A state cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, criminalize the public display of a single offensive expletive when that display does not incite immediate violence, is not directed at a specific individual in a personally abusive manner, is not obscene in the legal sense, and does not intrude upon substantial privacy interests in an intolerable way; the emotive function of speech is also protected.

The case arose during the Vietnam War era, a period of significant social and political unrest in the United States, particularly concerning the military draft. Cohen's act of wearing the jacket was a form of protest against the draft and the war, reflecting a common sentiment among dissenters at the time. The public display of such an expletive in a courthouse, a public forum, brought to the forefront the conflict between an individual's right to free expression and the state's interest in maintaining public order and decency.

• On April 26, 1968, Paul Robert Cohen was observed in the corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the plainly visible words "Fuck the Draft."
• Women and children were present in the corridor at the time.
• Cohen testified that he wore the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.
• Cohen did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, any act of violence, nor did anyone react violently to his conduct.
• Cohen did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor did he utter any sound prior to his arrest.
• When Cohen entered a courtroom within the building, he removed his jacket and folded it over his arm; he was arrested by an officer only after he emerged from the courtroom.
• Cohen was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 415, which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct," and was sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment.

• Cohen argued that his conviction, based on the display of the words on his jacket, infringed his rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
• Cohen contended that his conduct was symbolic speech expressing his opposition to the draft and the Vietnam War.
• Cohen asserted that the words, while offensive to some, did not constitute "fighting words" as they were not directed at any particular individual and were not inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction.
• Cohen argued that the statute, as applied to him, was overly broad and punished speech based on its content and the presumed sensitivities of onlookers, rather than any actual disruption or incitement to violence.

• The State of California argued that Cohen's conduct was "offensive conduct" within the meaning of California Penal Code § 415, which it defined as "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace."
• The State contended it was reasonably foreseeable that Cohen's conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a violent act against him or attempt to forcibly remove his jacket.
• The State asserted its power to protect the public from offensive language and maintain a minimum level of public decorum, especially in public places like a courthouse.
• The State suggested that Cohen's expression was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers, justifying state intervention to protect the sensitive from such crude forms of protest.

• Whether the State of California, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can criminalize the simple public display of a single four-letter expletive, specifically "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket, under a statute prohibiting "offensive conduct" that disturbs the peace.
• Whether Cohen's display of the expletive constituted "speech" protected by the First Amendment, or if it fell into an unprotected category such as obscenity or "fighting words."
• Whether the State's interest in maintaining public order and decorum, or protecting the sensibilities of unwilling viewers, outweighs an individual's right to express offensive messages.

• The Supreme Court reversed Cohen's conviction, holding that the State's action violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
• The Court reasoned that Cohen's conviction rested solely upon the asserted offensiveness of the words used to convey his message, which is "speech," not "conduct" in a non-communicative sense.
• The Court found that the message on the jacket was not obscene, as it was not erotic, and did not constitute "fighting words" because it was not directed at any particular person and there was no evidence it incited or was intended to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
• The Court rejected the argument that the State could ban such speech to protect unwilling viewers, noting that those in the courthouse could easily avert their eyes and that the government's ability to shut off discourse to protect others from hearing it is limited, especially outside the home.
• The Court emphasized the importance of protecting even offensive speech, recognizing that language serves both cognitive and emotive functions, and that governments cannot be arbiters of taste or suppress ideas simply because they are offensive.
• The Court concluded that the State, absent a more particularized and compelling reason, cannot make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense, as doing so risks suppressing ideas and gives too much power to the majority to silence dissidents.

