Belongilot vs. Cua

The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the complaint without properly assessing probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as the DARAB respondents' issuance of a TRO and injunction after the final and executed PARAD decision evidenced manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, warranting the filing of criminal charges.

The dispute arose from a long-standing agrarian reform case involving parcels of land in Bulacan owned by the petitioner's wife, which were forcibly occupied and converted into a fishpond by Juanito Constantino in 1979, leading to an ejectment suit under the Department of Agrarian Reform framework and subsequent procedural maneuvers that culminated in the petitioner's loss of possession despite a favorable final decision.

Leonarda Belongilot owned lands under OCT No. 0-359 in Bulacan; in 1979, Juanito Constantino forcibly occupied Lots 1, 2, and 3, converting them into a fishpond. Leonarda filed an ejectment complaint before PARAB in 1998. PARAD Sapora ruled on May 21, 2001, for eviction, denying Constantino's motion for reconsideration. Constantino's appeal notice on October 8, 2001, was dismissed on April 16, 2002, as late. Writ of execution issued May 22, 2002, enforced May 31, 2002, evicting Constantino and turning possession to petitioner Niceas Belongilot, who stocked the fishpond. Constantino filed a petition for injunction with TRO on May 21, 2002, before DARAB without seeking reconsideration of the appeal dismissal. DARAB issued TRO on November 15, 2002, after execution, and injunction on December 27, 2002, despite the decision's finality and lack of affidavit of merit. Constantino harvested fishlings on November 23, 2002. Petitioner filed amended complaint against DARAB officials with Ombudsman on January 20, 2003, for R.A. 3019 violation, dismissed June 10, 2003, and motion for reconsideration denied October 20, 2003.

The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the complaint without finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, ignoring material facts showing the DARAB respondents' manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence in issuing the TRO and injunction after the PARAD decision's finality and execution, which caused undue injury to the petitioner by allowing Constantino unwarranted benefits and depriving the petitioner of possession and income from the fishpond.

The petition should be dismissed for using the wrong remedy under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65; the Ombudsman has discretion to determine probable cause in criminal cases, and its finding of no probable cause should not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion, as procedural infirmities in the DARAB's actions do not automatically constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 without proof of manifest partiality, bad faith, or negligence, and the presumption of regularity applies to public officers.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to challenge the Ombudsman's dismissal of the criminal complaint, or if it should be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 due to allegations of grave abuse of discretion.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint without finding probable cause to charge the DARAB respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, given the DARAB's issuance of TRO and injunction despite the finality, execution, and procedural defects in Constantino's petition.

• Procedural: The Court treated the Rule 45 petition as a Rule 65 certiorari petition due to its substance alleging grave abuse of discretion, prioritizing constitutional duty to address such claims over strict procedural form, and found the remedy appropriate as the complaint was criminal in nature.
• Substantive: The Court reversed the Ombudsman's dismissal, finding grave abuse of discretion for failing to rule on probable cause and using irrelevant considerations; probable cause existed under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 as the respondents' actions showed manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence by issuing TRO and injunction post-execution without required affidavit or motion for reconsideration, causing undue injury to the petitioner and unwarranted benefit to Constantino, ordering the Ombudsman to file the information.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as patent evasion of duty or arbitrary action; applied here to the Ombudsman's refusal to assess probable cause and the DARAB respondents' disregard of rules in issuing the TRO and injunction, warranting Supreme Court intervention via certiorari.
• Probable Cause in Criminal Cases — Exists when facts engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the accused is probably guilty, requiring sufficient evidence to hold for trial; used to determine that indicators like procedural violations and post-execution injunction established basis for R.A. 3019 charges against respondents.
• Manifest Partiality, Evident Bad Faith, Gross Inexcusable Negligence under Section 3(e) R.A. 3019 — Modes of violating the anti-graft law where partiality is a clear inclination to favor one side, bad faith involves fraudulent purpose or ill will, and negligence is willful indifference to duty; interpreted as present in respondents' actions ignoring finality of decision, lack of affidavit, and accomplished execution, causing undue injury.
• Presumption of Regularity in Official Acts — Public officers are presumed to perform duties regularly absent proof otherwise; invoked by Ombudsman but rebutted here by evidence of gross neglect of DARAB rules and facts.

• "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction." — Definition applied to assess the Ombudsman's and DARAB's actions.
• "The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government." — From Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, emphasizing the Ombudsman's duty to investigate, which it shirked.
• "Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." — Exact text of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, central to the probable cause finding.
• "Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanic (sic) and literal application of a rule." — Ombudsman's rationale for denying reconsideration, critiqued by the Court as overlooking gross procedural violations.

• Soriano v. Cabais — Cited as controlling precedent for the proper remedy from Ombudsman resolutions in criminal cases being certiorari under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court, not Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals, to challenge findings of lack of probable cause.
• Estrada v. Desierto — Referenced to affirm that certiorari under Rule 65 is the remedy for Ombudsman resolutions tainted by grave abuse in criminal probable cause determinations, distinguishing administrative from criminal cases.
• Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon — Followed to reiterate that aggrieved parties in Ombudsman criminal complaints must file certiorari with the Supreme Court for lack of probable cause findings.
• Uriarte v. People — Cited for defining elements of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, including explanations of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, applied to respondents' conduct.
• Citizens' League of Free-Workers v. Court of Industrial Relations — Distinguished by the Court as irrelevant to the case, as it involved labor law and supported the duty to act on jurisdictional matters, contrary to Ombudsman's reliance.
• Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals — Referenced as precedent that injunction does not lie for accomplished acts (fait accompli), illustrating the impropriety of DARAB's post-execution orders.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Central provision defining corrupt practices through manifest partiality, bad faith, or negligence causing undue injury or unwarranted benefits; applied to find probable cause against respondents for their DARAB actions.
• Section 12, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints against public officials; invoked to highlight the Ombudsman's duty to investigate, which it evaded by dismissing without probable cause ruling.
• Section 13, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Enumerates Ombudsman's powers to investigate illegal, unjust, or improper acts of public officers; used to affirm primary jurisdiction over anti-graft cases.
• Section 15(1), Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Grants Ombudsman authority to investigate and prosecute acts appearing illegal or improper, with primary jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan cases; supports the duty to rule on probable cause.
• Section 1, Rule XIII, 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure — Provides 15-day period to appeal PARAD decisions; relevant as Constantino's late appeal was ignored by respondents, evidencing negligence.
• Section 1, Rule X, 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure — Requires affidavit of merit for injunction petitions; violation by Constantino's petition showed respondents' bad faith in granting TRO.
• Section 3, Rule VIII, 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure — Bars certiorari without prior motion for reconsideration within 5 days; applied to reject treating Constantino's petition as certiorari, highlighting procedural infirmities.