An executive agreement, such as the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, entered into by the President pursuant to their foreign affairs powers, is valid and binding without Senate concurrence, and does not unconstitutionally derogate from the Philippines' obligations under international law, including those potentially arising from a signed but unratified treaty like the Rome Statute.

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The Philippines signed the Rome Statute on December 28, 2000, but had not ratified it at the time of the petition. The United States, not a signatory to the Rome Statute, proposed a Non-Surrender Agreement to the Philippines to protect its nationals from prosecution by international tribunals, which was accepted by the Philippines through an exchange of notes. This agreement became the subject of the legal challenge.

• Petitioner Bayan Muna is a registered party-list group. Respondents were the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
• The Republic of the Philippines (RP) signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on December 28, 2000, which is subject to ratification by signatory states; the Philippines had not ratified it.
• On May 9, 2003, US Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone proposed the terms of a non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement) to the RP Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
• On May 13, 2003, via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Blas Ople, accepted the US proposals, putting the Agreement into effect.
• The Agreement defines "persons" as current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
• The Agreement stipulates that persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party, be surrendered or transferred to any international tribunal (unless established by the UN Security Council) or to any other entity or third country for such purpose.
• The Agreement also includes provisions regarding the transfer of persons to a third country by either the US or the GRP, requiring consent from the other party before agreeing to the surrender of that person by the third country to an international tribunal not established by the UN Security Council.
• The US Ambassador confirmed that the exchange of notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law and did not require US Senate advice and consent.
• Republic Act No. 9851, the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity," was signed into law on December 11, 2009.

• Respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement (Agreement) after the Philippines had signed the Rome Statute, pending its ratification.
• The Agreement constitutes an abandonment and waiver of the Philippines' recourse through the Rome Statute to prosecute "persons" who commit international crimes, thereby abdicating Philippine sovereignty.
• After signing the Rome Statute, the RP President and DFA Secretary are obliged by the principle of good faith to refrain from acts that would impair the value of the undertaking.
• The Agreement defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and contravenes the obligation of good faith inherent in the signature of the President on the Rome Statute, rendering the Agreement void.
• The Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are immoral or at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
• The Agreement is not valid, binding, and effective without the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.
• The Agreement unduly restricts the ICC's jurisdiction and infringes upon the effectivity of the Rome Statute by providing immunity, which is not within the scope of Art. 98 of the Rome Statute.
• The Agreement is an immoral act that leaves criminals immune from responsibility for atrocities.

• Petitioner lacks legal standing to maintain the suit.
• The Agreement, being an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy.
• The Agreement is constitutional.
• An exchange of notes is an internationally accepted form of international agreement and is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding contract among nations.
• The Agreement does not contravene or undermine the Rome Statute; it complements it, as the ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
• The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute, not a State-Party, and is thus only obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, not to follow all its provisions.
• The Agreement is an affirmation of the Philippines' national criminal jurisdiction and does not abdicate sovereignty.
• The President has the power to enter into international agreements, and concluding the Agreement was within the scope of this authority.

• Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the suit.
• Whether the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is validly concluded through an exchange of notes without Senate concurrence.
• Whether the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement contravenes the Rome Statute, international law principles, or Philippine sovereignty.
• Whether the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding the Agreement.
• Whether the Agreement needs to be in the form of a treaty, particularly in light of RA 9851.

• The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
• The Court held that petitioner Bayan Muna, through its representatives suing as citizens, has locus standi due to the transcendental importance of the issues raised concerning national policies and obligations.
• The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, concluded through an Exchange of Notes (E/N BFO-028-03), is a valid executive agreement and does not require Senate concurrence for its effectivity. The President has the power to enter into executive agreements.
• The Agreement does not contravene the Rome Statute. The ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to national jurisdictions, and the Philippines, as only a signatory and not a State-Party to the Rome Statute, is merely obliged to refrain from acts defeating the treaty's object and purpose. Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute itself allows states to act consistently with obligations under other international agreements regarding surrender.
• The Agreement does not constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty, as entering into international agreements inherently involves a voluntary shedding of some aspect of sovereignty for greater benefits or reciprocal undertakings.
• The Agreement is not immoral or at variance with universally recognized principles of international law, as it affirms the Philippines' primary jurisdiction to try crimes under its national laws.
• The President, in concluding the Agreement through the DFA Secretary, acted within the scope of constitutional authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
• The Agreement does not amend or is not repugnant to RA 9851. Section 17 of RA 9851, allowing surrender to an international court or another state, uses the permissive word "may," indicating discretion. The Agreement can be considered a "treaty" in the international law sense for purposes of RA 9851's reference to "applicable extradition laws and treaties." US laws also criminalize war crimes and genocide, fulfilling the dual criminality aspect for potential extradition.
• The Rome Statute is not declaratory of customary international law to the extent that it would bind the Philippines to all its provisions without ratification, as evidenced by the limited number of ratifications worldwide and the Statute's own requirement for ratification.