• Freedom of Speech (First Amendment, applied via Fourteenth Amendment) — This fundamental right protects individuals from government restriction on their expression of ideas and opinions. The Court held that Cohen's display of the words on his jacket was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, and the State could not criminalize it merely because it was offensive.
• Fighting Words Doctrine — This doctrine, established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, defines "fighting words" as those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to an ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. The Court found Cohen's expletive was not "fighting words" because it was not directed at any particular individual and was not a direct personal insult likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction from a specific hearer.
• Obscenity — This refers to a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment, typically defined by its erotic nature and appeal to prurient interest, lacking serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Court determined that the expletive on Cohen's jacket, while vulgar, was not obscene as it did not have an erotic component.
• Captive Audience Doctrine — This doctrine considers whether speech is thrust upon a listener who cannot reasonably avoid it, potentially justifying some restrictions on speech, particularly in the privacy of one's home. The Court found that individuals in the courthouse corridor were not a captive audience in the same way as someone in their home and could easily avert their eyes, thus this doctrine did not justify suppressing Cohen's speech.
• Content-Based Regulation of Speech — This refers to government restrictions on speech based on its message, ideas, subject matter, or content, which are presumptively unconstitutional. The Court's decision underscored that the State's attempt to ban the expletive was an impermissible content-based restriction, as it targeted the offensiveness of the specific word used.
• Emotive Function of Speech — This principle recognizes that language conveys not only cognitive ideas but also inexpressible emotions, and this emotive aspect is also protected under freedom of speech. The Court highlighted that words are often chosen for their emotive force as much as their cognitive content, and the Constitution protects this dual communicative function.

• "For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."
• "Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual."
• "[W]e cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated."
• "[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." (Quoting Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United States)
• "Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."

• Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931) — Referenced to distinguish Cohen's case as resting solely on "speech" rather than on separately identifiable conduct.
• United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968) — Contrasted with Cohen's situation, as O'Brien involved conduct (burning a draft card) that had both communicative and non-communicative elements, whereas Cohen's "conduct" was purely the communication itself.
• Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957) — Cited to support the principle that Cohen could not be punished for the underlying anti-draft message itself, absent incitement to illegal activity.
• Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) — Used to argue that the statute did not provide notice that certain speech permissible elsewhere would not be tolerated in specific locations like a courthouse, as the statute was applicable statewide.
• Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966) — Contrasted with Cohen, likely to show that while states can regulate conduct on certain public properties, the regulation here was based on the content of speech, not its location in a way that Adderley addressed (trespass on jail grounds).
• Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) — Cited to establish that Cohen's expression was not obscene, as obscenity requires an erotic element, which was absent.
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) — Referenced for the "fighting words" doctrine, which the Court found inapplicable to Cohen's generalized expletive not directed at a particular individual.
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) — Cited to support that the words on Cohen's jacket were not "directed to the person of the hearer" as required for "fighting words."
• Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949) — Distinguished because there was no showing that Cohen intended to provoke a hostile reaction or that anyone was actually violently aroused.
• Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971) — Cited for the principle that the mere presumed presence of unwilling listeners does not automatically justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense, and that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability."
• Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970) — Referenced in the context of the "captive audience" doctrine, distinguishing the lesser privacy interest in a public courthouse from the sanctity of the home.
• Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969) — Quoted for the principle that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."
• Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965) — Cited to argue against the state effecting censorship itself to prevent a hypothetical violent response from a lawless few.
• Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) — Referenced for the underlying philosophy of free expression: that it is essential for a capable citizenry, a more perfect polity, and individual dignity.
• Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) — Quoted to support the idea that even "wholly neutral futilities" are protected by free speech.
• Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 (1944) — Quoted for the "prerogative of American citizenship... to speak foolishly and without moderation."
• Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921) — Cited in support of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the appeal.
• In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P. 2d 727 (1970) — Mentioned in a footnote and by the dissent regarding the California Supreme Court's interpretation of Cal. Penal Code § 415, which the majority found consistent with the Court of Appeal's construction in Cohen's case.

• First Amendment, United States Constitution — Its guarantee of freedom of speech was central to the Court's decision that California could not criminalize Cohen's expression.
• Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution — This amendment makes the First Amendment's free speech protections applicable to the states. The Court found California's actions inconsistent with these protections.
• California Penal Code § 415 — This was the statute under which Cohen was convicted. It prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct." The Court analyzed whether Cohen's actions constituted "offensive conduct" punishable under this statute in a manner consistent with the First Amendment.
• 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) — This federal statute concerns the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions, and was cited to affirm the Court's authority to hear Cohen's appeal.

• Justice Blackmun (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black; Justice White joined in part) — Argued that Cohen's "absurd and immature antic" was mainly conduct and little speech, falling within the sphere of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (fighting words). He also expressed uncertainty whether the California Court of Appeal's construction of § 415 was still authoritative after the California Supreme Court's subsequent decision in In re Bushman, suggesting the case should be remanded for reconsideration in light of Bushman if not dismissed. Justice White concurred only with the second point regarding Bushman.