State officials may not compose an official state prayer and require its recitation in public schools, even if the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils may remain silent or be excused, because such a practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The New York State Board of Regents, a governmental agency with supervisory powers over the State's public school system, composed and recommended a prayer for recitation in public schools. The prayer was part of a "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools." The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, adopted this recommendation and directed its principal to have the prayer said aloud by each class at the beginning of each school day in the presence of a teacher.

• The Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting under state law, directed the School District's principal to cause a specific prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day.
• The prayer, recommended by the State Board of Regents, read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."
• This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by the State Constitution with broad supervisory powers over the State's public school system.
• The parents of ten pupils in the district brought an action in a New York State Court, challenging the constitutionality of the state law authorizing the prayer and the School District's regulation ordering its recitation.
• The petitioners argued that the use of this official prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was contrary to their beliefs, religions, or religious practices and those of their children.
• The New York courts upheld the practice, provided that students were not compelled to participate and could be excused upon parental request.

• The state laws requiring or permitting the use of the Regents' prayer violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because the prayer was composed by governmental officials as part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs.
• The State's use of the Regents' prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State.

• The Regents' prayer is "non-denominational" and does not establish a religion.
• The program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer; it permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room, thus making observance voluntary.
• The religious nature of prayer is conceded, but this specific prayer is distinguished because it is based on "our spiritual heritage."

• Does a New York State rule authorizing a public school district to direct the daily recitation of an official, denominationally neutral prayer in public schools, where student participation is voluntary, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

• Yes, the New York State rule authorizing the recitation of an official prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
• The Court reasoned that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion means that it is not part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.
• The fact that the prayer is denominationally neutral and that its observance is voluntary for students does not free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause.
• The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon a showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by laws that establish an official religion, regardless of whether they directly coerce nonobserving individuals.
• The Court emphasized that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion, and that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent the government from placing its official stamp of approval upon any particular kind of prayer or religious service.
• The Court found that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer, which is inconsistent with the purposes of the Establishment Clause.

• Establishment Clause of the First Amendment — This clause prohibits the government from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion." The Court applied this doctrine to mean that government, whether state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. In this case, the state-composed and state-directed prayer in public schools was found to be an unconstitutional establishment of religious beliefs.
• Application of the First Amendment to States via the Fourteenth Amendment — This principle holds that the prohibitions of the First Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, are made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reiterated this established doctrine, making the federal constitutional limitations on establishing religion binding on New York State.
• Separation of Church and State — This is a foundational principle underlying the Establishment Clause, signifying that governmental institutions should not be involved in religious affairs and religious institutions should not control governmental functions. The Court invoked this principle by stating that the State's use of the Regents' prayer breaches the "constitutional wall of separation between Church and State."
• Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment — This clause protects individuals' rights to practice their religion freely. While the case was primarily decided under the Establishment Clause, the Court distinguished it from the Free Exercise Clause, noting that the latter might permit voluntary religious observance if not for the Establishment Clause's broader prohibition against government endorsement of religion. The Court clarified that the Establishment Clause violation here did not depend on direct coercion, which is often a key element in Free Exercise claims.

• "We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause."
• "It is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."
• "Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause..."
• "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."
• "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
• "It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."

• Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 — Referenced for its review of the historical events surrounding the enactment of the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" and the general principles of the Establishment Clause. The Court in Engel builds upon Everson's articulation of the separation between church and state.
• McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (Concurring Opinion of Douglas, J.) — Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, distinguishes the present case from McCollum, which involved the use of public school facilities for religious instruction by outside teachers. He notes that McCollum involved elements of proselytizing and influence of teaching staff not present in the same way with the Regents' prayer, but still finds the financing of a religious exercise unconstitutional.
• Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (Dissenting Opinion of Stewart, J., and Concurring Opinion of Douglas, J.) — Justice Stewart, dissenting, cites Zorach for the proposition that "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," arguing that the prayer in Engel is consistent with this understanding. Justice Douglas, concurring, also cites Zorach for the same quote but argues that government financing a religious exercise, even if non-coercive, is unconstitutional.

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Specifically, the Establishment Clause ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion") is the central provision. The Court held that the New York prayer program violated this clause.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — The Court reiterated that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
• New York Constitution, Art. V, § 4; New York Education Law, §§ 101, 120 et seq., 202, 214-219, 224, 245 et seq., 704, and 801 et seq. — Cited as the state legal framework under which the Board of Regents and the local school district operated, granting them authority over the public school system.

• Mr. Justice Douglas — Justice Douglas concurred with the Court's judgment, but wrote separately to emphasize that the core issue is whether the government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. He argued that any government financing of religious exercises, including paying teachers to lead prayers or chaplains in legislative bodies, is unconstitutional. He distinguished this case from practices like the Pledge of Allegiance containing "under God," viewing the school prayer as a more direct governmental involvement in a religious exercise. He expressed concern that even non-coercive, government-sponsored religious activities inherently involve an element of coercion for a "captive" audience and insert a divisive influence. He also suggested that Everson v. Board of Education (allowing bus fares for parochial school pupils) seems out of line with the First Amendment.

• Mr. Justice Stewart — Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the Court misapplied a great constitutional principle. He contended that allowing students who wish to do so to join in a brief, non-denominational prayer does not establish an "official religion" but rather acknowledges the spiritual heritage of the Nation. He pointed to numerous instances where government officials and institutions invoke God or prayer (e.g., opening of Supreme Court sessions, presidential inaugurations, Congressional chaplains) without violating the Constitution. He argued that the Court's decision denied children the opportunity to share in this heritage and that the "wall of separation" metaphor is not a helpful guide. He saw no interference with the free exercise of religion, as participation was voluntary.