Enemecio vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the Ombudsman's dismissal of a criminal complaint must be filed directly with the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals, as the latter lacks jurisdiction over such matters under Republic Act No. 6770; furthermore, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for falsification of public documents, as no law requires disclosure of the specific purpose or location for using earned leave credits, and thus no untruthful narration of facts occurred under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

The dispute arose in the context of workplace tensions at the Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology, where Enemecio, as a utility worker, accused Bernante, an assistant professor, of professional misconduct including defamatory acts and falsifying leave records to conceal his incarceration for slight physical injuries, amid retaliatory filings between parties involving school officials, highlighting issues of administrative accountability and the proper use of government employee leave benefits under Philippine civil service regulations.

Agustina M. Enemecio, a utility worker at CSCST-CFT, filed an administrative complaint on 30 March 1998 against Servando Bernante, an Assistant Professor IV, for gross misconduct, falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty, and defamation, alleging that Bernante orchestrated the spray-painting of obscene words against her on school walls on 29-30 March 1998, shouted defamatory words like "buricat," "putang ina," and "maot" at her on 10 and 25 March 1998, and falsified leave applications to claim forced leave from 15-21 May 1996 and vacation leave from 22-31 May 1996 while actually serving a 20-day prison sentence from 14 May to 2 June 1996 for slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. NR-1678-CR, allowing him to receive salary of P3,185.08 during incarceration with approval from Superintendent Andres T. Melencion; a parallel criminal complaint for falsification was filed with the Ombudsman, which jointly heard both cases after receiving affidavits; Bernante admitted incarceration but defended the approved leave applications without required disclosure of reasons or location, denied involvement in graffiti or defamation, and claimed retaliation for his complaints against Enemecio's allies; witnesses like Bernadette Mante and Delfin Buot provided partial corroboration, but no eyewitnesses linked Bernante to graffiti, and the defamation on 10 March 1998 was deemed unrelated to official functions with a pending criminal case.

Enemecio argued that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion by refusing jurisdiction over her certiorari petition, that Rule 65 certiorari was the appropriate remedy due to the final and unappealable nature of the Ombudsman's exoneration in the administrative case under Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07 as unaffected by Fabian v. Desierto, which only invalidated appeals to the Supreme Court in administrative cases, and that no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy existed; she claimed the petition actually targeted the administrative dismissal, not the criminal one, and that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse by ignoring evidence of falsification and malversation through approved but misleading leave forms and payroll proving salary receipt during imprisonment.

The Office of the Ombudsman and Bernante argued through the Court of Appeals' resolutions that the certiorari petition was untimely under Rule 43's 15-day period for appeals from Ombudsman decisions, filed 35 days after notice of the reconsideration denial, and improper as Fabian v. Desierto mandates Rule 43 petitions to the Court of Appeals for administrative cases and reserves criminal case reviews for the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770; the Ombudsman defended its dismissal by stating no regulation requires specifying leave purposes or locations, thus no falsification occurred as leave forms were truthfully marked for earned credits, graffiti lacked eyewitness proof, and defamation was unofficial and pending in court, warranting no administrative liability without final conviction for moral turpitude offenses.

• Procedural Issues: - Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Court of Appeals is the proper remedy to challenge the Ombudsman's dismissal of a criminal complaint, or if it should be a direct certiorari to the Supreme Court, and whether the petition was timely filed within the reglementary period.
• Substantive Issues: - Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents and malversation by finding no legal obligation for Bernante to disclose the true purpose of his leave, and whether sufficient evidence existed to establish probable cause for the charges of defamation, misconduct, and graffiti involvement.

• Procedural: - The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, as challenges to the Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal complaints must be via certiorari under Rule 65 directly to the Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770, while administrative dismissals go to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 per Fabian v. Desierto, and the filing with the wrong forum rendered it improper; the petition was also untimely, filed beyond the 15-day period from notice of the reconsideration denial, and the attempt to recharacterize it as targeting the administrative case failed due to clear records showing it assailed the criminal dismissal.
• Substantive: - The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman, as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code requires a legal obligation to disclose truthful facts in public documents, which was absent since no law or regulation mandates specifying the purpose or location of earned leave credits, making Bernante's approved applications for forced and vacation leave non-falsified despite use during incarceration; malversation was unsupported as salary receipt was lawful for accrued leave, graffiti evidence was circumstantial without eyewitnesses, and defamation on 10 March 1998 was unofficial, requiring final conviction for administrative action per Festijo v. Crisologo, with the pending criminal case making it premature; the Ombudsman's thorough merits review justified outright dismissal to avoid unnecessary proceedings.

