Defamatory statements made by a party or counsel in pleadings filed during judicial or administrative proceedings lose the protection of absolute privilege if such statements are irrelevant or impertinent to the cause or subject of inquiry, particularly when they constitute personal attacks on the character, honor, or reputation of an individual.

The petitioner, Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, then a practicing lawyer, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle. This complaint was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. ACP Suñega-Lagman subsequently dismissed the estafa complaint, which aggrieved the petitioner and led him to file an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify) containing the statements that became the basis for the libel charge.

• Petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, a lawyer, filed an estafa complaint against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr., which was dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.
• On August 27, 2004, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify) with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, furnishing copies to Nezer D. Belen, Sr. and the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
• The Omnibus Motion contained statements accusing ACP Suñega-Lagman of, among others, exhibiting "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons," having "wrongful assumptions were tarnished with silver ingots," being "intellectually infirm or stupidly blind," issuing a "moronic resolution," showing "manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity," and that "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind." It also called her "a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty."
• The copy of the Omnibus Motion for the OCP was received by its Receiving Section, recorded, and then processed for referral.
• ACP Suñega-Lagman learned of the motion from Michael Belen (son of Nezer D. Belen, Sr.) and Joey Flores (OCP staff), and subsequently obtained a photocopy.
• Prosecution witnesses Joey Flores and Gayne Gamo Enseo (administrative staff at the OCP Receiving Section) and Michael Belen testified that they read the contents of the Omnibus Motion.
• ACP Suñega-Lagman filed a libel complaint against petitioner, leading to his conviction by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA.

• The element of publication was absent because the Omnibus Motion was enclosed in sealed envelopes and sent only to its legal recipients; the son of the estafa respondent (Michael Belen) and the OCP staff (Flores and Enseo) who read it cannot be considered "third persons" for purposes of publication.
• The statements made in the Omnibus Motion are covered by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication because they were relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry, which was the dismissal of his estafa case and the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
• The lower courts erred in relying on the opinion of ordinary witnesses (Michael Belen, Flores, and Enseo) to establish malicious imputations, as this contravenes the rules on opinion evidence.
• The test for relevancy in privileged communications should be liberally construed in his favor, and the libel information did not allege that the statements were irrelevant.

• Publication occurred because the defamatory matter was made known to third persons, namely: prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo (staff in the OCP of San Pablo City who read the motion) and Michael Belen (son and representative of the respondent in the estafa case who was furnished a copy).
• The doctrine of absolutely privileged communication is inapplicable because the subject statements were unnecessary, irrelevant to determining the propriety of the estafa case dismissal, and constituted defamatory remarks on ACP Suñega-Lagman's personality, reputation, and mental fitness.
• The trial court correctly determined the defamatory nature of the statements based on its own assessment of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, and not solely on the opinions of the witnesses.

• Whether the element of publication, essential for the crime of libel, was present when the Omnibus Motion was read by OCP staff and the son of the respondent in the estafa case.
• Whether the allegedly defamatory statements made by the petitioner in his Omnibus Motion are protected by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication due to being part of a pleading in an administrative proceeding.
• Whether the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found the statements to be malicious and defamatory, and whether reliance on the testimony of ordinary witnesses regarding the nature of these imputations was proper.

• The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with the modification that the fine imposed on petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be increased to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
• The Court found that the element of publication was present because the defamatory matter was made known to persons other than ACP Suñega-Lagman. The filing of the Omnibus Motion with the OCP, where it was read by staff members Flores and Enseo, and the furnishing of a copy to Nezer Belen, Sr. (read by his son Michael), constituted publication. Petitioner, as a lawyer, was aware that such a motion would be read by OCP personnel as part of standard procedure.
• The Court ruled that the statements were not covered by absolutely privileged communication because they were not relevant or pertinent to the petitioner's prayers for reconsideration of the estafa dismissal or for ACP Suñega-Lagman's disqualification. The language used constituted personal attacks on ACP Suñega-Lagman's honor, reputation, and character, going beyond the bounds of legitimate commentary on her official functions.
• The Court held that the trial court correctly determined the defamatory nature of the statements based on its own assessment of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used. The testimonies of witnesses Michael Belen, Flores, and Enseo on their understanding of the statements were considered relevant to how the public would naturally perceive them, but the court's finding was not solely dependent on these testimonies.
• The penalty was modified in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, considering the petitioner's status as a lawyer, the irrelevance and baselessness of the attacks, the damage to the prosecutor's reputation and the prosecutorial service, and his lack of remorse.