• Locus Standi — A party's personal and substantial interest in a case, requiring direct injury. The Court adopted a liberal stance, recognizing that issues of transcendental importance allow citizens to sue, relaxing the direct injury requirement. Applied here by granting petitioner standing due to the paramount public interest in the Agreement's validity.
• Doctrine of Incorporation (Art. II, Sec. 2, Constitution) — Generally accepted principles of international law form part of the law of the land. The Court acknowledged this but found the Non-Surrender Agreement not violative of such principles. It also determined that the Rome Statute, not having achieved universal ratification or consistent state practice with opinio juris, is not (in its entirety) customary international law binding on the Philippines without ratification, especially given its own ratification clause.
• Executive Agreements — International agreements entered into by the President that do not require Senate concurrence. They are distinct from treaties but binding under international law. The Court affirmed that the Non-Surrender Agreement is a valid executive agreement, within the President's power to conclude.
• Pacta Sunt Servanda — Agreements must be kept; treaties in force are binding and must be performed in good faith. While acknowledged, its application to the unratified Rome Statute was limited to the obligation not to defeat its object and purpose. The Non-Surrender Agreement was found not to violate this.
• Principle of Complementarity (Rome Statute, Art. 1) — The ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, meaning the ICC acts only when national systems are unwilling or unable genuinely to prosecute. This principle was used to show the Non-Surrender Agreement does not conflict with the ICC's role, as it reinforces national jurisdiction.
• Separation of Powers — The division of governmental powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The Court emphasized that the President's power to enter into executive agreements is an executive power that should be afforded great respect, and courts should exercise utmost caution in invalidating them absent clear contravention of law.
• Treaty vs. Executive Agreement Distinction (Domestic Law) — Treaties require Senate concurrence for domestic validity, while executive agreements do not. The Court held the Non-Surrender Agreement falls into the latter category and is valid without Senate concurrence.
• President's Power in Foreign Affairs — The President is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country, vested with the power to enter into international agreements. The conclusion of the Non-Surrender Agreement was an exercise of this power.
• Statutory Construction (use of "may") — The word "may" in a statute denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. Applied to Section 17 of RA 9851, indicating that the State's option to surrender accused persons is permissive, not obligatory.

• "Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
• "Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers."
• "The jurisdiction of the ICC is to 'be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].'"
• "The Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute."
• "By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country."
• "The Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of universal jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therein as evidenced by it requiring State consent. Even further, the Rome Statute specifically and unequivocally requires that: 'This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States.' These clearly negate the argument that such has already attained customary status."

• Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. — Cited for the requirements for a citizen to have locus standi, specifically the need for direct and personal interest, or assertion of a public right.
• Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. — Cited as an instance where the Court relaxed standing requirements for issues of transcendental importance.
• Bayan v. Zamora — Cited for the principle that the Court may relax standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury if the case involves transcendental importance; also cited regarding the binding effect of executive agreements without Senate concurrence.
• Tañada v. Angara — Cited for the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution in matters involving grave abuse of discretion.
• Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading — Cited by petitioner for the traditional distinction between subjects covered by treaties (political issues, permanent arrangements) and executive agreements (details, temporary arrangements). The Court found this categorization not cast in stone and noted the evolution of international affairs.
• Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales and Merchant — Distinguished by the Court; Adolfo held an executive agreement cannot amend a treaty. The Court found it inapplicable as the Non-Surrender Agreement was not amending a prior treaty in the same way.
• Nicolas v. Romulo — Cited for the point that an executive agreement is a 'treaty' in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law in the US; also that the Constitution does not prohibit agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction for certain foreign personnel.
• Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary — Cited for the principle that the power to ratify a treaty rests with the President, subject to Senate concurrence, and the President has the prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate.
• Weinberger v. Rossi — Cited in Nicolas v. Romulo, supporting the idea that an executive agreement can be considered a 'treaty' in international law.
• Suplico v. Neda — Distinguished; Justice Carpio's dissent in Suplico (that an executive agreement cannot amend prior laws) was noted as not being the ratio decidendi of that case and that RA 9851 was a subsequent law, not a prior one to the Agreement in a direct sense of amendment.
• The Paquete Habana — Cited to show that US law incorporates international law, including customs and usages of civilized nations.
• U.S. v. Coolidge and U.S. v. Hudson — Cited in the discussion about US domestic law and international crimes, with the Court clarifying these cases relate to common law crimes, not necessarily international law crimes.
• Ex Parte Quirin — Cited to demonstrate US Supreme Court recognition and application of the law of war as part of the law of nations, even without specific codification by Congress.
• Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations — Cited for the principle that the President's authority to enter into executive agreements without legislative concurrence is traditionally recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

