The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. 10175) is constitutional in its general aim to regulate and punish cybercrimes, but specific provisions that unduly curtail fundamental rights, such as certain aspects of online libel, unsolicited commercial communications, real-time collection of traffic data without a warrant, and the power of the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data, are unconstitutional.

The proliferation of internet use and the rise of cyberspace activities brought about new avenues for communication, commerce, and information dissemination, but also new forms of criminal behavior collectively termed "cybercrimes." Recognizing the need to address these emerging threats, the Philippine government enacted Republic Act No. 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, to define and penalize various offenses committed through or with the use of computer systems, and to provide for their prevention, investigation, and prosecution.

• Republic Act No. 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, was signed into law, defining and penalizing various acts committed with the use of a computer system, including illegal access, data interference, cyber-squatting, identity theft, cybersex, child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications, and online libel.
• The Act also included provisions on penalties, prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175, real-time collection of traffic data, preservation and disclosure of computer data, search and seizure, restricting access to computer data, and the creation of a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC).
• Fifteen (15) groups of petitioners filed separate petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. 10175, arguing they violated fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, expression, and the press, due process, equal protection, right to privacy, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on October 9, 2012, enjoining the implementation of R.A. 10175, which was later extended on February 5, 2013, pending the resolution of the consolidated cases.

• Petitioners argued that Section 4(a)(1) (Illegal Access) is vague and overbroad, potentially criminalizing acts of ethical hackers.
• Petitioners contended that Section 4(a)(3) (Data Interference) is overbroad and creates a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
• Petitioners claimed Section 4(a)(6) (Cyber-squatting) violates the equal protection clause by not distinguishing between malicious and non-malicious registration of similar names.
• Petitioners asserted that Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) violates rights to due process, privacy, correspondence, and freedom of the press.
• Petitioners argued that Section 4(c)(1) (Cybersex) is vague and overbroad, potentially criminalizing private consensual acts.
• Petitioners contended that Section 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications) infringes on freedom of expression as commercial speech is protected.
• Petitioners challenged Section 4(c)(4) (Online Libel) and related RPC Articles on libel, arguing they violate freedom of expression, employ presumed malice, and that online libel imposes a higher penalty.
• Petitioners claimed Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting and Attempt) is overbroad and vague, creating a chilling effect, especially concerning online libel (e.g., "liking" or "sharing" posts).
• Petitioners argued Section 6 (Penalty of One Degree Higher) is unconstitutional for imposing a higher penalty for crimes committed using ICT.
• Petitioners contended Section 7 (Liability under Other Laws) violates the right against double jeopardy.
• Petitioners challenged Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) for authorizing warrantless collection of traffic data, violating the right to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures, and for vagueness of "due cause."
• Petitioners argued Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data) grants the DOJ unconstitutional power to restrict access to data without judicial warrant, violating freedom of expression and due process.
• Petitioners challenged other provisions like Section 13 (Preservation), Section 14 (Disclosure), Section 15 (Search), Section 17 (Destruction), Section 20 (Noncompliance), and Sections 24 and 26(a) (CICC) on various constitutional grounds.

• Respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that R.A. 10175 is a valid exercise of police power aimed at reasonably regulating cyberspace activities, punishing wrongdoings, and preventing harmful attacks.
• Respondents contended that most challenged provisions do not infringe on fundamental rights and meet constitutional standards of clarity and specificity.
• Respondents asserted that the strict scrutiny standard is not applicable to provisions like Section 4(a)(1) (Illegal Access) as no fundamental freedom is involved.
• Respondents argued that ethical hackers are not criminalized by Section 4(a)(1) if they act with prior permission.
• Respondents maintained that Section 4(a)(3) (Data Interference) punishes a form of vandalism and does not encroach on protected freedoms.
• Respondents defended Section 4(a)(6) (Cyber-squatting) by stating that the evil purpose of acquiring a domain name in bad faith is what the law condemns.
• Respondents argued that Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) does not violate privacy rights as it punishes unauthorized acquisition of identifying information for illegitimate purposes.
• Respondents claimed Section 4(c)(1) (Cybersex) is intended to punish cyber prostitution and similar businesses, not private consensual acts.
• Respondents argued that Section 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications) targets "spam" which is a nuisance and a form of trespass to privacy, and commercial speech enjoys less protection.
• Respondents defended Section 4(c)(4) (Online Libel) by stating that libel is not constitutionally protected speech and that online libel merely identifies another means of committing libel already punished under the RPC.
• Respondents contended that Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting) has well-defined meanings in existing jurisprudence.
• Respondents argued that Section 6 (Penalty of One Degree Higher) is justified by the substantial distinction between crimes committed using ICT and those committed through other means, due to increased reach and potential for harm.
• Respondents asserted that Section 7 (Liability under Other Laws) merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single act can be prosecuted under two different laws.
• Respondents argued that Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) serves a compelling state interest in crime-fighting and that traffic data, by its nature, does not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.
• Respondents conceded that Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data) may be unconstitutional.

