Chua vs. Commission on Elections

A petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court questioning a resolution of the COMELEC En Banc must be filed within the 30-day reglementary period, and the filing of a prohibited pleading, such as a second motion for reconsideration disguised as another motion, does not toll the running of this period, leading to the finality of the assailed resolution by operation of law.

The case originated from an election protest concerning the results of the October 28, 2013 Barangay Elections for the position of Punong Barangay of Addition Hills, San Juan City. Petitioner Herbert O. Chua was initially proclaimed the winner with 465 votes, a five-vote lead over respondent Sophia Patricia K. Gil, who garnered 460 votes. Gil subsequently filed an election protest alleging fraud and illegal acts.

• Herbert O. Chua and Sophia Patricia K. Gil were candidates for Punong Barangay of Addition Hills, San Juan City in the October 28, 2013 elections.
• Chua was proclaimed the winner with 465 votes against Gil's 460 votes.
• Gil filed an election protest with the MeTC, which was dismissed, affirming Chua's victory.
• On appeal, the COMELEC First Division reversed the MeTC's decision on April 7, 2017, and declared Gil as the duly-elected Punong Barangay.
• Chua filed a motion for reconsideration, which the COMELEC En Banc denied in a resolution dated November 6, 2017.
• Chua received notice of the denial on November 9, 2017, leaving him with a remaining period of 24 days (until December 3, 2017) to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
• Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, Chua filed a "Manifestation with Clarification and Motion to Stay Execution" on November 10, 2017, arguing that Gil had abandoned her protest by filing a certificate of candidacy for councilor in 2015.
• The COMELEC En Banc denied this motion on January 19, 2018, ruling it was in the nature of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
• A Certificate of Finality was issued, and the COMELEC En Banc's resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on January 23, 2018.
• Chua filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court on January 31, 2018.
• During the pendency of the case, the May 14, 2018 Barangay Elections were held, and Chua won as Punong Barangay for the new term.

• The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to rule on the supposed mootness of Gil's election protest, which was allegedly abandoned when she ran for councilor in 2015.

• The petition for certiorari was filed out of time, as the reglementary period was not tolled by Chua's filing of a "Manifestation with Clarification and Motion to Stay Execution," which is considered a prohibited pleading.
• The resolution of the COMELEC En Banc had already attained finality and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the 30-day reglementary period prescribed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the issue of who won the 2013 Barangay Elections has become moot and academic due to the expiration of the term and the holding of the subsequent 2018 Barangay Elections.

• Procedural:
  • Yes, the petition was filed out of time and must be dismissed. The Court held that under Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari must be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment. While Chua's initial motion for reconsideration interrupted this period, he had only 24 days remaining after receiving the denial from the COMELEC En Banc. His subsequent "Manifestation with Clarification and Motion to Stay Execution" was a prohibited pleading under Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as it was effectively a second motion for reconsideration. A prohibited pleading does not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Thus, the period expired on December 3, 2017, and the petition filed on January 31, 2018, was belated.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, the case is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court ruled that even if the petition had been timely filed, the issue regarding the winner of the 2013 Barangay Elections ceased to present a justiciable controversy. The term of office for that election had already expired, and the May 14, 2018 Barangay Elections had been concluded. Deliberating on the merits would be an exercise in futility, as any outcome could no longer be enforced. The Court took judicial notice that Chua himself won the same position in the 2018 elections, reinforcing the mootness of the petition.

• Doctrine of Finality of Judgment (Immutability of Judgment) — This doctrine states that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect. The Court applied this by holding that the COMELEC En Banc's resolution became final and executory by operation of law when Chua failed to file a timely petition for certiorari, precluding any further review.
• Prohibited Pleadings — These are motions or pleadings that are disallowed under procedural rules and, if filed, do not produce any legal effect. The Court applied this by classifying Chua's "Manifestation with Clarification and Motion to Stay Execution" as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC En Banc ruling, which consequently did not toll the 30-day period for filing a petition for certiorari.
• Doctrine of Mootness — A case is moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to supervening events, such that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the petition because the expiration of the 2013-2018 term and the conduct of the 2018 Barangay Elections rendered the dispute over the 2013 election results devoid of any practical significance.

• "Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is prohibited except in a case involving an election offense."
• "[A] prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal since such pleading cannot be given any legal effect precisely because of its being prohibited."
• "It is well-settled that judgment or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration."
• "it must be stressed that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law."

• Angelia vs. Commission on Elections — Cited to establish that a COMELEC En Banc resolution in a non-election offense case is not subject to reconsideration, and the only recourse is to file a timely petition for certiorari under Rule 65, without waiting for a resolution on a prohibited motion.
• Landbank of the Philippines vs. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc. — Referenced to support the principle that a prohibited pleading is deemed not filed at all and cannot toll the running of the period to appeal.
• Baldo, Jr. vs. Comelec, et al. — Used as a parallel case to illustrate the doctrine of mootness in election disputes, where a subsequent election renders any potential victory in the previous one an "empty victory" as no practical relief can be enforced.
• Testate Estate of Maria Manuel vs. Biascan — Cited to underscore that the finality of a judgment occurs by operation of law upon the lapse of the reglementary period for appeal, without need for a judicial declaration.

• Rules of Court, Rule 64, Section 3 — This provision was central to the procedural ruling, as it establishes the 30-day period for filing a petition for certiorari from a COMELEC judgment and governs the interruption of this period by a motion for reconsideration.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 13, Section 1(d) — This rule was applied to classify Chua's "Manifestation..." as a prohibited motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, which therefore did not stop the running of the period to file a petition with the Supreme Court.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 13(a) — Cited to affirm that a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an ordinary action becomes final and executory thirty days after its promulgation, which supported the Court's finding that the assailed resolution had already attained finality.