Callo-Claridad vs. Esteban

The determination of probable cause for filing a criminal information is an executive function exclusively within the competence of the Secretary of Justice, and courts cannot interfere absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in this case, no such abuse occurred as the circumstantial evidence was incompetent and insufficient to establish probable cause for charging the respondents with murder.

The case arises from the unsolved stabbing death of 17-year-old Chase Callo Claridad on February 27, 2007, in the carport of an uninhabited house in Ferndale Homes, Quezon City, amid suspicions of involvement by respondent Philip Esteban, a friend of the victim, and his mother Teodora, fueled by observations of their vehicles at the scene, prior parking disputes in the subdivision, and the family's subsequent non-cooperation with investigators, though no direct evidence or motive linked them to the crime.

On February 27, 2007, around 5:30 p.m., Chase returned home from visiting his girlfriend Ramonna Liza “Monnel” Hernandez; at approximately 7:00 p.m., his sister Ariane noticed respondent Philip driving a white Honda Civic parked nearby, waved at him without response, and later saw Chase leave with house helpers Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus after Chase boarded the white Honda Civic; Chase exchanged text messages with Monnel from 7:09 p.m. to 7:31 p.m., including one stating he was on the way to get tires and feeling sad; security guards Rodolph Delos Reyes and Henry Solis logged the white Honda Civic (plate CRD 999, owned by Richard Joshua Ulit and entrusted to Philip) entering the subdivision at 7:26 p.m. with Philip driving and a male passenger; at about 7:30 p.m., house helper Marivic Rodriguez and nanny Jennylyn Buri heard cries of “Help! Help!” from the carport of No. 10 Cedar Place, an uninhabited house, but did not investigate; the Esteban family had a history of illegally parking vehicles there, leading to disputes with security guards; at 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora arrived in a vehicle (plate XPN 733); three cars were parked at the carport, including the white Honda Civic (CRD 999), a Honda CRV (ZAE 135), and Philip's usual car (JTG 333), with witnesses alleging a male and female arguing inside JTG 333; at 7:50 p.m., security guard Abelardo Sarmiento Jr. noticed red streaks on JTG 333, inspected the vehicles, found blood on CRD 999, a bloodied cellphone inside, and Chase's naked upper body lifeless between the cars with a crumpled bloodied shirt and socks; Sarmiento called for backup, and Rene Fabe barricaded the scene; at 7:55 p.m., an unidentified caller (later identified as Larry Esteban, Philip's relative) reported a “kid” accident at Cedar Place; SOCO team documented the scene, recovering bloodstained items, a green nylon cord, fingerprints, a wristwatch, and a bloodied Nokia N90 phone; autopsy reports confirmed two stab wounds, one fatal to the heart piercing the descending aorta at 9 cm depth, and another on the forearm; common friends attested to no rift between Philip and Chase; the Estebans were uncooperative, with Philip allegedly injured but details undisclosed, and the family offered to pay funeral expenses.

The Secretary of Justice erred in denying the petition for review as probable cause exists against respondents for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code based on numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence, including sightings of Philip with Chase, vehicle logs, cries for help, blood on Philip's associated car, the family's parking disputes and non-cooperation, and the presence of Teodora's vehicle; the elements of murder are present, including qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery given the time, manner, weapon, and wound locations.

There is a lack of eyewitnesses, motive, and sufficient circumstantial evidence to link respondents to the crime, as identifications of Philip are doubtful due to tinted windows and darkness, many affidavits are unsworn or hearsay, no evidence shows respondents' presence at the exact time of the stabbing, common friends confirm no ill feelings between Philip and Chase, and possibilities exist of multiple suspects or other perpetrators; Teodora cannot be charged as principal, accomplice, or accessory without reliable evidence.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to challenge the Secretary of Justice's resolution on probable cause, or if a special civil action for certiorari was required demonstrating grave abuse of discretion.
• Substantive Issues: Whether sufficient probable cause exists to charge respondents with murder based on the circumstantial evidence presented, and whether the Secretary of Justice and Court of Appeals erred in finding no prima facie evidence of respondents' involvement in the killing of Chase.