• Whether Section 4(a)(1) (Illegal Access) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(a)(3) (Data Interference) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(a)(6) (Cyber-squatting) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(c)(1) (Cybersex) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(c)(2) (Child Pornography) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 4(c)(4) (Online Libel) and related RPC Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 are unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting and Attempt) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 6 (Penalty of One Degree Higher) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 7 (Liability under Other Laws) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data) is unconstitutional.
• Whether Sections 8 (Penalties), 13 (Preservation), 14 (Disclosure), 15 (Search), 17 (Destruction), 20 (Noncompliance), 24 and 26(a) (CICC) are unconstitutional.

• Section 4(a)(1) (Illegal Access) is CONSTITUTIONAL. It punishes accessing a computer system without right, a universally condemned act, and does not involve fundamental freedoms requiring strict scrutiny. Ethical hackers with client permission are insulated.
• Section 4(a)(3) (Data Interference) is CONSTITUTIONAL. It punishes intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion, or deterioration of computer data without right, akin to vandalism, and does not encroach on protected speech.
• Section 4(a)(6) (Cyber-squatting) is CONSTITUTIONAL. It does not violate equal protection as it penalizes the acquisition of a domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others, regardless of whether the name used is real or a pseudo-name.
• Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) is CONSTITUTIONAL. It punishes the intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information of another without right. It does not violate due process or the right to privacy, as there is no fundamental right to acquire another's personal data for illegitimate purposes.
• Section 4(c)(1) (Cybersex) is CONSTITUTIONAL. Interpreted to apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating lascivious exhibitions for favor or consideration, it punishes cyber prostitution and similar activities, not private consensual acts.
• Section 4(c)(2) (Child Pornography committed through a computer system) is CONSTITUTIONAL. It merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act (ACPA) to cyberspace, and the higher penalty is a legislative prerogative with a rational basis.
• Section 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It unduly restricts the right to freedom of expression and information, as unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression, and recipients have the option to ignore or delete them.
• Section 4(c)(4) (Online Libel) is CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the libelous post. However, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to persons who simply receive the post and react to it (e.g., by "liking," "commenting," or "sharing"). Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on libel are also upheld as constitutional.
• Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting and Attempt) is CONSTITUTIONAL in relation to Sections 4(a)(1) to 4(a)(6), 4(b)(1) to 4(b)(3), and 4(c)(1). However, it is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) (Child Pornography), 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications), and 4(c)(4) (Online Libel) due to vagueness and its chilling effect on freedom of expression in these contexts.
• Section 6 (Penalty of One Degree Higher) is CONSTITUTIONAL. Imposing a higher penalty for crimes under the RPC and special laws committed through ICT is a valid legislative prerogative due to the substantial distinction in the means of commission, potential for greater harm, and ease of evasion.
• Section 7 (Liability under Other Laws) is CONSTITUTIONAL in general, but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to online libel and online child pornography. Charging an offender for online libel under both R.A. 10175 and the RPC, or for online child pornography under R.A. 10175 and ACPA, violates the proscription against double jeopardy.
• Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data by law enforcement authorities with "due cause") is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The phrase "due cause" is vague, and the provision lacks sufficient safeguards to protect the right to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures, as it allows warrantless collection of traffic data which, when aggregated, can reveal personal information.
• Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data by the DOJ) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It grants the DOJ power to restrict access to computer data based on a prima facie finding without judicial warrant, violating freedom of expression and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Sections 8 (Penalties), 13 (Preservation), 14 (Disclosure with court warrant), 15 (Search, Seizure, and Examination with court warrant), 17 (Destruction of preserved data), 20 (Noncompliance, in relation to valid provisions), 24 and 26(a) (CICC) are CONSTITUTIONAL.

