The President has the constitutional power to declare a state of national emergency and call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, such a declaration does not authorize the President to (1) issue decrees, (2) direct the AFP to enforce laws unrelated to suppressing lawless violence, (3) impose prior restraint on the press, or (4) take over privately-owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest without legislative authority under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution. General Order No. 5 is constitutional in providing a standard for the AFP and PNP to implement PP 1017, but its reference to undefined "acts of terrorism" is unconstitutional.

On February 24, 2006, amidst alleged conspiracies by political opposition, leftist insurgents (NDF-CPP-NPA), and military adventurists to overthrow the government, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency. This declaration cited threats to the democratic Philippine State, including plots to unseat or assassinate the President, magnified by certain media segments, and actions adversely affecting the economy and national security. On the same day, G.O. No. 5 was issued to implement PP 1017, directing the AFP and PNP to suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence. These issuances followed a series of events, including the escape of Magdalo Group members, discovery of "Oplan Hackle I" (a plot for bombings and assassinations), recapture of Lt. San Juan with subversive documents, alleged defection plans within the PNP-SAF, and confessions by military officers about plans to join anti-Arroyo protests.

• On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency, citing conspiracies by political opposition, leftist insurgents, and military adventurists to overthrow the government.
• The "WHEREAS" clauses of PP 1017 detailed alleged plots, destabilization efforts, magnification by media, and the resulting clear and present danger to the state.
• On the same day, President Arroyo issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), directing the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence and to carry out necessary measures.
• Following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, EDSA People Power I anniversary celebrations were cancelled, rally permits were revoked, and officials announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, could be implemented.
• Petitioner Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas were arrested without warrant while on their way to an EDSA celebration.
• The offices of the Daily Tribune, a pro-opposition newspaper, were raided by CIDG operatives without a warrant, and materials were confiscated. Police were stationed at the Daily Tribune and Malaya offices.
• Members of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU) were dispersed by police when they attempted to rally.
• Congressman Crispin Beltran was arrested based on a 1985 warrant for inciting to rebellion, which his lawyer claimed had been quashed.
• On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1021, lifting PP 1017 and declaring the state of national emergency had ceased to exist.
• Respondents, through the Solicitor General, presented factual bases for PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, including the escape of Magdalo members, "Oplan Hackle I," Lt. San Juan's recapture with subversive materials, alleged PNP-SAF defection plans, and military officers' confessions of plans to join anti-Arroyo protests.

• PP 1017 encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress, is a subterfuge for martial law, and violates freedoms of press, speech, and assembly.
• The raid on the Daily Tribune offices constituted censorship and prior restraint, and there was no "emergency" (referring to natural disasters) to warrant PP 1017.
• PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative powers, violation of freedom of expression, and a de facto declaration of martial law without factual basis.
• PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogate unto the President the power to enact laws and decrees, were issued without factual basis, and violate freedom of expression and assembly.
• PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violate various constitutional provisions, including Article II, Section 4; Article III, Sections 1, 2, and 4; Article VI, Section 23; and Article XII, Section 17.
• PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise of martial law powers or, alternatively, an exercise of emergency powers without congressional approval, and goes beyond the nature of a proclamation.
• PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression, press, and access to information.

• The petitions should be dismissed for being moot due to the issuance of PP 1021 lifting the state of national emergency.
• Certain petitioners lack legal standing to sue.
• Impleading President Arroyo as a respondent is improper due to presidential immunity.
• PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis, specifically Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and Section 17, Article XII (state's power during national emergency) of the Constitution.
• PP 1017 does not violate the people's right to free expression and redress of grievances.
• The President has full discretionary powers in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces, and PP 1017 had factual bases.
• The acts implementing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were justified by the existing clear and present danger from conspiracies to overthrow the government.

• Whether the issuance of PP 1021 (lifting PP 1017) renders the petitions moot and academic.
• Whether the petitioners have legal standing.
• Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
• Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional, considering:
  • Facial challenge (overbreadth and vagueness).
  • Constitutional basis.
  • As applied challenge (legality of acts done in their implementation).

