Inducing a minor, through persuasion via a computer system like Facebook Messenger, to create and send photos exhibiting their private parts constitutes the crime of child pornography under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b), and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775; the crime is mala in se, requiring criminal intent (specifically, the intent to induce the prohibited act), which was proven in this case.

The case arose from a romantic relationship between the petitioner (Christian Cadajas, 24 years old) and the victim (AAA, 14 years old), which started after AAA initiated contact. The relationship was discovered by AAA's mother (BBB) who disapproved due to AAA's minority. BBB later found messages on Facebook Messenger where petitioner was inducing AAA to send explicit photos, leading to the filing of criminal charges.

• Petitioner Christian Cadajas (24 years old) and AAA (14 years old) became sweethearts on April 2, 2016, after meeting at the canteen where petitioner worked and exchanging messages on Facebook Messenger.
• AAA's mother, BBB, discovered the relationship in June 2016 by reading their Facebook messages on her phone (which AAA borrowed) when AAA forgot to log out.
• BBB disapproved of the relationship due to AAA's age and admonished them, but they ignored her.
• In October 2016, BBB read messages indicating petitioner was luring AAA to a motel and confronted petitioner, telling him to stay away from her minor daughter.
• On November 18, 2016, BBB read Facebook Messenger conversations where petitioner coaxed AAA to send photos of her breasts and vagina, which AAA eventually did.
• Upon learning her mother read the messages, AAA tried to delete them; BBB forced AAA to open petitioner's Facebook Messenger account to get copies of the conversation.
• Petitioner admitted sending messages like "oo ready ako sa ganyan" and "sige hubad" but denied sending photos of his private parts.
• Petitioner broke up with AAA on November 17, 2016, because her mother disapproved.
• Petitioner was charged with violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 and Sec. 4(c)(2) of R.A. 10175 in relation to R.A. 9775.
• AAA testified that petitioner instructed her to send the pictures and she felt forced ("napilitan") due to his persistent requests ("panay ang please," "hindi po niya ako tinigilan").
• AAA also testified some messages she sent, like claiming to be aroused, were just jokes ("trip lang").
• AAA's Certificate of Live Birth established she was 14 years old at the time.

• The evidence (photos and conversations from Facebook Messenger) is inadmissible as it was obtained in violation of his right to privacy, constituting fruit of the poisonous tree.
• The act complained of does not constitute an offense penalized under R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775.
• The Court of Appeals gravely erred in its interpretation of the unlawful acts under the cited statutes.
• The prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• He raised the "sweetheart defense," implying the acts were consensual within a romantic relationship.
• The crime charged should be considered mala in se, requiring criminal intent which the prosecution failed to prove.

• The evidence obtained from the Facebook Messenger account is admissible because it was obtained by a private individual (BBB), not by state agents, hence the Bill of Rights protection against unreasonable searches does not apply.
• Petitioner waived his objection to the evidence's admissibility by failing to raise it timely during the trial court proceedings.
• Petitioner had a limited expectation of privacy concerning AAA, having voluntarily given her his password, authorizing her access.
• The Data Privacy Act (DPA) allows processing of sensitive personal information when necessary for determining criminal liability and protecting lawful rights in court proceedings.
• All elements of child pornography under R.A. 10175 in relation to R.A. 9775 were proven: AAA was a minor (14 years old), petitioner induced her to produce explicit photos (lascivious exhibition of genitals/breasts), and this was done through a computer system (mobile phone/Facebook Messenger).
• Petitioner was aware of AAA's minority.
• The "sweetheart defense" is inapplicable, especially in child pornography cases where a minor's consent is immaterial due to vulnerability and the nature of the offense (initially argued as malum prohibitum by lower courts).
• Even if considered mala in se, the intent to induce AAA was clearly established by the conversation and AAA's testimony.

• Whether the evidence (Facebook Messenger conversations and photos) obtained by AAA's mother is admissible despite petitioner's claim of violation of right to privacy.
• Whether the petitioner's act of inducing the minor AAA to send explicit photos through Facebook Messenger constitutes child pornography under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775.
• Whether the "sweetheart defense" is applicable in this case.
• Whether the crime of child pornography under the applicable laws is mala in se or malum prohibitum, and if petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was proper.

• The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
• The evidence obtained from petitioner's Facebook Messenger account is admissible; the exclusionary rule under the Bill of Rights applies only to evidence obtained by the State or its agents, not private individuals like BBB. Petitioner also waived his objection by not raising it timely. Furthermore, petitioner had a limited expectation of privacy towards AAA after sharing his password, and the DPA permits processing of such data for establishing criminal liability and protecting rights in court.
• All elements of child pornography were established beyond reasonable doubt: AAA was proven to be a minor (14); petitioner induced her through persistent requests via Facebook Messenger (a computer system) to send photos involving lascivious exhibition of her breasts and vagina (explicit sexual activity).
• The "sweetheart defense" is rejected; consent is immaterial when a minor is persuaded, coerced, or induced into such acts, and the law aims to protect minors from exploitation, regardless of relationship context. The age disparity (24 vs 14) placed petitioner in a position of influence.
• The crime is classified as mala in se, requiring criminal intent. However, the required intent is the intent to induce the child to perform the prohibited act (creating child pornography), which was proven by the petitioner's persistent prodding evident in the messages and AAA's testimony. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• The proper penalty under R.A. 10175 (Sec. 4 & 8) for child pornography committed via computer system is one degree higher than that in R.A. 9775 (Sec. 15(b), reclusion temporal maximum). One degree higher than reclusion temporal is reclusion perpetua, which is the penalty imposed by the Supreme Court. The P1,000,000.00 fine was affirmed.