• Strict Scrutiny Standard — A standard of judicial review for challenged laws, where the government must prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Applied when a law impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. The Court found it inapplicable to Section 4(a)(1) (Illegal Access) as no fundamental freedom like speech was involved.
• Overbreadth Doctrine — A governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms (especially speech). Applied to find Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting) unconstitutional in relation to online libel, child pornography, and unsolicited commercial communications due to its chilling effect. Also applied to Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) by some petitioners, though the Court struck it down on other grounds.
• Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine — A law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. This is to ensure fair notice and prevent arbitrary enforcement. Section 5, in relation to certain content-related offenses, and Section 12 ("due cause") were found to suffer from vagueness.
• Freedom of Expression — The constitutionally guaranteed right to express oneself without prior restraint or subsequent punishment, subject to certain limitations. This was a central doctrine in challenging provisions on libel, cybersex, unsolicited commercial communications, and aiding/abetting. The Court balanced this right against legitimate state interests.
• Right to Privacy — The right to be let alone and to control information about oneself. This was invoked against provisions like Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) and Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data). The Court recognized informational privacy but found that traffic data, in its raw form, does not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy unless aggregated.
• Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — The right to be secure in one's person, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. Invoked against Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data) and Section 19 (Restricting or Blocking Access), both of which were struck down for allowing government action without a judicial warrant.
• Double Jeopardy — The proscription against being prosecuted or punished twice for the same offense. Applied to declare Section 7 unconstitutional insofar as it would allow separate prosecutions for online libel under R.A. 10175 and the RPC, and for online child pornography under R.A. 10175 and ACPA.
• Police Power — The inherent power of the State to enact laws and regulations to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people. R.A. 10175 was recognized as an exercise of police power.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — Laws are presumed to be valid and constitutional unless proven otherwise. The Court acknowledged this but still struck down provisions that clearly violated constitutional guarantees.
• Separation of Powers — The principle that divides governmental powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Invoked in relation to the DOJ's power under Section 19, which was seen as an encroachment on judicial functions.
• Delegation of Legislative Power — The principle that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power except under certain conditions (completeness test and sufficient standard test). Applied to uphold Sections 24 and 26(a) regarding the CICC's power to formulate a cybersecurity plan.

• "The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries [cybercrimes] from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act."
• "Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse... Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms."
• "Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression."
• "The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees."
• "The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint."

• Morfe v. Mutuc — Referenced for the early acknowledgement of the right to privacy as existing independently and deserving constitutional protection.
• Sabio v. Gordon — Cited for explaining the concept of "Zones of Privacy" recognized and protected under Philippine law.
• Nogales v. People — Illustrates the extent to which the State can regulate materials serving no purpose other than satisfying lust or pornography, weighing property rights against public welfare.
• Fermin v. People — Discussed in relation to "actual malice" in libel cases involving public figures; the Court clarified that Fermin did not disregard the actual malice standard but found its presence.
• Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines — Referenced in the context of petitioners' arguments regarding the UNHRC's views on penal defamation laws; the Court noted the UNHRC did not enjoin decriminalization but urged careful crafting of such laws.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union — U.S. Supreme Court case cited as analogous to the challenge against Section 5 (Aiding or Abetting), where a vaguely worded statute (Communications Decency Act) was struck down for its chilling effect on protected speech.
• Whalen v. Roe — U.S. Supreme Court case cited for classifying privacy into decisional and informational privacy, relevant to the discussion on Section 12 (Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data).
• Smith v. Maryland — U.S. Supreme Court case cited by the Solicitor General, holding that telephone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial as they voluntarily convey this information to the telephone company. The Supreme Court, however, found Section 12 unconstitutional due to lack of safeguards for aggregated traffic data.
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan — Referenced in the discussion of the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, particularly Justice Mendoza's opinion on their applicability to penal statutes.

• Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) — The entire law was the subject of the case, with specific sections (Sec. 4(a)(1), 4(a)(3), 4(a)(6), 4(b)(3), 4(c)(1), 4(c)(2), 4(c)(3), 4(c)(4), 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26(a)) being challenged and ruled upon.
• Revised Penal Code, Articles 353, 354, 355, 361, 362 (Libel) — These provisions on libel were challenged alongside Sec. 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 and were upheld as constitutional.
• 1987 Constitution, Article III (Bill of Rights) — Various sections were invoked, including:
  • Section 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection): Basis for challenging several provisions for vagueness or unfair classification.
  • Section 2 (Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures): Basis for challenging Sec. 12 and Sec. 19.
  • Section 3 (Right to Privacy of Communication and Correspondence): Basis for challenging Sec. 12.
  • Section 4 (Freedom of Speech, Expression, and the Press): Central to challenges against provisions on libel, cybersex, unsolicited communications, aiding/abetting, and Sec. 19.
  • Section 21 (Right against Double Jeopardy): Basis for challenging Sec. 7.
• Republic Act No. 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009) — Referenced in relation to Sec. 4(c)(2) (Online Child Pornography) and Sec. 7 (Liability under Other Laws).
• Presidential Decree No. 1829 (Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) — Referenced by Section 20 (Noncompliance) of R.A. 10175. The Court upheld Section 20 by noting it incorporates the elements (knowingly or willfully) from P.D. 1829.
• Budapest Convention on Cybercrime — Referenced as an international instrument that requires signatory countries to adopt measures for collecting traffic data, relevant to the discussion on Section 12.

• Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno — Concurred with the ponencia in finding Section 12 (real-time collection of traffic data) and Section 19 (restriction or blocking of access to computer data) unconstitutional. Dissented from upholding Section 6 (increased penalty) as applied to cyberlibel due to its chilling effect. Argued for the partial invalidation of Section 4(c)(4) (libel) regarding those who merely react to posts and Section 7 (liability under other laws) as applied to libel. Emphasized the need for pre-enforcement judicial review for certain provisions and discussed the nature of traffic data and privacy expectations.
• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Concurred in striking down Sections 4(c)(3), 7 (in part), 12, and 19. Dissented from upholding Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (presumption of malice in libel) as applied to public officers and public figures, arguing it is irreconcilable with the actual malice rule and free speech jurisprudence. Also dissented from upholding Section 4(c)(1) (cybersex), arguing it fails strict scrutiny due to overbreadth and underinclusiveness, and reverses well-entrenched jurisprudence on obscenity (Miller test).
• Justice Arturo D. Brion — Concurred with the ponencia on most rulings but offered extensive qualifications and dissents on specific points. Argued that cyber-libel (Sec. 4(c)(4)) itself is constitutional but Sections 5, 6, and 7 should not apply to it to avoid undue chilling effects. Believed Article 354 of the RPC is unconstitutional as applied to public officers/figures. Provided a detailed analysis of Section 12, agreeing with its unconstitutionality due to lack of proper safeguards, and proposed alternative approaches for its valid implementation.

• Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen — Argued that most challenges should fail for lack of actual case or controversy, as they were pre-enforcement facial challenges. Maintained that facial review is only permissible for provisions that are so broad as to imminently threaten freedom of expression. Voted to declare criminal libel (Sec. 4(c)(4) and related RPC articles) and cybersex (Sec. 4(c)(1)) unconstitutional for infringing on freedom of expression. Dissented from the majority’s striking down of Section 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications), arguing it has a valid purpose and no chilling effect on speech of lower value. Provided a framework for analyzing cybercrime provisions, emphasizing the complexity of the internet and the need for restraint in judicial review.