• Philippine Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2 — (Doctrine of Incorporation) "The Philippines x x x adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land x x x." Relevant to arguments about the binding nature of the Rome Statute and customary international law.
• Philippine Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 — Requires Senate concurrence for treaties related to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. The Court found this specific provision not directly applicable to the Non-Surrender Agreement's nature.
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 1 — Establishes the ICC and states its jurisdiction shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Central to the argument that the Agreement does not conflict with the ICC.
• Rome Statute, Art. 17 — (Issues of admissibility) Details when a case is inadmissible before the ICC, including when a state with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting. Supports the complementarity principle.
• Rome Statute, Art. 20 — (Ne bis in idem) Prohibits trial by the ICC if a person has already been tried by another court for the same conduct. Underscores primacy of national jurisdiction.
• Rome Statute, Art. 27 — (Irrelevance of official capacity) Official capacity does not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Petitioner argued the Agreement violated this; Court found it binding only on State-Parties.
• Rome Statute, Art. 86 — (General obligation to cooperate) States Parties shall cooperate fully with the ICC. Petitioner argued the Agreement violated this; Court found it binding only on State-Parties.
• Rome Statute, Art. 89 — (Surrender of persons to the Court) States Parties shall comply with requests for arrest and surrender. Petitioner argued the Agreement violated this; Court found it binding only on State-Parties.
• Rome Statute, Art. 90 — (Competing requests) Deals with situations where a State receives requests for surrender from both the ICC and another State. Art. 90(4) gives priority to ICC request if the other state is not a party and there's no international obligation to extradite, but recognizes primacy of existing international agreements.
• Rome Statute, Art. 98(2) — The ICC may not proceed with a surrender request if it requires the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements requiring consent of a sending State for surrender. Crucial for the Court's ruling that the Agreement is compatible with the Rome Statute.
• Rome Statute, Art. 125 — States that the Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval by signatory states. Used to emphasize that the Philippines was not yet fully bound as a State-Party.
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2 — Defines "treaty." Used to distinguish between treaties requiring legislative concurrence and executive agreements.
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18 — Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. Applied to the Philippines as a signatory to the Rome Statute.
• Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity), Sec. 17 — Allows Philippine authorities to dispense with investigation or prosecution if another court or international tribunal is already doing so, and instead surrender or extradite suspects "pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." The Court found the Agreement compatible with this, interpreting "may" as discretionary.
• United States Code Annotated (USCA), Title 18, §2441 (War crimes) — Cited to show the US has domestic legislation criminalizing war crimes.
• United States Code Annotated (USCA), Title 18, §1091 (Genocide) — Cited to show the US has domestic legislation criminalizing genocide.
• Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Art. 38 — Lists sources of international law (conventions, custom, general principles, judicial decisions, teachings of publicists). Used in discussing whether the Rome Statute embodies customary international law.

• Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno — Concurred in the result of the decision dismissing the petition. (No separate detailed opinion provided in the main text).

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Argued that the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement violates existing municipal laws, specifically RA 9851 and principles of international law incorporated into Philippine law. He contended that an executive agreement cannot prevail over or amend municipal law. RA 9851 imposes a duty on the Philippines to prosecute international crimes or surrender accused individuals to appropriate international courts or to another State under applicable extradition laws/treaties, provided the other state is already investigating/prosecuting. Carpio argued the RP-US Extradition Treaty is not applicable because not all Rome Statute crimes are punishable under US law (lacking dual criminality). He asserted that any derogation from RA 9851 or incorporated international law (like principles in the Rome Statute, which he views as customary international law or at least relevant under RA 9851 Sec. 15) requires a treaty ratified by the Senate, not a mere executive agreement. The Agreement, by requiring US consent for surrender to international tribunals and not ensuring US prosecution for all RA 9851 crimes, contravenes these domestic legal obligations.