An accused person is not entitled, as a matter of fundamental right, to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses during the preliminary investigation stage after the issuance of an arrest warrant; while the investigating judge has the discretion to grant such an opportunity, Section 11 of Rule 108 does not mandate it, and the constitutional right to confront witnesses applies specifically to the trial proper.

The petitioner, Dominador B. Bustos, was accused in a criminal case and underwent a preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace (JP) of Masantol, Pampanga. After the JP found probable cause and issued a warrant based on the complainant's and witnesses' initial testimony, the case was set for the second stage of the preliminary investigation where the accused could present evidence.

• The petitioner, Dominador B. Bustos, was the accused in a criminal case originating from the Justice of the Peace (JP) Court of Masantol, Pampanga.
• During the preliminary investigation, after being informed of the charges and pleading not guilty, the petitioner, through counsel, moved that the complainant and her witnesses be presented again so they could be cross-examined.
• The fiscal and private prosecutor objected, citing Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
• The JP sustained the objection, denying the petitioner's motion to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses at that stage.
• In response to the denial, the petitioner's counsel announced the intention to renounce the petitioner's right to present evidence during the preliminary investigation.
• Consequently, the JP forwarded the case records to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga for trial.
• Upon the case reaching the CFI, the petitioner filed a motion asking the CFI to remand the case back to the JP specifically for the purpose of allowing the petitioner to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses.
• The respondent CFI Judge, Antonio G. Lucero, denied the petitioner's motion to remand.
• The petitioner then filed the present proceeding (likely certiorari) before the Supreme Court challenging the CFI's denial.

• The petitioner argued that he had a right to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses during the preliminary investigation as part of due process.
• The petitioner contended that the denial of this opportunity by the JP, and the subsequent refusal of the CFI to remand the case for this purpose, constituted an error or abuse of discretion.
• (As argued in the dissent, supporting petitioner's position) Section 11 of Rule 108, if interpreted to deny the right to cross-examine at the preliminary investigation, potentially infringes upon the accused's substantive rights or constitutional right to confrontation.

• (Implied from the JP's and CFI Judge's actions and the Court's ruling) The respondent Judge acted correctly because Section 11 of Rule 108 does not grant the accused an absolute right to recall and cross-examine prosecution witnesses during the preliminary investigation after the initial examination for issuing an arrest warrant.
• (Implied) The petitioner waived his right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation stage, and the case was properly elevated to the CFI.
• (Implied) The constitutional right to confrontation applies primarily to the trial phase, not necessarily the preliminary investigation phase.
• (Implied) Allowing cross-examination at this stage is discretionary upon the investigating judge, not mandatory, as affirmed in the Dequito case.

• Whether an accused has the absolute right to compel the complainant and witnesses to testify again and be cross-examined during the second stage of preliminary investigation (after arrest but before trial) under Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether the respondent CFI Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace court for cross-examination purposes.

• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that the respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.
• The Court reiterated its ruling in Dequito vs. Arellano, stating that while Section 11 of Rule 108 defines the defendant's rights in preliminary investigation, it does not grant an absolute right to compel the complainant and witnesses to repeat their testimony for cross-examination after the arrest warrant has been issued based on their initial statements.
• The Court clarified that allowing such cross-examination falls within the sound discretion of the investigating Justice of the Peace or judge, aimed at ascertaining truth, but it is not a demandable right of the accused at this stage.
• The Court emphasized that the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by witnesses applies specifically to the trial phase and does not extend, as a matter of right, to the preliminary investigation, which can even be omitted entirely without violating due process.

• Preliminary Investigation (Nature and Purpose) — A statutory procedure (not constitutional, except as part of due process) to determine probable cause before holding a person for trial. The Court affirmed that its primary purpose is satisfied by establishing probable cause for arrest and trial, and it doesn't necessitate all trial-type procedures like mandatory cross-examination at every stage.
• Right of Confrontation (Constitutional Right) — The right guaranteed by the Constitution for an accused to meet witnesses face-to-face, primarily during the trial proper. The Court explicitly stated this right does not, as a matter of course, apply to preliminary hearings or investigations.
• Judicial Discretion (in Preliminary Investigation) — The inherent authority of a court or investigating officer to make decisions based on reasonableness and justice within the bounds of the law. The Court held that under Rule 108, Sec 11, the investigating judge has the discretion, but not the obligation, to recall witnesses for cross-examination by the defense during the preliminary investigation.
• Substantive vs. Procedural Rights (Invoked in Dissent) — Substantive rights create or define primary rights and duties, while procedural rights prescribe the method of enforcing them. Justice Feria's dissent argued the right to cross-examine at PI is a substantive statutory right that cannot be diminished by procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under its rule-making power.

• "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest."
• "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses."
• "As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial."
• (Dissenting, Feria J.) "It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right."
• (Dissenting, Perfecto J.) "Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental right to hear the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-examine them."

• Potenciana Dequito and Carlos Saling Buhay vs. Hon. Hugo O. Arellano (G.R. No. L-1336) — Cited as the controlling precedent where the Court previously held that while a Justice of the Peace has the discretion to recall prosecution witnesses for cross-examination during preliminary investigation, Section 11 of Rule 108 does not grant the accused the right to demand it. This case established the discretionary nature of the act.

• Rule 108, Section 11 (Rules of Court) — This was the central provision under interpretation. It outlined the procedure for preliminary investigation, and the Court interpreted it as not granting the accused an absolute right to cross-examine witnesses after the issuance of the arrest warrant but before the presentation of defense evidence.
• Constitution, Article VIII, Section 13 (Cited in Dissent) — Cited by Justice Feria to argue that the Supreme Court's rule-making power is limited and cannot diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights, contending that the right to cross-examine at PI is a substantive right diminished by Rule 108, Sec 11.
• Constitution, Article III, Section 1(17) (Cited in Dissent) — Cited by Justice Perfecto regarding the right of the accused "to meet the witnesses face to face," arguing this constitutional guarantee should apply even at the preliminary investigation stage.

• Feria, J. — Argued strongly that the right to cross-examine witnesses during preliminary investigation is a substantive statutory right, not merely procedural. He contended that Section 11 of Rule 108, as interpreted by the majority, diminishes this substantive right, thereby exceeding the Supreme Court's rule-making power under the Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 13), rendering the rule invalid in that aspect. He believed the accused should have the right to cross-examine to potentially avoid the burden of a full trial.
• Perfecto, J. — Maintained his position from the Dequito case, arguing that the constitutional right "to meet the witnesses face to face" (Art. III, Sec. 1(17)) should be interpreted to apply to the preliminary hearing stage. He asserted that denying cross-examination at this stage forces the accused to endure the ordeal of trial even if the charges could be shown to be groundless earlier, making the preliminary investigation an "empty gesture." He voted to grant the petition.