Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals

The persistent and unjustified refusal of a spouse to engage in sexual intercourse, an essential marital obligation, for a prolonged period is equivalent to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as it demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. Throughout their cohabitation, which lasted until March 15, 1989, they never engaged in sexual intercourse. The wife, Gina, alleged that her husband consistently refused to consummate the marriage, leading her to believe he was either impotent or a closet homosexual who married her merely to maintain his residency status in the Philippines. This complete lack of sexual intimacy and the husband's emotional distance prompted the wife to file a complaint for the annulment of their marriage.

• Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi and respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988, and lived together until March 15, 1989.
• The parties admitted that no sexual intercourse ever occurred between them from the first night of their marriage until their separation almost ten months later.
• Gina Lao-Tsoi testified that on their wedding night and every night thereafter, her husband would simply sleep on one side of the bed, turn his back on her, and go to sleep without any attempt at intimacy.
• During their four-day honeymoon in Baguio City, which they took with several family members at the husband's invitation, he continued to avoid her, for instance by taking long walks alone during siesta time.
• A medical examination on January 20, 1989, confirmed that Gina was healthy, normal, and still a virgin.
• The petitioner, Chi Ming Tsoi, claimed that it was his wife who avoided his advances, but he admitted he only attempted to force her once and stopped because she was shaking and did not like it.
• The petitioner submitted a medical report from a Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., stating that there was no evidence of impotency and that he was capable of erection, although it was noted as a "soft erection."
• Gina alleged that her husband was impotent or a closet homosexual who used her to acquire or maintain his residency status and maintain the public appearance of a normal man.

• The lower courts erred in granting the annulment based merely on the parties' admissions of non-coitus, which could be a product of collusion and violates the rule that material facts in annulment cases must always be proven.
• The refusal to have sexual intercourse does not, by itself, constitute psychological incapacity, and the respondent failed to present any independent evidence proving such a condition.
• The courts failed to make a categorical finding of psychological incapacity and did not conduct an in-depth analysis of the reasons for the refusal, which could have been due to physical disorders on the part of the wife rather than a psychological issue on his part.
• The lower courts did not fully satisfy themselves that there was no collusion between the parties before decreeing the annulment.

• The petitioner's consistent and unexplained refusal to have sexual intercourse with her throughout their cohabitation constitutes psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
• Medical examinations proved that she was physically healthy, normal, and capable of sexual relations, negating the petitioner's claim that she was the one at fault.
• The petitioner's actions, including his lack of interest in sex, observations of him using an eyebrow pencil, and his motive for marriage being residency, support the finding of his psychological incapacity.
• She is unwilling to reconcile with the petitioner due to the frustration of her normal marital expectations caused by his inadequacy.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the annulment of the marriage was improperly granted based on the parties' admissions, in violation of the rule against collusion and judgment on the pleadings in annulment cases.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the senseless and protracted refusal of the petitioner to fulfill the essential marital obligation of sexual intercourse constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court ruled that the decision was not based on a prohibited judgment on the pleadings or a confession of judgment. The respondent (wife) presented evidence through her testimony under oath and was cross-examined. The petitioner's admission of non-coitus was made during the trial, and his active opposition to the annulment negated any suspicion of collusion. Therefore, the requirement that material facts be proven at trial was sufficiently met.
• Substantive:
  • The Court affirmed the lower courts' finding of psychological incapacity. It held that sexual intercourse is an essential marital obligation, and the procreation of children is a basic end of marriage. The petitioner's senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage for almost ten months is a manifestation of a serious personality disorder that renders him incapable of fulfilling his duties as a husband. This abnormal reluctance demonstrates an "utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage," which falls squarely within the meaning of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

• Psychological Incapacity (Article 36, Family Code) — This doctrine refers to a condition of a spouse characterized by a grave, permanent, and incurable personality disorder that prevents them from comprehending and discharging the essential obligations of marriage. In this case, the Court held that the senseless and protracted refusal to have sexual intercourse is a direct manifestation of such incapacity, as it defeats the fundamental purpose of marriage.
• Essential Marital Obligations — The Court identified the obligation "to procreate children through sexual cooperation" as a basic end of marriage and an essential marital duty. It ruled that the constant and unexplained non-fulfillment of this obligation by one party is equivalent to psychological incapacity as it destroys the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
• Prohibition Against Collusion in Annulment Cases — This principle ensures that annulment is granted only on valid grounds and not through the connivance of the spouses. The Court applied this by verifying that the facts were established through a proper trial where the respondent testified and was cross-examined, and noted that the petitioner's own opposition to the annulment was the strongest evidence against collusion.

• "If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity."
• "Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations."

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals — Referenced for its definition of psychological incapacity as an "utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage," which the Court applied to characterize the petitioner's refusal to consummate his marriage.
• Tompkins vs. Tompkins — Cited as a persuasive foreign case to cast doubt on the petitioner's claim that he refrained from sex out of sympathy for his wife, suggesting that a husband would normally assert his marital rights.
• Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno — Cited to support the idea that the bond of marriage is sustained by "spontaneous, mutual affection" rather than by legal mandate, highlighting the absence of such a bond in the present case due to the lack of intimacy.

• Article 36, Family Code — This is the central legal basis for the annulment, defining psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring a marriage void from the beginning. The Court's entire ruling is an interpretation and application of this article to the facts of the case.
• Article 68, Family Code — Cited to outline the spousal obligations to live together and observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, underscoring the relational aspects of marriage that the petitioner failed to fulfill.
• Section 1, Rule 19, Rules of Court — This procedural rule, which prohibits judgment on the pleadings in annulment cases and requires that material facts always be proved, was addressed by the Court to dismiss the petitioner's procedural objections.
• Articles 88 and 101 (par. 2), Civil Code — Mentioned as the legal basis for the prohibition against annulling a marriage based on a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment, which the Court found was not violated in this case.