• Publication in Libel — Defined as making defamatory matter known to someone other than the person defamed. The Court affirmed that parting with possession of a libelous communication in a way that allows it to be read by a third person, or where there is reasonable probability of such exposure, constitutes publication. This was applied to the OCP staff and the estafa respondent's son reading the motion.
• Absolutely Privileged Communication — This doctrine protects statements made by parties or counsel in pleadings or during judicial/administrative proceedings from being actionable for libel, even if made in bad faith, provided such statements are relevant to the issues. The Court held this inapplicable as petitioner's statements were found irrelevant and impertinent to the subject matter of his Omnibus Motion.
• Relevancy Test for Privileged Communications — For statements in pleadings to be privileged, they must be legitimately related or pertinent to the subject of controversy. While liberally construed, privilege is lost if statements are so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter that no reasonable man can doubt their irrelevancy. The petitioner's ad hominem attacks failed this test.
• Presumption of Intent (Rule 131, Section 3(c), Rules of Court) — A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. Applied to petitioner, a lawyer, who was presumed to know his filed motion would be read by OCP staff.
• Elements of Libel (Article 353, Revised Penal Code) — The Court implicitly found all elements present: (1) imputation of a crime, vice, or defect; (2) publication; (3) malice (presumed as statements were not privileged and defamatory); (4) direction at a natural person; and (5) tendency to cause dishonor.
• Professional Conduct for Lawyers (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8, Rule 8.01) — Lawyers shall not use abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper language in their professional dealings and must treat colleagues with courtesy, fairness, and candor. The petitioner's language violated this standard.
• Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 (Preference for Fines in Libel Cases) — This circular guides judges to prefer imposing a fine alone rather than imprisonment in libel cases, under specific circumstances, without removing imprisonment as an alternative. The Court applied this to modify the penalty to a higher fine due to aggravating circumstances (petitioner being a lawyer, nature of attacks, lack of remorse).
• Opinion Evidence (Rule 130, Sections 48 & 50, Rules of Court) — While generally inadmissible, ordinary witnesses can testify to their impressions. The Court found the witnesses' testimony on their understanding of the libelous statements relevant to how the public would perceive them, and noted the trial court also made its own assessment.

• "Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written."
• "A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings... provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues..."
• "As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety."
• "If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute, and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege."
• "In fine, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice."

• Alcantara v. Ponce — Referenced for the extension of absolute privilege to preliminary investigations if statements are relevant (citing Borg v. Boas), and for the definition of when communication to another officer is not publication (distinguished here). Also cited for the elements of libel.
• Borg v. Boas — A U.S. case whose principle of extending absolute privilege to preliminary steps leading to judicial action (if relevant) was found persuasive.
• Buatis, Jr. v. People — Cited for the twin rules for determining the meaning of an allegedly libelous publication (natural and ordinary sense, construed as a whole) and as an instance where a fine was preferred for a lawyer convicted of libel.
• People v. Andres — Distinguished by the Court; in Andres, the privilege was apparent on the face of the information because the statements seemed pertinent, unlike in the present case where statements were found irrelevant.
• Gutierrez v. Abila, et al. — Cited for the principle that if a pleader includes irrelevant libelous matter in a pleading, the privilege is lost.
• Novicio v. Aggabao — Cited for the definition of publication in libel.
• Orfanel v. People; Malit v. People — Cited for the definition of absolutely privileged communication, emphasizing the requirement of relevance.
• U.S. v. Bustos — Cited for the liberal interpretation of relevancy in privileged communications.

• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel and its elements, which the Court found were met.
• Article 355, Revised Penal Code — Specifies the penalty for libel, which the Court applied in modifying the fine.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court.
• Rule 131, Section 3(c), Rules of Court — On the disputable presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; applied to petitioner's filing of the motion.
• Rule 130, Sections 48 and 50, Rules of Court — Regarding opinion evidence; the Court addressed petitioner's argument on the admissibility of witness testimonies about the statements' nature.
• Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to use respectful language and act with courtesy; petitioner's conduct was contrary to this.
• Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 — Guidelines on the preference for imposing fines in libel cases; used by the Court to justify the increased fine.

• Justice Leonen — Argued that the petitioner should not be held criminally liable for libel. He contended that Belen's statements, although intemperate, were made in an Omnibus Motion filed in an estafa case and thus constituted absolutely privileged communication as they were intended to protect his interests and justify his motion. Alternatively, he argued they were qualifiedly privileged as criticisms of a public official, and actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth) was not proven, the statements being mere opinions. Justice Leonen reiterated his stance that libel should be decriminalized as it is overbroad and inconsistent with freedom of speech, with civil actions being sufficient to address defamation.