• The petitions are not moot and academic despite the lifting of PP 1017, as the case involves grave constitutional violations, exceptional character, paramount public interest, need for guiding principles, and is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• All petitioners have legal standing, applying the doctrine of transcendental importance and recognizing direct injury for some.
• The Court can review the factual bases of the President's exercise of the calling-out power, not for correctness, but to determine if the President acted arbitrarily. Petitioners failed to show PP 1017 was totally bereft of factual basis.
• PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence under Section 18, Article VII. However, its provisions giving the President power to (1) issue decrees, (2) direct the AFP to enforce all laws (even those unrelated to lawless violence) and her decrees, and (3) impose standards on media or prior restraint are unconstitutional and ultra vires. The provision declaring a national emergency under Section 17, Article XII is constitutional, but does not authorize the President to take over private utilities without prior congressional legislation.
• G.O. No. 5 is constitutional as it provides a standard ("necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence") for implementing PP 1017. However, the phrase "acts of terrorism" is unconstitutional as it is not legally defined by Congress.
• The warrantless arrests of petitioners David and Llamas, the dispersal and warrantless arrests of KMU/NAFLU-KMU members, the imposition of standards on media/prior restraint, and the warrantless search of the Tribune offices were unconstitutional.

• Judicial Review — The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. The Court exercised this power to examine the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
• Moot and Academic Principle — A case is moot if it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to supervening events. The Court held this principle inapplicable due to exceptions: grave constitutional violation, paramount public interest, need for guiding principles, and capability of repetition yet evading review.
• Locus Standi (Legal Standing) — A personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act. The Court relaxed this rule based on the transcendental importance of the issues.
• Presidential Immunity from Suit — The President, during their tenure, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case. The Court affirmed this, noting President Arroyo should not have been impleaded.
• Review of Factual Bases for Calling-Out Power — The Court can review the factual bases for the President's exercise of the calling-out power not to determine correctness but to ascertain if there was arbitrariness (i.e., if the decision was totally bereft of factual basis). Applied to find the President justified in issuing PP 1017.
• Overbreadth Doctrine — A statute is unconstitutional on its face if it sweeps unnecessarily broadly and invades the area of protected freedoms, particularly free speech. The Court found this inapplicable to PP 1017 as it is not primarily directed at speech.
• Void for Vagueness Doctrine — A law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, typically applied in free speech cases. The Court found this inapplicable as petitioners did not show PP 1017 was vague in all applications.
• President's Calling-Out Power (Commander-in-Chief Powers) — Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution allows the President, whenever necessary, to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. This was the primary constitutional basis upheld for PP 1017.
• President's "Take Care" Power — Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The Court ruled that the part of PP 1017 directing enforcement of decrees and all laws (even unrelated to lawless violence) was an overreach of this power.
• Ordinance Power of the President — The President can issue executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders, but not decrees having the force of law, as legislative power is vested in Congress. The "decrees" provision in PP 1017 was struck down.
• Emergency Powers of Congress (Delegation to President) — Under Section 23(2), Article VI, Congress may authorize the President, in times of war or other national emergency, to exercise powers necessary to carry out a declared national policy. This is distinct from the President's calling-out power.
• State's Power to Take Over Private Utilities (Article XII, Section 17) — In times of national emergency, when public interest requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of privately-owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest, under reasonable terms prescribed by it (referring to Congress). The Court held PP 1017's invocation of this without congressional delegation for takeover was unconstitutional.
• Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — Article III, Section 2 protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires a warrant based on probable cause. Applied to declare the raid on Daily Tribune and arrests of David and Llamas unconstitutional.
• Freedom of Speech, Expression, Press, and Assembly — Article III, Section 4 guarantees these rights. These rights were found to be violated by the dispersal of rallies, arrests, and actions against the media.
• Prior Restraint — Governmental restriction on expression before it is made or published. The actions against the Daily Tribune and warnings to media were considered prior restraint and censorship.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — Laws are presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise. However, the Court found specific provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, and acts done in their implementation, to be unconstitutional.

• "An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."
• "The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority."
• "The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case..."
• "Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature."
• "Military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves."
• "It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state."

