A state statute that requires individuals to obtain a certificate from a public official before soliciting for religious or charitable causes, where the official has the discretion to determine if the cause is genuinely religious, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore, speech that is offensive but does not create a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order is protected under the First Amendment and cannot be the basis for a common law breach of the peace conviction.

The case arose from the activities of Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, who were Jehovah's Witnesses. They were engaging in proselytizing activities in New Haven, Connecticut, which involved distributing religious literature and playing phonograph records with religious messages. Their actions led to their arrest and conviction under a state statute regulating solicitation for religious causes and for the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. This case tested the extent to which states can regulate religious solicitation and speech, particularly when it is deemed offensive by others.

• Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jesse and Russell, all Jehovah's Witnesses claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut.
• They were going house-to-house on Cassius Street, a predominantly Roman Catholic neighborhood, equipped with religious books, pamphlets, a portable phonograph, and records.
• They would ask permission to play a record, which described one of their books. If permission was granted, they would play the record, offer the book for sale, and if refused, solicit contributions for their publications.
• One record, describing a book titled "Enemies," contained an attack on the Catholic religion.
• All three were convicted under a Connecticut statute (§ 6294) for soliciting money for a religious cause without a certificate from the secretary of the public welfare council, who had to determine if the cause was genuinely religious.
• Jesse Cantwell was additionally convicted of the common-law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. This conviction stemmed from an incident where he stopped two men on the street, received permission to play a record, and played the "Enemies" record. The two men, who were Catholic, were incensed and testified they felt like striking Cantwell, but he left when told to. There was no evidence Jesse was personally offensive, loud, or truculent, nor that he impeded traffic or drew a crowd.

• The Connecticut statute requiring a certificate for religious solicitation, as construed and applied, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them freedom of speech and prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
• The statute constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of their religion because it required them to obtain a certificate based on an official's determination of whether their cause was religious.
• Jesse Cantwell's conviction for inciting a breach of the peace violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, because his conduct did not present a clear and present danger.

• The statute was a legitimate exercise of state power to protect the public from fraud in the solicitation of money or valuables under the guise of religion, not an impairment of freedom of speech or religion.
• The statute only regulated the solicitation of funds, not the distribution of literature or the teaching of doctrines.
• The denial of a certificate by the licensing officer, if arbitrary or capricious, would be subject to judicial review.
• Jesse Cantwell's conduct in playing a phonograph record that violently attacked the religion of his listeners constituted a common law breach of the peace, as it was likely to provoke violence.
• The right to propagate religious views does not permit committing a breach of peace under the guise of preaching.

• Does the Connecticut statute requiring a certificate for soliciting funds for any alleged religious cause, where issuance depends on an official's determination of whether the cause is religious, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty, including the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech?
• Did Jesse Cantwell's conviction for the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace, based on playing an offensive religious record to two individuals on a public street, violate his rights to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment?

• Yes, the Connecticut statute, as applied to the Cantwells, is unconstitutional. The Court held that the statute's requirement for a certificate, contingent upon a state official's determination of whether a cause is "religious," constitutes a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. This system amounts to a censorship of religion.
• Yes, Jesse Cantwell's conviction for inciting a breach of the peace is reversed. The Court found that while the content of the record was offensive to the listeners, Jesse Cantwell's conduct (playing the record after receiving permission, without being noisy, truculent, or impeding traffic) did not pose a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order. His actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of freedom of speech and religion.

• Incorporation Doctrine (First Amendment via Fourteenth Amendment) — The principle that the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment (such as freedom of speech and free exercise of religion) are made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated, "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." This was foundational to applying First Amendment protections against state action.
• Free Exercise Clause (First Amendment) — Protects the freedom of individuals to practice their religion. The Court distinguished between freedom to believe (absolute) and freedom to act (subject to regulation for societal protection, but such regulation must not unduly infringe the protected freedom). The Connecticut statute was found to unduly infringe the freedom to act in religious solicitation by imposing a prior restraint.
• Prior Restraint — Government action that prohibits speech or other expression before it can take place. The Court found the Connecticut statute to be an unconstitutional prior restraint because it required official approval (a certificate based on determining if a cause was "religious") before religious solicitation could occur. "Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment..."
• Freedom of Speech (First Amendment) — Protects the right to communicate information and opinions. This was invoked concerning Jesse Cantwell's conviction for breach of the peace. The Court held that speech, even if offensive or provocative, is protected unless it incites imminent lawless action or falls into other unprotected categories.
• Clear and Present Danger Test — A doctrine used to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms. Speech that creates a "clear and present danger" of a significant evil that Congress (or a state) has power to prevent is not protected. The Court found that Jesse Cantwell's conduct did not rise to the level of a clear and present danger to public peace and order. "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."
• Regulation of Time, Place, and Manner — The principle that states may enact general and non-discriminatory legislation to regulate the time, place, and manner of activities like soliciting or holding meetings on streets to safeguard peace, good order, and comfort, without unconstitutionally invading protected liberties. The Court found the Connecticut statute was not such a regulation because if a certificate was denied, solicitation was altogether prohibited, rather than merely regulated in its manner.

• "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment [Fourteenth] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment."
• "Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
• "In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."
• "Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth."
• "To condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution."
• "In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor."
• "Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner's communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common law offense in question."

• Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 — Referenced for the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to states and for discussing regulations of speech in public places. (p. 303, 308 footnote 3)
• Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 — Cited for the proposition that freedom to act in the exercise of religion is subject to regulation for the protection of society, and that acts contrary to social duties or good order are not immune due to religious belief. (p. 300, 304 footnote 4)
• Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 — Cited alongside Reynolds for the limits on religiously motivated conduct that violates social duties. (p. 304 footnote 4)
• Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 — Compared to emphasize that prior restraints on speech and press are generally inadmissible, and that judicial review of administrative licensing does not cure the defect of a system of previous restraint. (p. 304 footnote 5, 306 footnote 7)
• Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 — Implicitly relevant as a prior restraint case where distribution of literature without permission was forbidden. (Mentioned by respondent, p. 299)
• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 — Compared in the context of legislative judgment versus common law application regarding speech that might provoke disorder. (p. 307 footnote 9)
• Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (ante, p. 88) — Compared in the context of legislative judgment versus common law application and the need for narrowly drawn statutes when regulating speech. (p. 307 footnote 9, 311 footnote 10)
• Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 — Compared regarding the "clear and present danger" test in the context of the breach of peace conviction. (p. 311 footnote 10)
• Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 — Compared regarding the "clear and present danger" test and the need for specific statutes rather than broad common law applications to punish speech. (p. 311 footnote 10)

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its guarantees of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion are central to the case. The Court held these are made applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Due Process Clause) — The Court held that this clause incorporates the First Amendment's protections of free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, making them applicable to state actions. The Connecticut statute and the common law conviction were found to violate these liberties without due process.
• Connecticut General Statutes § 6294 (as amended by § 860d of the 1937 supplement) — This statute prohibited solicitation for any alleged religious, charitable, or philanthropic cause without a certificate from the secretary of the public welfare council, who had to determine if the cause was religious and conformed to standards of efficiency and integrity. The Court found this statute unconstitutional as applied.