The designation of a Department Undersecretary (a deputy of a Cabinet Member) to concurrently serve as Officer-in-Charge of an attached agency, such as MARINA, is unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which imposes a stricter prohibition against holding multiple offices on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, allowing exceptions only when expressly provided in the Constitution itself.

The case arose from the President's designation of respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista, then DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) on September 1, 2008, following the resignation of the MARINA Administrator. This designation was made in a concurrent capacity with her existing role as DOTC Undersecretary.

• On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
• On October 23, 2006, Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the DOTC.
• On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of the MARINA Administrator, Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary.
• On October 21, 2008, petitioner Dennis A. B. Funa, as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's concurrent designation.
• During the pendency of the petition, on January 5, 2009, Bautista was appointed as the permanent Administrator of MARINA.
• On February 2, 2009, Bautista assumed her duties as MARINA Administrator and consequently relinquished her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

• Petitioner argued that Bautista's concurrent holding of the positions of DOTC Undersecretary and OIC of MARINA violated Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment.
• Petitioner contended that the position of MARINA Administrator is not an ex-officio capacity to the post of DOTC Undersecretary, as shown by MARINA's charter (P.D. No. 474) and the Administrative Code of 1987.
• Petitioner asserted that even if the designation as OIC of MARINA was temporary, it still violated the constitutional prohibition, as temporariness is not an enumerated exception.
• Petitioner claimed the two posts were incompatible, as the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport might have to review or counter recommendations from MARINA, creating a conflict.
• Petitioner maintained that the case should be decided despite potential mootness because the issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

• Respondents argued that the petition was moot and academic because Bautista had already been appointed as MARINA Administrator and had relinquished her post as DOTC Undersecretary.
• Respondents questioned petitioner's legal standing, alleging he failed to show personal and substantial interest or illegal disbursement of public funds, especially since Bautista received no salary as MARINA OIC.
• Respondents submitted that Bautista's concurrent designation was constitutional because she was merely designated as acting head temporarily to prevent a hiatus, did not receive additional compensation, and the designation fell under recognized exceptions related to the primary functions of her office.
• Respondents pointed out that Bautista held the OIC position for only four months before her permanent appointment and subsequent relinquishment of the DOTC post.
• Respondents contended that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and MARINA Administrator positions were not incompatible, citing that MARINA Administrator recommendations go to the MARINA Board, not directly to the Undersecretary.

• Whether the petitioner has legal standing to file the suit.
• Whether the supervening appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator and her relinquishment of the DOTC Undersecretary post rendered the case moot and academic.
• Whether the designation of respondent Bautista as Officer-in-Charge of MARINA, concurrent with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, violated Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring respondent Bautista's concurrent designation as OIC of MARINA and DOTC Undersecretary unconstitutional.
• The Court affirmed petitioner's legal standing as a concerned citizen, given that the case involved a grave violation of a constitutional prohibition and raised issues of transcendental importance.
• The Court ruled that the case was not moot and academic, despite Bautista's subsequent appointment and relinquishment of her DOTC post, because the issue of the constitutionality of such concurrent designations is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
• The Court held that Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution imposes a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, and their deputies and assistants (which includes Undersecretaries) against holding any other office or employment, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. This is distinct from the general prohibition in Section 7, Article IX-B, which allows other appointive officials to hold other offices if allowed by law or by the primary functions of their position.
• The Court found that Bautista, as a DOTC Undersecretary, fell under the stricter prohibition of Section 13, Article VII. Her designation as OIC of MARINA was not an ex-officio capacity attached to her primary role, nor was it an exception expressly provided by the Constitution.
• The Court clarified that the term "hold any other office" in the constitutional prohibition encompasses both appointment and designation, as both involve the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The temporary nature of the designation did not exempt it from the constitutional ban.