• Marbury v. Madison — Cited for establishing the concept of judicial review.
• Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary — Cited for upholding the President's power to declare a "state of rebellion" as part of the calling-out power, though deeming the declaration itself as legally superfluous. Distinguished because PP 1017 invoked more powers. Also cited for the principle that an otherwise moot case may be decided if a party continues to be prejudiced.
• Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora — Cited for the principle that the Court can review the President's exercise of the calling-out power for grave abuse of discretion and for the criteria of the calling-out power ("whenever it becomes necessary").
• Lansang v. Garcia — Cited for the Court's authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (analogous to reviewing factual basis for calling-out power) to determine constitutional sufficiency, shifting from the "political question" doctrine. Standard set was arbitrariness, not correctness.
• Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda — Cited as earlier cases where the Court held that the decision on the existence of an exigency for emergency powers belongs to the President and is conclusive on courts (political question doctrine). Contrasted with Lansang.
• Aquino v. Enrile and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile — Cited as cases that diluted Lansang and showed division on the justiciability of martial law. Garcia-Padilla suggested the President is answerable only to conscience, People, and God in times of war/emergency.
• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer — U.S. Supreme Court case cited to support the principle that the President's power to seize private property in emergencies must stem from the Constitution or an act of Congress, not from inherent executive or military power.
• Araneta v. Dinglasan — Cited for the principle that legislative power remains with Congress even in times of crisis and that emergency powers delegated to the President are for a limited period.
• United States v. Salerno — U.S. case cited to explain that the overbreadth doctrine is generally limited to First Amendment (free speech) cases.
• Broadrick v. Oklahoma — U.S. case cited to state that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception and attenuates as conduct moves from pure speech to conduct punishable under valid criminal laws.
• De Jonge v. Oregon — U.S. case cited for the principle that peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
• Burgos v. Chief of Staff — Cited for the principle that closure of media establishments constitutes prior restraint and is abhorrent to freedom of the press.

• Constitution, Article VII, Section 18 — (Commander-in-Chief clause) The President may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. This was the primary basis for upholding the general validity of PP 1017's call to the AFP.
• Constitution, Article XII, Section 17 — (National Emergency, State takeover of private utilities) In times of national emergency, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The Court ruled this requires congressional authorization for the President to act.
• Constitution, Article VII, Section 17 — (President's duty to ensure faithful execution of laws) The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Used to analyze the directive in PP 1017 to enforce laws and decrees.
• Constitution, Article VI, Section 1 — (Legislative Power) Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress. Used to declare unconstitutional the part of PP 1017 granting the President power to issue decrees.
• Constitution, Article VI, Section 23(2) — (Emergency Powers of Congress) Congress may authorize the President to exercise emergency powers. Interpreted in conjunction with Article XII, Section 17.
• Constitution, Article III, Section 1 — (Due Process and Equal Protection) Cited by petitioners as violated.
• Constitution, Article III, Section 2 — (Right against unreasonable searches and seizures) Basis for declaring the raid on Daily Tribune and certain arrests unconstitutional.
• Constitution, Article III, Section 4 — (Freedom of speech, expression, press, assembly, and petition) Basis for declaring dispersal of rallies, media restrictions, and certain arrests unconstitutional.
• Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power) — Defines the types of issuances the President can make (Executive Orders, Proclamations, etc.). Used to show the President cannot issue "decrees" with legislative force.
• Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880 (Public Assembly Act) — Governs public assemblies. The Court noted its provisions on permits and due notice were violated in the dispersal of rallies.
• Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5 — (Warrantless Arrests) Provides conditions for lawful warrantless arrests. Used to find the arrests of David and Llamas illegal.
• Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126 — (Search and Seizure) Details procedures for search and seizure, requiring a warrant. Used to find the search of Daily Tribune offices illegal.

• Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban — Emphasized that while PP 1017 itself might be seen as a "paper tiger," its implementation led to "nuclear teeth" that needed defanging. Stressed the Court's duty to set parameters of power and prevent abuse, drawing lessons from historical experiences with authoritarianism. Considered his concurrence integral to the ponencia.
• Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago — Agreed that PP 1017 is only a call-out power and does not authorize the President to promulgate decrees, enforce unrelated laws, or curtail fundamental rights. Stated that Article XII, Section 17 requires congressional authorization for takeover. Found G.O. No. 5's "acts of terrorism" provision unconstitutional due to vagueness and lack of a defining law, leading to arbitrary enforcement. Emphasized that government action to stifle liberties cannot be preemptive and requires a clear and present danger.

• Justice Dante O. Tinga — Argued that PP 1017, like PP 427 in Sanlakas, is an "utter superfluity" and devoid of legal significance, creating no rights or obligations. Believed the majority was "defanging paper tigers" and ruling on non-justiciable issues. Contended that the reference to "decrees" in PP 1017 refers to existing Marcos-era decrees still in force, not new ones. Argued that G.O. No. 5's reference to "acts of terrorism" is not constitutionally infirm as it refers to acts already punishable under existing penal laws. Believed the Court should not adjudicate the specific "as applied" injuries without proper trial of facts. Voted to dismiss all petitions.