An employee who receives money or property on behalf of an employer acquires only material or physical possession, not juridical possession; thus, the misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the employee constitutes theft, not Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The case arose from an internal audit conducted by Siam Bank Inc., Iligan City Branch, which uncovered alleged fraud and irregularities in its loan transactions. Specifically, the audit revealed non-remittance of loan payments collected by its employees, including petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye, who was a Loans Bookkeeper.

• Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye was a Loans Bookkeeper for Siam Bank Inc., Iligan City Branch, authorized to collect loan payments, issue provisional receipts, accomplish cash transfer slips, and remit payments to her supervisor, Jenkin U. Tupag.
• An audit from December 1, 2000, to June 15, 2001, revealed non-remittance of some loan payments.
• The audit showed 853 provisional receipts amounting to P470,768.00 issued by Benabaye were unreported, and the corresponding payments were unremitted. The information stated a total amount of P688,833.00.
• Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain the discrepancies and demanded the return of the money.
• Benabaye, in her written explanation, claimed she submitted daily cash transfer slips and provisional receipts to Tupag, and discrepancies could be clarified by him.
• Siam Bank also demanded an explanation and return of money from Tupag, who admitted accountability but did not disclose identities of alleged co-employees involved.
• Siam Bank terminated Benabaye and Tupag and filed a criminal case for Estafa against them.
• Benabaye testified that she remitted receipts and collections to Tupag daily, making only one copy of cash transfer slips which Tupag kept. She also claimed Tupag reissued provisional receipts for unremitted ones she had issued, and other employees also issued provisional receipts.
• Tupag was unable to testify during the trial.

• Benabaye argued that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely material, not juridical, and therefore she could not be validly indicted for Estafa.
• She contended that the RTC erred in holding that the acts described in the Information constituted only one single offense.
• She asserted there was no conspiracy between her and Tupag.
• She maintained that she remitted the provisional receipts and corresponding amounts collected, along with daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag.

• The prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and CA, argued that all elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) were established.
• It was argued that Benabaye and Tupag held the loan payments in trust for Siam Bank with the obligation to remit them.
• They allegedly misappropriated the money to the damage and prejudice of Siam Bank and failed to account for it despite demand.
• The CA found that Benabaye's "continuing intention to commit Estafa constituted a single intention although committed on different dates," thus classifying it as a "continuing offense."
• The CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and Tupag was sufficiently established as both had access and facility to determine if payments were properly remitted.

• Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Specifically, whether the first element of Estafa, which is the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same (implying juridical possession), was established.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution, and dismissed the criminal charges for Estafa against Benabaye and her co-accused Tupag, without prejudice.
• The Court ruled that the first element of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) – juridical possession of the property – was not established.
• Benabaye, as a Loans Bookkeeper whose duty was to collect loan payments and remit them to her supervisor daily, only had material or physical possession of the funds, not juridical possession.
• Juridical possession means possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner; an employee receiving money on behalf of an employer only has material possession.
• Conversion of personal property by an employee having mere material possession constitutes theft, whereas misappropriation by an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred constitutes Estafa.
• Since Benabaye was merely a custodian of the funds, akin to a bank teller, she did not acquire juridical possession, and thus cannot be convicted of Estafa as charged.
• The Court extended the dismissal of the Estafa charge to her co-accused, Tupag, pursuant to Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as the favorable judgment was applicable to him given he also lacked juridical possession.

• Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (Elements) — This crime requires: (a) receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, on commission, for administration, or under an obligation to deliver/return; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender, or denial of receipt; (c) prejudice to another; and (d) demand by the offended party. The Court found the first element, specifically juridical possession, lacking.
• Juridical Possession vs. Material Possession — Juridical possession is a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. Material possession is mere physical custody. For Estafa by misappropriation, the offender must have acquired juridical possession. An employee receiving money for an employer generally has only material possession. This distinction was central to acquitting Benabaye of Estafa, as her role as a collector meant she only had material possession.
• Distinction between Estafa and Theft based on Possession — Conversion of personal property by an employee having mere material possession constitutes theft. Misappropriation of property by an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred constitutes Estafa. The Court applied this to determine that if a crime was committed, it would be theft, not Estafa.
• Effect of Appeal by Any of Several Accused (Section 11(a), Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) — An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. This doctrine was applied to extend the acquittal for Estafa to the co-accused Tupag, even though his appeal was not perfected, because the ground for Benabaye's acquittal (lack of juridical possession) was equally applicable to him.
• Continuing Offense (Delito Continuado) — The CA characterized Benabaye's actions as a "continuing offense" due to a "single criminal design" despite multiple acts of misappropriation on different dates. While mentioned, the Supreme Court's primary ruling on the nature of possession made further discussion on this point for Estafa moot.

• "It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee."
• "Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner."
• "Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa."
• "There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank."

• Chua-Burce v. CA (387 Phil. 15, 2000) — Cited to support the ruling that a bank cash custodian (similar to Benabaye's role) has no juridical possession over missing funds, only material possession, and thus cannot be convicted of Estafa. This case was pivotal in establishing the nature of Benabaye's possession.
• Guzman v. CA (99 Phil. 703, 1956) — Referenced for its explanation of the distinction between the possession of a bank teller (mere custodian) and an agent (who can have juridical possession) for determining criminal liability for Estafa. This helped clarify why Benabaye, like a teller, lacked juridical possession.
• Matrido v. People (610 Phil. 203, 2009) — Cited to reiterate that money received by an employee for an employer is only in the employee's material possession, and that conversion of such by an employee constitutes theft, not Estafa if juridical possession did not pass.
• Serona v. CA (440 Phil. 508, 2002) — Cited for the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC.
• Lim v. CA (524 Phil. 692, 2006); Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (559 Phil. 622, 2007) — Cited to support the principle that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, including aspects not raised by the parties, relevant to extending the favorable judgment to Tupag.

• Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended — This is the specific provision defining Estafa through misappropriation, under which Benabaye was charged. The Court analyzed its elements, particularly the nature of possession required.
• Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Mentioned in the RTC's denial of Tupag's appeal, regarding loss of remedy to appeal for failure to appear at promulgation without justifiable cause.
• Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended — This rule states that an appeal by one accused shall not affect non-appealing co-accused, unless the appellate court's judgment is favorable and applicable to them. The Court applied this to extend Benabaye's acquittal to her co-accused, Tupag.