• Fabian v. Desierto Doctrine — This doctrine invalidates provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07 allowing direct appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions to the Supreme Court, redirecting them to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43, but preserves Supreme Court review over criminal cases under Section 14 of RA 6770; in this case, it was applied to clarify that certiorari for criminal dismissals belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, leading to dismissal of the Court of Appeals petition for wrong forum.
• Ombudsman's Discretion in Probable Cause Determination — The Ombudsman has broad discretion to dismiss complaints lacking probable cause without full investigation if insufficient in form or substance, as affirmed in PCGG v. Desierto; here, it justified the outright dismissal after reviewing affidavits and evidence, finding no prima facie case for falsification or malversation, preventing undue prolongation of proceedings.
• Final Conviction Requirement for Moral Turpitude Offenses Unrelated to Official Duties — Under Festijo v. Crisologo, administrative liability for crimes involving moral turpitude not connected to official functions requires a final conviction as a prerequisite; in this case, it was used to deem the defamation charge premature for administrative resolution since it was pending in court and unrelated to Bernante's professorial duties.
• Elements of Falsification by Untruthful Narration under Article 171(4) RPC — Requires untruthful statements in a public document where the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth, the facts are false, and intent to injure exists; applied here to rule no falsification in leave forms absent any law requiring disclosure of leave purposes or locations, thus no misrepresentation occurred despite incarceration.

• "It matters not how he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on leave be spelled out in such application." — Ombudsman's explanation for dismissing falsification charge.
• "As an officer of the court, Atty. Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." — Supreme Court's admonition to petitioner's counsel for misleading representations.
• "There could be no falsification where nothing is being misrepresented in the official leave forms which the respondent prepared and submitted." — Ombudsman's reasoning on lack of probable cause.
• "Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish." — Supreme Court's affirmation of Ombudsman's discretion.

• Fabian v. Desierto — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions go to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, not the Supreme Court, and clarifying jurisdiction limits under RA 6770; referenced to dismiss the petition for improper remedy and forum in both administrative and criminal contexts.
• PCGG v. Desierto — Followed as illustrative of the Ombudsman's discretion to dismiss complaints without preliminary investigation if lacking probable cause; used to uphold the dismissal here after merits review, emphasizing avoidance of undue anguish.
• Festijo v. Crisologo — Cited as precedent classifying administrative suspension grounds and requiring final conviction for moral turpitude offenses unrelated to official duties; applied to defer defamation liability pending criminal resolution.
• Palma v. Fortich — Referenced to support that acts unrelated to official functions, like personal defamation, do not warrant immediate administrative action without conviction; distinguished the shouting incident as non-official.
• Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman — Cited illustratively for allowing Supreme Court certiorari under Rule 65 when Ombudsman probable cause findings show grave abuse; however, distinguished here as the petition was wrongly filed in the Court of Appeals.
• Relucio v. Civil Service Commission — Followed to outline elements of falsification under Article 171(4) RPC, requiring legal obligation for disclosure; applied to negate the charge due to no such obligation in leave applications.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act) — Provides for appeals from Ombudsman decisions, but partially invalidated by Fabian for administrative cases directing them to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43; relevant here as it retains Supreme Court jurisdiction over criminal case reviews under Section 14, justifying dismissal of the Court of Appeals petition.
• Section 14, Republic Act No. 6770 — Grants the Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over Ombudsman decisions in criminal cases; applied to rule that certiorari for criminal dismissals must be filed directly with the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals.
• Article 171(4), Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in narration of facts with legal obligation to disclose truth; central to ruling no falsification in leave forms absent disclosure requirement for leave purposes.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for certiorari to assail grave abuse of discretion; used to evaluate the propriety of the remedy, but held applicable only to the Supreme Court for Ombudsman criminal dismissals.
• Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for appeals from quasi-judicial agencies like the Ombudsman in administrative cases to the Court of Appeals within 15 days; cited to declare the petition untimely and misdirected for the administrative aspect.