment acts by petitioner (replevin suit for vehicles, alleged kidnapping attempt on son, threats against daughter, filing of kidnapping case against Rosalie via housemaids).
• An August 23, 2006 TPO included prohibitions on threats/violence, harassment/communication, staying away, firearm surrender, financial support (current and arrears), educational expenses, vehicle use, non-dissipation of assets, and orders to the Register of Deeds.
• This TPO was extended for 10 days on Sept 26, 2006, with petitioner given 5 days to show cause for non-renewal; the court later renewed it indefinitely on Oct 5, 2006, pending final termination.
• Petitioner, after receiving the Oct 5 Order, did not file the required comment, deeming it futile.
• During the RTC proceedings, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA) challenging RA 9262's constitutionality.

• The CA erred in dismissing the petition for prohibition on procedural grounds (issue of constitutionality not raised at earliest opportunity and collateral attack).
• RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violates the equal protection clause because it protects only women and children, not men who can also be victims of spousal abuse, despite the law's purpose being to curb spousal violence generally.
• RA 9262 violates the due process clause due to the ex parte issuance of TPOs based on unsubstantiated allegations, stripping the husband of family, property, rights, and reputation without adequate opportunity to respond.
• The definitions of psychological violence and economic abuse (e.g., "mental or emotional anguish," "marital infidelity," "controlling conjugal money") in RA 9262 are vague and overly broad, potentially criminalizing normal marital disagreements.
• RA 9262 singles out the husband/father as the culprit.
• RA 9262 harms the family as a basic social institution by criminalizing minor arguments instead of encouraging mediation/counseling.
• RA 9262 allows an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials by authorizing them to issue Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs).
• Family Courts have limited jurisdiction inadequate to tackle complex constitutionality issues.
• The rule prohibiting counterclaims/cross-claims in the opposition prevented raising the constitutionality issue before the RTC.

• (Implicitly, through TPO application and OSG defense of the law) Petitioner committed acts constituting physical, psychological, emotional, and economic violence under RA 9262 against her and her children.
• RA 9262 is a valid exercise of legislative power and is constitutional.
• The classification protecting women and children is valid and based on substantial distinctions recognized historically and statistically (women as predominant victims due to unequal power relations).
• The procedures under RA 9262, including ex parte TPO issuance, are necessary for the immediate protection of victims and comply with due process, providing the respondent opportunity to be heard later.
• The definitions in RA 9262 are sufficiently clear and based on documented dynamics of abuse.
• Petitioner failed to raise the issue of constitutionality at the earliest opportunity before the RTC.
• The challenge via prohibition constituted an improper collateral attack on the law.
• The Supreme Court should resolve the constitutional challenge definitively to put the issue to rest.

• Was the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing the petition for prohibition on the grounds that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and constituted a collateral attack?
• Does RA 9262 violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution by providing protection only to women and children against violence committed by intimate partners?
• Does RA 9262 violate the due process clause of the Constitution, particularly regarding the issuance of protection orders (ex parte TPOs) and the definitions of acts constituting violence?
• Does RA 9262 allow an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials through the issuance of Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)?

• The petition was DENIED for lack of merit, and the constitutionality of RA 9262 was sustained.
• The CA correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition; the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, which was in the petitioner's Opposition filed before the RTC. RTCs, including designated Family Courts, have jurisdiction to resolve constitutional questions. The challenge was not barred by the rule against counterclaims/cross-claims, as unconstitutionality is a defense, not a cause of action for such claims. Summary proceedings do not prevent raising issues of law. The petition was also improper as it challenged interlocutory orders (TPOs).
• RA 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause. The classification favoring women and children is based on substantial distinctions: (1) unequal power relationship between men and women; (2) women are the usual and most likely victims of violence; (3) widespread gender bias and prejudice. These distinctions are real and justify the classification, which is germane to the law's purpose of addressing VAWC, is not limited to existing conditions, and applies equally to all women and children victims. The legislative intent, based on deliberations and statistics, was specifically to protect women and children as the predominant victims.
• RA 9262 does not violate the due process clause. The ex parte issuance of TPOs is a necessary measure to provide immediate protection to victims facing imminent danger, similar to other ex parte reliefs like preliminary attachment. The requirements of due process yield to the vital public interest of protecting women and children. The respondent is subsequently given notice and an opportunity to be heard through filing an opposition and participating in hearings. The definitions of VAWC are sufficiently definite for ordinary intelligence to understand prohibited conduct and are based on documented patterns of abuse, thus not void for vagueness. The removal from residence under a TPO is temporary, becoming permanent only if property rights are not violated. Non-referral to mediation is justified as violence is not subject to compromise and mediation implies fault on the victim.
• RA 9262 does not involve undue delegation of judicial power. The issuance of Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) by the Punong Barangay or Kagawad is a purely executive function, related to their duty to enforce laws and maintain peace and order under the Local Government Code. It involves determining facts (imminent danger) to apply the law, akin to a prosecutor's preliminary investigation, not the exercise of judicial power which settles actual controversies.

