The actual recital of facts in the information, not the caption or the specific provision of law cited, determines the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused; thus, an accused can be convicted of a crime adequately described by the facts in the information, even if it's different from the specific paragraph of the statute initially designated, provided the accused is not deprived of the right to be informed of the charge.

The case originated from a business venture in 2002 where Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (private complainant) would provide jewelry to petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters, petitioner Josephine G. Umali and accused Rowena Gamaro, for them to sell. The agreement involved Fineza purchasing foreclosed jewelry identified by Umali (a pawnshop manager), Norma Gamaro selling them, and profits being split. Checks were issued as security for the jewelry.

• Sometime in 2002, Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) entered a business venture with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro, and her daughters, petitioner Josephine G. Umali (manager of M. Lhuillier Pawnshop) and accused Rowena Gamaro.
• Fineza would buy foreclosed jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop, identified by Umali, and Norma Gamaro would sell them to her co-employees at SSS.
• Proceeds were to be split 50% for Fineza and 50% divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro, and Rowena Gamaro.
• Norma and Rowena Gamaro issued checks from their joint account to Fineza as security, reflecting the appraised value of the jewelry.
• The business was initially successful, but Fineza decided to terminate it upon discovering the Gamaros were also dealing with other jewelry suppliers.
• It was agreed that Norma and Rowena Gamaro would sell the remaining jewelry in their possession.
• Checks issued by Rowena Gamaro to Fineza were dishonored due to a closed account.
• Norma Gamaro confessed she lacked funds to cover the checks and Fineza learned the jewelry had been pawned contrary to their agreement.
• Pawnshop tickets showed Norma Gamaro's nephew, Frederick San Diego, pledged the jewelry. Fineza redeemed some jewelry with her own money.
• Norma Gamaro failed to return remaining jewelry and offered her house and lot as payment, which Fineza declined.
• A demand letter dated February 16, 2004, for the return of P2,292,519.00 (value of unreturned jewelry and cash for rediscounting) was unanswered.
• Norma Gamaro denied involvement in her daughters' jewelry business; Umali denied business dealings with her sister Rowena and Fineza, and knowledge of the origin of jewelry pawned by her cousin.
• The Information charged petitioners with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), alleging Norma Gamaro pretended to be knowledgeable in the jewelry business, induced Fineza to deliver jewelry worth P2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business and remit proceeds, but instead managed it as her own, failed to remit proceeds, and pawned jewelries.

• The CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision finding Norma Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) when the Information charged her under paragraph 2(a), violating her constitutional right to be informed of the charge.
• The CA committed grave abuse of discretion by sustaining RTC findings that relied on proceedings in an administrative case with SSS against Norma Gamaro.
• The CA committed grave abuse of discretion by sustaining RTC findings that considered the testimony of prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo, despite an alleged conflict of interest because Atty. Baldeo supposedly advised Norma Gamaro on her case.
• The CA committed grave abuse of discretion by upholding RTC findings that Norma Gamaro received the subject jewelries despite incompetent and contradictory evidence from the prosecution.

• The prosecution successfully proved the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) through the testimony of Fineza and corroborating evidence.
• The factual allegations in the Information sufficiently charged estafa through misappropriation, apprising Norma Gamaro of the nature of the accusation.
• Norma Gamaro received jewelry in trust from Fineza with the obligation to sell and remit proceeds, but she misappropriated them by pawning them and failing to return them or their value upon demand.
• Josephine Umali, despite acquittal from criminal charges based on reasonable doubt, remained civilly liable due to her knowledge and participation in the business transaction, including signing a Joint Solidary Account Agreement used for the business.

• Whether a conviction for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) (misappropriation) is legally permissible when the accused was charged under paragraph 2(a) (deceit) in the Information.
• Whether the testimony of Atty. Baldeo violated the attorney-client privilege.
• Whether the RTC and CA erred in their factual finding that Norma Gamaro received the jewelry and was guilty of estafa.
• Whether Josephine Umali is civilly liable despite her acquittal from the criminal charge.