• Requisites for Judicial Review — The power of judicial review is subject to limitations: (1) an actual case or controversy; (2) legal standing of the challenger; (3) the constitutional question raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question being the very lis mota of the case. The Court found these requisites present, particularly granting standing to the petitioner as a concerned citizen.
• Locus Standi (Legal Standing) — A party must have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness. Petitioner was granted standing as a concerned citizen because the issues raised were of transcendental importance, involving an alleged grave violation of a constitutional prohibition.
• Moot and Academic Case Doctrine (Exception: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review) — A case is moot if it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to supervening events. However, courts may decide an otherwise moot case if the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review. This exception was applied because the President's designation of a Department Undersecretary as OIC of an attached agency could recur.
• Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices (Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution) — The President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. The Court applied this stricter prohibition to declare Bautista's concurrent designation unconstitutional, emphasizing that exceptions must be found within the Constitution itself.
• Distinction between Article VII, Section 13 and Article IX-B, Section 7(2) of the 1987 Constitution — Article VII, Section 13 provides a stricter prohibition for the President and his official family, with exceptions only if provided in the Constitution. Article IX-B, Section 7(2) is the general rule for other appointive officials, allowing them to hold other offices if permitted by law or the primary functions of their position. Bautista, as an Undersecretary, fell under the stricter rule.
• Ex-Officio Capacity — A position held by an individual by virtue of or as incidental to another office already held. The Court determined that the OIC of MARINA position was not held by Bautista in an ex-officio capacity as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
• Appointment vs. Designation — Appointment is the selection by the appointing power of an individual to exercise the functions of a given office, often conferring security of tenure. Designation connotes the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official, often temporary. The Court held that the constitutional prohibition against "holding" an office applies to both forms of occupying a position.

• "These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions."
• "Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity."
• "Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned."

• Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317) — Cited as the controlling precedent interpreting Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution, establishing that Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants are subject to a stricter prohibition against holding multiple offices, with exceptions only if explicitly provided in the Constitution itself.
• Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma (494 SCRA 53) — Referenced for reiterating principles from Civil Liberties Union and for its discussion on mootness. The Court distinguished the present case because Bautista, as an Undersecretary, is covered by Section 13, Article VII, unlike Elma who was not a cabinet member, undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
• Achacoso v. Macaraig (195 SCRA 235) — Cited for the principle that a temporary designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition.
• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (489 SCRA 160) — Referenced for its summary of rules on legal standing, supporting the grant of standing to the petitioner as a concerned citizen due to the transcendental importance of the constitutional issue.
• Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr. (188 SCRA 154) — Cited for its distinction between "appointment" and "designation." The Court clarified that the constitutional prohibition on "holding" an office applies regardless of whether it is through appointment or designation.
• Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. (415 SCRA 44) — Cited in relation to the requisites of judicial review, specifically referencing Angara v. Electoral Commission for the foundational principles.
• Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita (472 SCRA 587) — Cited for the exception to the mootness doctrine, particularly when an issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

• 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 13 — This is the central provision applied by the Court. It prohibits the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. This provision was found to have been violated by Bautista's concurrent designation.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 7, paragraph (2) — This provision states that "Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government..." It was distinguished from the stricter prohibition in Article VII, Section 13, which applied to Bautista.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 — The petition was filed under this rule, seeking certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
• Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 474 — The charter creating MARINA. Referenced by petitioner to argue that the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the DOTC Undersecretary.
• Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6, Sections 23 and 24 — Provisions concerning the DOTC. Cited by petitioner to support the argument that DOTC Undersecretaries do not have an ex-officio role in attached agencies like MARINA.

• Justice Carpio Morales — Concurred with the ponencia in declaring the designation unconstitutional. She opined that Bautista, during her tenure as OIC Administrator of MARINA, was a de facto officer. She further discussed the implications of nullifying the holding of a second position, suggesting that the rule in Civil Liberties Union (rendering the officer ineligible for the second position) applies to cases under Section 13, Article VII, as opposed to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma rule (deeming the first office vacated upon acceptance of an incompatible second office), which applies to other incompatibility scenarios. She emphasized that Bautista remained a de jure DOTC Undersecretary throughout her concurrent designation.