• Right to Privacy: Defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation or intrusion into private activities, the "right to be let alone." The Court reiterated that the constitutional protection (Art. III, Sec. 3) primarily shields individuals from government intrusion, not acts of private persons.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test: Used to determine violation of privacy rights, requiring assessment of (1) whether the individual exhibited an expectation of privacy and (2) whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. Applied here, petitioner's expectation was limited regarding AAA as he gave her his password, and diminished regarding admissibility as evidence was obtained privately and objection was waived.
• Exclusionary Rule (Fruit of the Poisonous Tree): Principle that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights (like right to privacy against state intrusion) is inadmissible. Held inapplicable here because the evidence was obtained by a private individual (BBB), not a state agent.
• Waiver of Objection to Evidence: Failure to object to the admissibility of evidence at the proper time (when formally offered) is deemed a waiver of the objection. Applied to petitioner's failure to object to the Facebook messages/photos during trial.
• Mala In Se vs. Malum Prohibitum: Distinction between acts inherently immoral (mala in se, requiring criminal intent) and acts wrong merely because prohibited by statute (mala prohibita, intent generally immaterial). The Court held child pornography under RA 9775/10175 is mala in se, requiring proof of intent (to induce), contrary to lower courts' finding of malum prohibitum, but found such intent was proven.
• Sweetheart Theory/Defense: A defense, usually in rape or acts of lasciviousness, arguing that the act was consensual within a romantic relationship. Rejected here as consent of a minor induced into creating child pornography is immaterial, and the law specially protects children.
• Parens Patriae: Doctrine referring to the State's role as guardian of persons under legal disability, such as minors. Invoked to emphasize the State's duty to protect children like AAA from sexual predators and the harmful consequences of premature sexual activity.
• Best Interest of the Child: Principle that the child's welfare shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them. Applied to justify the protective measures of the anti-child pornography laws and rejection of defenses undermining child protection.
• Data Privacy Act (DPA) Limitations: The DPA allows processing of personal and sensitive personal information under specific circumstances, such as for investigation of criminal liability of the data subject (Sec. 19) or for protection of lawful rights in court proceedings (Sec. 13(f)). Applied to justify the use of petitioner's messages as evidence.

• "The right to privacy is defined as 'the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.' It is the right of an individual 'to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.' Simply put, the right to privacy is 'the right to be let alone.'"
• "That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission."
• "In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated."
• "Basic is the rule that in order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds therefore be specified... When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived."
• "If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita."
• "[T]he crime of child pornography as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 9775 should be classified as a crime mala in se."
• "The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable."

• Zulueta v. Court of Appeals (1996): Cited by petitioner for inadmissibility of evidence obtained by a spouse violating privacy. Distinguished by the Court as obiter dictum regarding constitutional privacy between private individuals and factually different (civil case for return of documents).
• People v. Marti (1991): Cited as the controlling doctrine that the Bill of Rights' protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies against the State, not private individuals. Followed in this case regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained by BBB.
• Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr. (2013): Cited for the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test used to assess violations of the right to privacy. Applied in analyzing petitioner's privacy expectation regarding his Facebook account.
• Ople v. Torres (1998): Cited within the Spouses Hing quote for enunciating the two-part test for reasonable expectation of privacy.
• Vivares v. St. Theresa's College (2014): Cited regarding privacy settings on social media (Facebook) and the user's responsibility, and the concept of informational privacy.
• Disini v. Secretary of Justice (2014): Cited for discussion on the nature of the internet, cybercrimes, and the rationale for the higher penalty for child pornography committed in cyberspace.
• Bangayan v. People (2020): Cited regarding the sweetheart theory and the capacity of minors (above 12) to give sexual consent under certain circumstances (in RA 7610 cases). The Court ultimately distinguished child pornography cases, holding the sweetheart defense inapplicable here due to inducement and the specific nature of child pornography laws (RA 9775/10175).
• Malto v. People (2007): Cited for its previous ruling (later clarified/modified by Bangayan) that the sweetheart defense was unacceptable in RA 7610 cases and that a minor's consent was immaterial (treating the offense as malum prohibitum). Contrasted with the current ruling.
• Dungo v. People (2015): Cited for the definition and distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes.

• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 3 (Right to Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; Exclusionary Rule)
• Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), Section 4(c)(2) (Child Pornography as a cybercrime)
• Republic Act No. 10175, Section 8 (Penalties, providing for one degree higher penalty)
• Republic Act No. 10175, Section 3(g) (Definition of Computer System, includes mobile phones)
• Republic Act No. 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009), Section 4(a) (Unlawful act: hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child...)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 3(b) (Definition of Child Pornography)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 3(c)(5) (Definition of Explicit Sexual Activity: lascivious exhibition...)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 3(a) (Definition of Child)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 2 (Declaration of Policy)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 15(b) (Penalty for violating Sec 4(a), (b), (c): reclusion temporal maximum)
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 4(d) (Possession with intent to sell, distribute, publish) - Discussed in legislative deliberations cited.
• Republic Act No. 9775, Section 4(l) (Mere possession) - Discussed in legislative deliberations cited.
• Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), Section 10(a) (Other acts of abuse - Petitioner acquitted of this)
• Republic Act No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012), Section 13(f) (Lawful processing of sensitive personal info for legal claims/rights protection)
• Republic Act No. 10173, Section 19 (Non-applicability for criminal investigations)
• Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 54(a)(1) (Character of offended party - mentioned re: AAA's previous boyfriends)
• Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child And Youth Welfare Code), Article 1 (State policy to promote child welfare)
• United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child, Article 3(1) (Best interests of the child)
• Civil Code (Implied reference regarding governance of relationships between private individuals)