Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc.

The medical assessment of a company-designated physician, who has conducted extensive and continuous monitoring and treatment of a seafarer's condition over a significant period, is given greater evidentiary weight than the contrary opinion of a seafarer's chosen physician which is based on a single consultation and is not supported by comprehensive medical tests and records.

Petitioner Julio C. Espere was employed as a Bosun by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and was declared "Fit for Sea Duty" in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). Approximately five months into his nine-month contract aboard the vessel M.V. Kalpana Prem, he experienced dizziness, body malaise, and chills. He was diagnosed in Vancouver, Canada with "uncontrolled hypertension," declared unfit for duty, and was medically repatriated to the Philippines for further treatment and evaluation.

• Upon repatriation, petitioner Julio C. Espere was referred to company-designated physicians who treated him for hypertension over a period of five months, from December 2011 to May 2012.
• The company-designated physicians conducted regular follow-ups, adjusted his medication, and concluded in a February 16, 2012 report that his hypertension was not work-related but multifactorial in origin (e.g., genetic predisposition, lifestyle).
• On April 24, 2012, a company doctor stated that petitioner's hypertension was not a contraindication to resuming work, provided he complied with his medication to control his blood pressure.
• Dissatisfied, on May 7, 2012, petitioner consulted his own physician, Dr. Manuel C. Jacinto, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, who issued a medical certificate on the same day.
• Dr. Jacinto's certificate diagnosed petitioner with "uncontrolled essential hypertension" and concluded that the illness was "work-related/work-aggravated" and rendered him unfit to work, without providing supporting laboratory tests or a detailed explanation.
• On May 16, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits against the respondents.
• While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution based on the NLRC's favorable decision, and respondents paid the full judgment award to the petitioner.

• The Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the findings of the company-designated physicians over the assessment of his chosen doctor.
• The petitioner's illness of hypertension is work-related or at least work-aggravated, as evidenced by his "fit for work" status prior to deployment.
• The petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits because he was not declared fit to work within the maximum 120-day treatment period under the POEA contract.
• The Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the factual findings of the NLRC, as it is not a trier of facts.
• The respondents' petition before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed for being moot and academic, as they had already fully paid the judgment award.

• The petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that his hypertension was work-related.
• The medical findings of the company-designated physicians, which were based on extensive and continuous examinations over five months, are more credible and reliable than the single, unsubstantiated opinion of the petitioner's private doctor.
• The payment of the judgment award was made in compliance with a writ of execution and was not an amicable settlement; therefore, it did not render their petition for certiorari moot.
• The petitioner's hypertension was not classified as "essential hypertension," which is the only type of hypertension listed as a compensable occupational disease under the POEA-SEC.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
  • Whether the respondents' payment of the judgment award pursuant to a writ of execution rendered their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and academic.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whose medical assessment—that of the company-designated physicians or that of the petitioner's chosen doctor—should prevail in determining the seafarer's disability claim.
  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits for his hypertension.

• Procedural:
  • Yes, the Court of Appeals is empowered to review the factual findings of the NLRC in a certiorari petition to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, such as by capriciously disregarding material evidence or when its findings contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.
  • No, the satisfaction of the judgment award was not an amicable settlement but was made in strict compliance with a duly issued writ of execution. This act does not prevent the respondents from availing of other legal remedies, such as their petition for certiorari, and thus does not render the case moot.
• Substantive:
  • The medical assessment of the company-designated physicians must prevail. Their findings were based on five months of close monitoring, diagnostic tests, and consultations with a cardiologist, which provided a more accurate and comprehensive diagnosis compared to the petitioner's chosen doctor's single, unsubstantiated medical certificate issued after only one consultation.
  • No, the petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits. He failed to discharge his burden of proving by substantial evidence that his hypertension was work-related or that his working conditions caused or aggravated his illness. A "fit to work" declaration from a PEME is not conclusive proof that he was free from any ailment prior to deployment, and the disputable presumption of work-relatedness is not sufficient without evidence of a causal link. Since the illness was not proven to be work-related, the claim for benefits must fail. The petitioner was also ordered to restitute the amount he received from the respondents.

• Credibility of Company-Designated Physician's Assessment — Jurisprudence holds that the assessment of the company-designated physician, who is entrusted with the task of assessing a seaman's disability and who has closely monitored the seafarer's condition, is generally given more weight than a conflicting assessment from a seafarer's private doctor based on a single examination. In this case, the Court favored the company doctors' five-month comprehensive evaluation over the petitioner's doctor's unsubstantiated, single-consultation report.
• Work-Relatedness of an Illness — For a disability to be compensable under the POEA-SEC, the claimant must prove two elements: (1) the illness is work-related, and (2) it existed during the term of the contract. The burden is on the claimant to present substantial evidence of a reasonable connection between the work and the illness. The Court applied this by ruling that the petitioner failed to prove this causal link for his hypertension.
• Judicial Review of NLRC Decisions — The proper mode for judicial review of NLRC decisions is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, where the reviewing court is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. However, the Court of Appeals can evaluate the materiality and significance of evidence to determine if the NLRC capriciously or arbitrarily disregarded it. This doctrine justified the CA's re-evaluation of the evidence.
• Restitution — Where an executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by a higher court with finality, the party who received payment under the reversed judgment must return the amount received. The Court applied this by directing the petitioner to return the full judgment award he received pursuant to the writ of execution after the NLRC decision was ultimately reversed.

• "Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. It is his findings and evaluations which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim. His assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts, as its inherent merits would still have to be weighed and duly considered."

• Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. — Cited as the primary authority establishing that the company-designated physician's assessment forms the basis of a disability claim, though it is not automatically conclusive and can be disputed by a second opinion.
• Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano — Referenced to affirm the power of the Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition to review the factual findings of the NLRC to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion.
• Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Madjus — Distinguished from the present case. In Madjus, payment was considered an amicable settlement rendering the case moot, whereas here, payment was merely in compliance with a writ of execution and did not preclude further legal remedies.
• Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation — Cited to support the principle that greater weight should be accorded to the assessment of doctors who have closely and regularly monitored a seafarer's condition over time.

• POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), Section 20 — This section, which governs compensation and benefits for injury or illness, was the contractual foundation of the case. It establishes the conditions for compensability, including the requirement that an illness be work-related.
• Rules of Court, Rule 45 — This rule on Petition for Review on Certiorari was the procedural basis for the petitioner's appeal of the Court of Appeals' decision to the Supreme Court.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 — This rule on Petition for Certiorari was the basis for the respondents' challenge of the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals, with the Supreme Court clarifying the scope of judicial review under this rule.
• 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule XI, Section 18 — This rule on restitution was the legal basis cited by the Supreme Court for ordering the petitioner to return the monetary award he received after the judgment in his favor was reversed.