• Equal Protection: This constitutional guarantee requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike regarding rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It allows for valid classification provided it (1) rests on substantial distinctions, (2) is germane to the law's purpose, (3) is not limited to existing conditions only, and (4) applies equally to all members of the class. The Court found RA 9262's focus on women and children met these criteria due to historical and societal realities of gender inequality and violence.
• Due Process: This guarantee ensures no one is deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. Its essence is the opportunity to be heard. The Court ruled that while TPOs can be issued ex parte, this is justified by the urgency of protecting victims from imminent danger (a vital public interest), and the respondent is afforded due process through subsequent notice and the opportunity to file an opposition and be heard before a permanent order is issued.
• Void for Vagueness Doctrine: A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The Court held that the definitions of VAWC in RA 9262 (physical, sexual, psychological, economic abuse) are sufficiently definite and based on documented abuse dynamics, providing fair notice of prohibited conduct.
• Judicial Review: Courts can review the constitutionality of laws. This power requires: (1) an actual case or controversy, (2) legal standing of the challenger, (3) the question raised at the earliest possible opportunity, and (4) the constitutional question being the lis mota of the case. The Court emphasized that constitutionality should have been raised in the RTC (earliest opportunity) which has jurisdiction, not initially in a separate CA petition.
• Presumption of Constitutionality: Laws are presumed valid unless clearly shown to be unconstitutional beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner failed to overcome this presumption regarding RA 9262.
• Separation of Powers: Courts do not inquire into the wisdom, justice, or expediency of laws, as these are legislative concerns. The Court also distinguished between executive functions (like BPO issuance by barangay officials enforcing laws) and judicial power (settling controversies).
• Police Power: The State's inherent power to enact laws promoting public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The Court identified RA 9262 and its TPO mechanism as a valid exercise of police power to protect women and children.
• Statutory Construction (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius): The express mention of one thing excludes others. Applied to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, Sec. 20(b), the Court noted that the prohibition applied specifically to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party complaints, not necessarily to raising the defense of unconstitutionality in the opposition.

• "Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same." (citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union)
• "All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class." (citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union)
• "It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security."
• "The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 'To be heard' does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings."
• "Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault." (citing Commentary on Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence regarding non-referral to mediation)
• "(T)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." (regarding BPO issuance by barangay officials)
• "Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach otor a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court."

• Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (1974): Cited extensively for the definition and requirements of valid classification under the equal protection clause. Used as the primary basis for upholding the classification in RA 9262.
• J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA (1961): Cited to establish that RTCs (inferior courts) have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of laws, supporting the finding that petitioner should have raised the issue in the RTC.
• Drilon v. Lim (1994): Cited to affirm that RTCs possess the authority (judicial power) to determine the constitutionality of laws.
• People v. Vera (1937): Cited by the CA (and noted by SC) regarding the requirement to raise constitutionality directly, not collaterally. Also cited in concurring opinion regarding the four-fold test for classification.
• Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan (2008): Cited as an example that RA 9262 does not preclude applying conspiracy principles, allowing respondents other than the direct intimate partner (like parents-in-law) to be included if they participated in the VAWC.
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001): Cited for the principle that laws are presumed constitutional and passed with legislative awareness of constitutional boundaries. Also cited regarding the vagueness doctrine.
• Younger v. Harris, Jr. (1971 US): Cited to support the principle that alleged unconstitutionality alone does not warrant enjoining a statute's enforcement, especially protective orders like TPOs whose purpose would be defeated by injunction.
• Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation (2008): Cited to affirm RTC jurisdiction over constitutionality issues.
• People v. Solon (1960): Cited as an example where a classification (ordinance targeting animal-drawn vehicles but not other animals on roads) was upheld despite potential inequality, because the targeted group posed the primary problem. Used by analogy to support RA 9262 targeting the primary perpetrators/victims of VAWC.
• Benancillo v. Amila (2011): Cited as an example of judicial bias against women in VAWC cases, highlighting the need for laws like RA 9262 to address such prejudices.
• Laurel v. Desierto (2002): Cited for the definition of executive power, contrasted with judicial power, in the context of BPO issuance.
• Lovina and Montilla v. Moreno and Yonzon (1963): Cited for the principle that an officer applying law to facts does not necessarily exercise judicial power, supporting the finding that BPO issuance is executive.

• Republic Act No. 9262 (VAWC Act): Sections 2 (Declaration of Policy), 3 (Definition of VAWC, Persons involved), 5 (Acts of VAWC), 7 (Venue, Family Court Jurisdiction), 8 (Protection Orders - Purpose), 11 (Reliefs - Removal from Residence), 14 (Barangay Protection Orders - BPOs), 15 (Temporary Protection Orders - TPOs).
• 1987 Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 11 (Dignity, Human Rights); Art. II, Sec. 12 (Family); Art. II, Sec. 14 (Role of Women, Equality); Art. III, Sec. 1 (Due Process, Equal Protection); Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (Judicial Power); Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (SC Powers, Review of Constitutionality); Art. XV, Sec. 1 (Family as Foundation); Art. XV, Sec. 3 (Rights of Spouses, Children).
• A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on VAWC): Sec. 4(o) (Definition of Protection Order); Sec. 7 (Petition requirements); Sec. 11(c) (Relief - Removal from Residence); Sec. 14 (BPOs); Sec. 15 (TPOs - Issuance, Effectivity, Service); Sec. 16 (Notice without TPO); Sec. 20 (Opposition, Prohibition on Counterclaim/Cross-claim); Sec. 22(j) (Prohibited Pleadings - Certiorari/Prohibition against Interlocutory Orders); Sec. 23(c) (Non-referral to Mediation); Sec. 25 (Order for Further Hearing); Sec. 26(b) (Extension/Renewal of TPO).
• Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997): Sec. 5(k) (Jurisdiction over VAWC cases); Sec. 17 (Designation of Family Courts).
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Preamble, Article 2, Article 4, Article 5(a), Article 15, Article 16. General Recommendations No. 19, 25.
• Rules of Civil Procedure (1997): Rule 6, Sec. 8 (Cross-claim); Rule 6, Sec. 11 (Third-party complaint).
• Family Code: Art. 73 (Mentioned in RA 9262 Sec 3(D)(1)).
• Local Government Code of 1991: Sec. 389 (Powers/Duties of Punong Barangay - enforce laws, maintain public order).
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): Articles 1, 7, 8.