Primary Holding

Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 of Marikina City, which regulate fence height and setback requirements, are invalid exercises of police power because they are not reasonably necessary for the stated purposes, are unduly oppressive, and constitute a taking of private property without just compensation.

Background

The City of Marikina enacted Ordinance No. 192 aiming to regulate fence construction for public safety, security, beautification, and neighborliness. The ordinance set height limits and see-through requirements for fences and mandated a five-meter parking setback for certain establishments, including educational institutions. St. Scholastica's College, affected by this ordinance, challenged its validity.

Facts

• 1. St. Scholastica's College (SSC) owns a property in Marikina City enclosed by a concrete perimeter fence built 30 years prior to the case.
• 2. Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192 which regulated fence height, required see-through fences beyond a certain height, and mandated a five-meter parking setback for educational institutions.
• 3. The City ordered SSC to demolish and rebuild their fence to comply with the ordinance, requiring an 80% see-through fence and a six-meter setback for parking.
• 4. SSC argued compliance would cause significant property loss, destruction of facilities, and appropriation without just compensation.
• 5. The City argued the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power for public safety, health, morals, convenience, and prosperity.

Arguments of the Petitioners

• 1. Ordinance No. 192 is a valid exercise of police power to promote public welfare, safety, and beautification.
• 2. The setback requirement is for the benefit of students and patrons and ownership remains with the respondents.
• 3. The ordinance is remedial, intended to correct deficiencies in building regulations.
• 4. Zoning Ordinance No. 303, enacted later, cures any invalidity by classifying the area as institutional with a setback requirement.
• 5. The 80% see-thru fence requirement is reasonable for security and crime prevention.

Arguments of the Respondents

• 1. Ordinance No. 192 is an invalid exercise of police power and contravenes the Constitution.
• 2. Demolishing and moving the fence constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation, akin to eminent domain without proper procedure.
• 3. The ordinance violates due process and right to privacy.
• 4. The existing concrete fence already provided sufficient security for many years.
• 5. The ordinance is retroactive and impairs vested substantive rights.
• 6. The ordinance is not remedial or curative as the original fence was legal when built, and the ordinance doesn't correct any prior legislation.

Issues

• 1. Is Ordinance No. 192 a valid exercise of police power?
• 2. Does Ordinance No. 192 constitute a taking of private property requiring just compensation?
• 3. Does Ordinance No. 192 violate the due process clause?
• 4. Is Ordinance No. 192 retroactively applied, and if so, is such application valid?

Ruling

• 1. The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners, affirming the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192.
• 2. The Court found that the five-meter setback for parking constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without just compensation because it effectively deprived SSC of the beneficial use of that portion of their land for public parking.
• 3. The Court also held that the 80% see-through fence requirement and the height limitation were not reasonably necessary to achieve the ordinance's stated objectives of crime prevention and beautification, making them unduly oppressive and an invalid exercise of police power.
• 4. The Court rejected the argument that Zoning Ordinance No. 303 cured the defects, as it served a different purpose and was raised for the first time on appeal.
• 5. The Court concluded that enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 would unduly interfere with the respondents' rights to property and privacy.

Rationale

• 1. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable

Doctrines

• 1. Police Power: The inherent power of the State to regulate liberty and property to promote the general welfare. The exercise of police power by local government units must be within constitutional and statutory limits, and must be lawful, reasonable, and not oppressive.
• 2. Eminent Domain (Taking): The power of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. The ordinance's setback requirement was deemed a taking because it deprived the owner of beneficial use for public parking, even if ownership remained.
• 3. Due Process (Substantive): Requires that laws serve a legitimate governmental interest and the means employed are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive. The ordinance failed substantive due process because its means were not rationally related to its objectives and were unduly oppressive.
• 4. Rational Basis Test: Used to evaluate the validity of laws under police power. Requires that the law rationally further a legitimate governmental interest and the means are reasonably related to the purpose. Ordinance No. 192 failed this test for Sections 3.1 and 5.
• 5. Right to Privacy: A fundamental right protected by the Constitution, which the Court found was potentially violated by the see-through fence requirement in the context of a religious residential property.
• 6. Curative Statute: Statutes enacted to cure defects in prior laws or validate legal proceedings. The Court held Ordinance No. 192 was not a curative statute as it did not correct any irregularity or invalidity in existing laws.

Key Excerpts

• 1. "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
• 2. "The test of a valid ordinance is well established… it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable."
• 3. "The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens."
• 4. "Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive."

Precedents Cited

• 1. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Used to define police power.
• 2. Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.: Discussed the rational relationship test and requisites for valid exercise of police power by local governments.
• 3. Rural Bank of Makati v. Municipality of Makati: Further explained the delegation of police power to local government units.
• 4. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila: Outlined the substantive requirements for a valid ordinance.
• 5. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.: Discussed the limits of police power and the concept of taking.
• 6. Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land, Incorporated: Clarified that taking does not require acquisition of title or total destruction of value.
• 7. People v. Fajardo: Established that aesthetic purposes alone may not justify police power to permanently divest owners of beneficial use of property.
• 8. Peña v. Tolentino: Reinforced the principle that new legal theories cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• 9. Gamboa v. Chan: Defined the right to privacy as the right to be let alone.
• 10. Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission: Defined curative statutes and their retroactive nature.
• 11. PKSMMN v. Executive Secretary: Cited regarding separability clauses in statutes.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

• 1. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: General Welfare Clause, delegation of police power to local government units. (Incorrect reference, should be Section 16 of the Local Government Code, RA 7160, which is General Welfare Clause; Article III of the Constitution is the Bill of Rights which generally protects individual rights against government power)
• 2. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: Eminent Domain, requirement of just compensation for taking private property for public use.
• 3. Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: Bill of Rights, relevant provisions related to due process, right to privacy and property rights.
• 4. Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991): Empowerment of Sangguniang Bayan to prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on property use.
• 5. Section 7, Ordinance No. 192: Transitory provision allowing time to conform to the ordinance.
• 6. Section 3.1, Ordinance No. 192: Standard height for front yard fences and see-through requirement.
• 7. Section 5, Ordinance No. 192: Five-meter parking setback requirement.
• 8. Section 7, Ordinance No. 217: Amendment to transitory provisions of Ordinance No. 192 for educational institutions.
• 9. Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines): Mentioned as not providing adequate guidelines for fence construction.
• 10. Rule XIX of the National Building Code: Cited regarding parking space requirements for educational institutions.
• 11. Zoning Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000: Marikina City Zoning Ordinance, argued by petitioners as curing defects of Ordinance No. 192 but rejected by the Court.