An employee's dependent who has claimed and received benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code is not barred from subsequently suing the employer for damages under the Civil Code if the initial choice of remedy was made without knowledge of the employer's negligence or of the existence of the alternative remedy, as such ignorance negates a knowing and intelligent waiver.

The case arose from a fatal workplace accident on November 2, 1990, where Jose Juego, a construction worker for petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), died after falling 14 floors when the platform he was on collapsed. The incident prompted his widow, Maria Juego, to seek compensation. This led to a legal conflict over whether her initial claim for statutory death benefits under the Labor Code prevented her from later seeking higher damages from the employer through a civil lawsuit based on negligence.

• On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker employed by petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), was working on a platform at the 14th floor of the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City.
• The platform, which was connected to a chain block, suddenly gave way, causing Juego to fall 14 floors to the basement, resulting in his immediate death.
• A police investigation report concluded that the fall was caused by a loose bolt or pin connecting the chain block to the platform, which lacked a safety lock.
• On November 15, 1990, Juego's widow, respondent Maria Juego, accomplished an application for benefits from the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which petitioner filed on her behalf on November 27, 1990.
• Respondent subsequently began receiving death benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code.
• On May 9, 1991, after receiving a copy of the police report and a prosecutor's memorandum suggesting the case was civil in nature, Maria Juego filed a complaint for damages against DMCI in the RTC of Pasig.

• The police report on the incident was inadmissible as evidence because it constituted hearsay.
• The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to establish negligence because DMCI had exercised due care, as supposedly evidenced by a sworn statement from its leadman.
• Respondent Maria Juego was barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code because she had already availed herself of the exclusive remedy of death benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code.
• Respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts or her remedies, as she was the complainant in a criminal case for negligence filed against DMCI's employees prior to receiving ECC benefits.
• The trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of respondent's ignorance or mistake of fact because she did not allege it in her complaint.

• The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, creating a presumption of negligence on the part of the petitioner, which the petitioner failed to rebut.
• The choice to claim benefits from the State Insurance Fund did not bar the subsequent civil suit for damages because the choice was not made intelligently.
• Respondent was ignorant of the facts constituting petitioner's negligence at the time she applied for ECC benefits and only learned of them later through the police report.
• Respondent, having only an elementary education, was also ignorant of her legal right to choose between remedies under the Labor Code and the Civil Code.
• Waiver is an affirmative defense that the petitioner raised, and therefore, the trial court had the authority to rule on the issue.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the police investigation report is admissible as evidence to prove the petitioner's negligence.
  • Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issue of waiver by election of remedies when the respondent did not allege ignorance or mistake of fact in her complaint.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case to presume negligence on the part of the petitioner.
  • Whether the respondent's availment of benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code constitutes a waiver of her right to file a separate action for damages against the petitioner under the Civil Code.

• Procedural:
  • The police report is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents as it is hearsay; however, it is admissible as part of the testimony of the investigating officer, PO3 Villanueva, who testified in court and was cross-examined. The officer's direct observations made during his investigation are admissible.
  • The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of waiver. Waiver is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant. Since the petitioner pleaded waiver in its Answer, it properly submitted the issue for the court's resolution.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. The Court found that the accident—a worker falling from a platform—is of a kind that does not ordinarily occur without someone's negligence. The instrumentality (the platform) was under the exclusive control of the petitioner, and there was no evidence of contributory negligence by the victim. This created a presumption of negligence that the petitioner failed to rebut with competent evidence, as the affidavit it presented was also inadmissible hearsay.
  • No, the respondent's prior claim from the State Insurance Fund does not bar her civil action for damages. The Court applied the exception established in Floresca, ruling that a choice of remedy only becomes a bar if it is a knowing and intelligent choice. The evidence showed that the respondent was ignorant of the facts of petitioner's negligence and of her legal rights when she claimed ECC benefits. Her ignorance of the Floresca doctrine is not held against her, as Article 3 of the Civil Code (ignorance of the law) applies only to mandatory and prohibitory laws, not to judicial doctrines granting a choice of remedies.

• Res Ipsa Loquitur — A rule of evidence where negligence of the defendant is presumed if (1) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the possibility of contribution to the injury by the plaintiff is eliminated. The Court applied this doctrine to presume DMCI's negligence because the falling of the platform was not a normal occurrence and the equipment was under DMCI's exclusive control.
• Doctrine of Election of Remedies — The principle that when two or more inconsistent remedies are available to a party, the choice of one remedy operates as a bar to the pursuit of the others. In this case, the Court affirmed the general rule that a claimant must choose between compensation under the Labor Code or damages under the Civil Code, but applied the exception that the choice is not binding if made out of ignorance or mistake of fact.
• Waiver — The intentional relinquishment of a known right, which requires knowledge of the facts and an awareness of the consequences of the choice. The Court ruled that the respondent did not make a valid waiver of her right to sue under the Civil Code because she lacked knowledge of the petitioner's negligence and of her available legal remedies at the time she claimed ECC benefits.
• Hearsay Rule — A rule of evidence that prohibits the admission of testimony or documents that quote persons who are not in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Court applied this rule to declare the police report and an affidavit from the petitioner's leadman as inadmissible for proving the truth of their contents, as their authors were not available for cross-examination regarding those specific statements.
• Entries in Official Records — An exception to the hearsay rule for records made by a public officer in the performance of a duty. The Court found that the police report did not meet all the requisites for this exception, particularly that the officer had sufficient personal knowledge of all the facts stated, but held that it was admissible as part of the officer's in-court testimony.

• "The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless... For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents."
• "The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence."
• "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. [It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them."
• "The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person's ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her."

• Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation — Cited as the controlling precedent establishing that an injured worker or their heirs have a choice of remedies between the Workmen's Compensation Act (now Labor Code) and the Civil Code, and that a choice made based on ignorance or mistake of fact does not bar the other remedy.
• Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals — Referenced to support the ruling that an official report, while potentially hearsay, is admissible as part of the testimony of the officer who executed it and testified in court.
• Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al. — Cited for enumerating the requisites for the admissibility of entries in official records as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company — Mentioned as a key case followed in Floresca, which held that an injured worker has a choice to either recover fixed amounts under the compensation act or sue the tortfeasor for higher damages, but cannot pursue both simultaneously.

Articles and Sections Cited

• Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court (Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded) — This rule was the basis for excluding the police report and an affidavit as hearsay evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of their contents.
• Rule 130, Section 44, Rules of Court (Entries in official records) — This exception to the hearsay rule was discussed and found not to be fully applicable to the police report on its own, as the officer lacked personal knowledge of all the facts stated.
• Article 173 of the Labor Code (Extent of liability) — This article provides that the liability of the State Insurance Fund shall be exclusive, which forms the basis for the doctrine of election of remedies in workplace injury cases.
• Article 3 of the Civil Code ("Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.") — The Court held this article was not applicable to the respondent's ignorance of the Floresca ruling, as the provision applies only to mandatory and prohibitory laws, not to judicial doctrines that grant a choice of action.
• Article 8 of the Civil Code ("Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.") — This article was invoked by the petitioner in its argument that the respondent should be presumed to know the Floresca ruling, an argument which the Court rejected.