• Yes, a conviction for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) is permissible even if the Information cited paragraph 2(a). The Court reiterated that the actual recital of facts in the information determines the crime charged. The Information sufficiently alleged acts constituting estafa by misappropriation, thus Norma Gamaro was not deprived of her constitutional right to be informed of the charge.
• No, the testimony of Atty. Baldeo did not violate attorney-client privilege. The Court found no evidence of an attorney-client relationship for the purpose of seeking legal advice; Atty. Baldeo's testimony merely consisted of observations as an officemate about Norma Gamaro's jewelry selling activities, corroborating Fineza's testimony.
• No, the RTC and CA did not err in their factual findings. The prosecution proved that Fineza entrusted jewelry to Norma Gamaro, who failed to account for them upon demand, leading to a presumption of misappropriation. Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive.
• Yes, Josephine Umali is civilly liable. Her acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, which does not extinguish civil liability when a mere preponderance of evidence supports it. The evidence showed Umali's participation in the business, including her knowledge of the jewelry's ownership and her role in the joint bank account used for the transactions.

• Nature of the Crime Determined by Allegations in the Information — The real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is determined by the actual recital of facts stated in the information, not by the caption, preamble, or the specific provision of law alleged to have been violated. This doctrine was applied to hold that although Norma Gamaro was charged under Art. 315, par. 2(a) (estafa by deceit), she could be convicted under Art. 315, par. 1(b) (estafa by misappropriation) because the factual allegations in the information sufficiently described the elements of the latter.
• Elements of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) (Misappropriation) — (1) money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. The Court found all these elements present in Norma Gamaro's case.
• Presumption of Misappropriation — Failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. A legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. This was applied because Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry or their value to Fineza upon demand.
• Attorney-Client Privilege — This privilege requires: (1) an attorney-client relationship (or prospective relationship) through which the communication was made; (2) the client made the communication in confidence; and (3) legal advice was sought from the attorney in a professional capacity. The Court found these elements absent regarding Atty. Baldeo's testimony, as her statements were observations as an officemate, not confidential communications for legal advice.
• Civil Liability Arising from Crime (Acquittal Based on Reasonable Doubt) — An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt the accused from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required to establish such liability. This was applied to hold Josephine Umali civilly liable despite her acquittal, as evidence showed her involvement in the business transactions that prejudiced Fineza.
• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings of Trial Courts — Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties, unless highly meritorious exceptions exist. The Supreme Court applied this to uphold the lower courts' findings regarding Norma Gamaro's receipt and misappropriation of the jewelry.

• "It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law."
• "The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation."
• "The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon."
• "It has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required."

• Flores v. Hon. Layosa — Cited to support the doctrine that the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime charged, not the caption or designation of the offense by the fiscal. It emphasizes that the accused's concern should be the facts alleged, not the technical name of the crime.
• U.S. v. Lim San — Referenced within the Flores citation, establishing that the characterization of the crime in the caption is immaterial; the facts in the body of the pleading determine the charge.
• Espino v. People — Cited for the principle that the designation of the offense in the information is not controlling and that the facts alleged determine the crime. Also cited regarding the conclusiveness of factual findings when trial and appellate courts agree.
• D'Aigle v. People — Cited for the elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) and the conclusiveness of factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the CA.
• Asejo v. People — Cited for the elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b).
• Pamintuan v. People — Cited for the definition of "convert" and "misappropriate" and the legal presumption of misappropriation.
• Mercado v. Atty. Vitriolo — Cited for the essential factors to establish attorney-client privilege and the definition of confidential communication.
• Dr. Lumantas v. Spouses Calapiz — Cited in relation to civil liability not being extinguished by acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
• Manantan v. Court of Appeals — Cited in relation to civil liability not being extinguished by acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
• Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals — Cited to support the principle that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt from civil liability where only a preponderance of evidence is required.
• Franco v. People — Cited for the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a).

• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 14 (Bill of Rights) — Specifically, Section 14(1) on due process and Section 14(2) on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Applied to determine if Norma Gamaro's right was violated by her conviction under a different paragraph of Estafa than charged.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 1(b) (Estafa by Misappropriation) — This is the provision under which Norma Gamaro was convicted. The Court discussed its elements and application to the facts.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 2(a) (Estafa by Deceit) — This is the provision under which petitioners were formally charged in the Information. The Court differentiated its elements from those of par. 1(b).
• Rules of Court, Rule 45 (Petition for Review on Certiorari) — This is the procedural basis for the petition filed before the Supreme Court.
• Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (unspecified section regarding sufficiency of information) — Mentioned in relation to the doctrine that an information is sufficient if it states the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and that the designation of the offense is not controlling.