• Procedural: The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review under Rule 43, as the Secretary of Justice performs an executive function in determining probable cause, not a quasi-judicial one, making certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy requiring a showing of grave abuse of discretion; nonetheless, the Court examined the merits and found no such abuse, as the dismissal was based on competent evidence review consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.
• Substantive: No probable cause exists to charge respondents with murder, as the circumstantial evidence is insufficient and incompetent, with many affidavits unsworn in violation of Rule 112 Section 3, lacking certifications of voluntary execution, and failing to form an unbroken chain proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Rule 133 Section 4; no eyewitnesses, motive, or direct link to the crime exists, and the evidence only shows bare suspicions without proving respondents' presence or participation at the stabbing.

• Doctrine of Separation of Powers — This principle allocates full discretionary authority to the Executive Branch, including the Secretary of Justice, for determining probable cause in criminal prosecutions, preventing courts from interfering unless grave abuse of discretion is shown; in this case, it was applied to uphold the Secretary's dismissal, as no patent or gross abuse was demonstrated to warrant judicial intervention.
• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigation — Defined as facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the accused is probably guilty, requiring more than bare suspicion but less than conviction-level evidence; here, it was interpreted to exclude the petitioner's circumstantial evidence due to its unreliability and incompleteness, justifying the non-filing of an information.
• Requirements for Circumstantial Evidence — For sufficiency, circumstances must be consistent, proven, and form an unbroken chain leading to guilt inconsistent with innocence, producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt; in this case, it was used to reject the evidence as it relied on unsworn affidavits, hearsay, and did not conclusively link respondents to the crime.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — An arbitrary, capricious, or despotic exercise of discretion amounting to evasion of duty or refusal to act, such as by passion or hostility; applied here to find no such abuse in the Secretary's affirmance of dismissal, as the decision was reasoned and evidence-based.

• "The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." — This opening statement encapsulates the core jurisdictional limit on judicial review in probable cause determinations.
• "Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch..." — Highlights the policy of non-interference absent grave abuse, cited from Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III.
• "For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof." — Explains the stringent test applied to dismiss the petitioner's reliance on indirect evidence.
• "The role and object of preliminary investigation were 'to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions...'" — Quoted from Hashim v. Boncan to underscore the protective purpose against unfounded charges.

• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III — Cited as controlling precedent on the doctrine of separation of powers and the need for grave abuse of discretion to justify judicial interference in executive probable cause determinations, directly applied to deny intervention here.
• Arula v. Espino — Referenced to outline the three purposes of preliminary investigation, including inquiring into the crime and accused's connection, preserving evidence, and determining bail, used illustratively to emphasize the inquiry's limited scope in this case.
• Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. v. Lim — Cited to affirm that Rule 43 is improper for reviewing Secretary of Justice resolutions on probable cause, as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies, distinguished to highlight the executive nature of the function.
• Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals — Invoked to stress the need for careful evidence examination to protect liberty and avoid unnecessary prosecutions, followed here to validate the dismissal based on lack of material damage prevention.
• People v. Pascual — Cited for the rules on circumstantial evidence sufficiency, applied to conclude that the evidence did not form an unbroken chain proving guilt.
• Oporto, Jr. v. Monserate — Referenced as precedent that certifications under Rule 112 Section 3 are mandatory to ensure affidavit reliability, used to exclude unsworn statements in the preliminary investigation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of murder, including qualifying circumstances like treachery and evident premeditation; relevant as the petitioner alleged its elements were present, but the court found no probable cause to apply it against respondents.
• Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Provides that preliminary investigation determines sufficient ground for a well-founded belief in the crime's commission and accused's guilt; central to the ruling as the executive's discretion in this inquiry was upheld.
• Section 3, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Requires affidavits in complaints to be subscribed and sworn before authorized officers with certifications of voluntary execution and understanding; applied to deem many of petitioner's affidavits inadmissible for non-compliance, leading to insufficient evidence.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Specifies conditions for circumstantial evidence to suffice for conviction beyond reasonable doubt; used to evaluate and reject the petitioner's chain of circumstances as broken and unproven.
• Rule 43, Rules of Court — Governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies; distinguished as improper remedy for reviewing the Secretary of Justice's executive determination, justifying potential dismissal of the CA petition.