Notice of the pre-trial conference under the Revised Rules of Court must be served not only upon the counsel but also directly upon the parties, and failure to notify the parties themselves renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings and judgments null and void for violation of due process.

The case originated from a dispute over the inheritance of a 173 square meter residential land originally owned by spouses Claro Barde and Juana Cordial. After their deaths, their son Pedro Barde registered the property exclusively in his name, excluding his sister Brigida and the heirs of his deceased brother Rafael. This led Brigida and Rafael's heirs to file a suit for reconveyance and partition against Pedro's heirs.

• Spouses Claro Barde and Juana Cordial owned a 173 sq.m. residential lot. They had three children: Brigida, Pedro, and Rafael.
• After the spouses' death (Juana first, then Claro), their son Pedro registered the land exclusively in his name using an affidavit of adjudication claiming he was the sole heir, excluding Brigida and Rafael's heirs (Josefina and Vilma, as Rafael was also deceased).
• Brigida and Rafael's heirs (appellees) filed a complaint for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages against Pedro's heirs (appellants: widow Socorro Posiquit and children).
• Appellants filed an Answer admitting they were all heirs but claimed Brigida had waived her 1/3 share for P150.00, and that Pedro received the land in consideration for caring for Claro. They counterclaimed for funeral and medical expenses.
• A notice for pre-trial scheduled for February 26, 1968, was sent only to appellants' counsel, Atty. Jaucian, but was returned unclaimed. The appellants themselves were not notified.
• A subsequent order setting the hearing for April 5, 1968, was also sent only to counsel and returned unclaimed.
• On April 5, 1968, the trial court allowed appellees to present evidence ex-parte due to the absence of appellants and their counsel.
• On April 6, 1968, the trial court rendered a decision favoring the appellees, ordering partition of the land into three equal shares.
• Appellants filed a Motion for New Trial, which was denied.
• Appellants, through a new lawyer, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, alleging lack of notice of the pre-trial and trial, preventing them from presenting their defenses (waiver, reimbursement).
• The trial court denied the Petition for Relief, leading to this appeal to the Supreme Court.

• The trial court erred in finding that their Petition for Relief from Judgment was improper and filed out of time.
• All proceedings starting from the notice of pre-trial dated January 23, 1968, up to the subsequent orders and decision, were null and void because they were never notified of the pre-trial, violating their right to due process.
• The trial court erred in holding that notice to their former counsel was sufficient notice to them, and they should not be bound by the alleged negligent acts of their former counsel, especially concerning mandatory pre-trial attendance.

• The appellants' Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed out of time.
• Notice of pre-trial sent to appellants' counsel was sufficient.
• They opposed the appellants' Motion for New Trial.
• They filed a Motion to Dismiss the appellants' Petition for Relief from Judgment based on timeliness.

• Whether notice of the pre-trial conference served only upon the counsel of record, and not upon the parties themselves, is sufficient under the Revised Rules of Court.
• Whether the proceedings and judgment subsequent to a pre-trial held without proper notice to the parties are valid.
• Whether the Petition for Relief from Judgment was the proper remedy and timely filed, considering the alleged nullity of the judgment.

• The Supreme Court granted the appeal, setting aside the trial court's decision of April 6, 1968, and remanding the case for further proceedings.
• The Court ruled that under the Revised Rules of Court, pre-trial is mandatory, and notice thereof must be served not only upon the counsel but also upon the parties themselves. The rationale is partly to enable exploration of amicable settlement, which attorneys cannot conclude without special authority (Rule 138, Sec. 23).
• Since the appellants (defendants below) were never notified of the pre-trial, their absence was justified, and the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to denial of due process in proceeding ex-parte and rendering judgment.
• Consequently, the pre-trial conference, the order allowing ex-parte evidence presentation, the decision, and all subsequent proceedings were declared null and void ab initio.
• A judgment void ab initio is non-existent, cannot acquire finality, and can be attacked directly or collaterally at any time; therefore, the timeliness of the Petition for Relief from Judgment was immaterial.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial Notice to Parties and Counsel (Rule 20, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court): The Court emphasized that under the revised rules, pre-trial is mandatory, and the rule explicitly requires the court to direct the parties and their attorneys to appear. This case applied the doctrine by holding that failure to notify the parties themselves, in addition to their counsel, is a fatal defect rendering subsequent proceedings void.
• Procedural Due Process: This fundamental doctrine requires that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court applied it by stating that the lack of notice of the pre-trial conference to the appellants deprived them of their opportunity to be heard and participate, thus violating their due process rights and nullifying the judgment.
• Void Judgment: A judgment rendered without jurisdiction or in violation of due process is null and void from the beginning (ab initio). The Court invoked this doctrine to explain that the trial court's decision, being predicated on proceedings held without proper notice, was void, could never become final, and could be challenged at any time, irrespective of the timeliness rules for remedies like a petition for relief.

• "It has been consistently held that notice of the pre-trial conference must be served not only upon the counsel but also upon the party litigants as well. x x x." (citing Samson vs. Court of Appeals)
• "This Court, interpreting these provisions, uniformly emphasized that pre-trial is mandatory, that the parties as well as the counsel, who are required to appear thereat, must be notified of the same..." (citing Lim vs. Animas and International Harvester Macleod, Inc. vs. Co Ban Ling & Sons Co.)
• "Hence, there being no question that the appellants were never notified of the pre-trial, all the proceedings that transpired subsequent thereto, are null and void."
• "...a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality..., and therefore, may be attacked directly or collaterally, and the action may be brought even after the time for appeal or review has lapsed..." (citing Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Sison and David vs. Aquilizan)

• Samson vs. Court of Appeals (105 SCRA 781 [1981]): Cited to support the established rule that pre-trial notice must be served on both counsel and the party litigants.
• Zenith Insurance Corp. vs. Purisima (114 SCRA 62 [1982]): Cited as an instance where declaring a party in default despite absence of pre-trial notice was deemed grave abuse of discretion, leading to the voiding of the default order and subsequent proceedings.
• Pineda vs. Court of Appeals (67 SCRA 228 [1975]): Referenced to illustrate that absence at pre-trial is justified if no notice was sent to the party, and an order of default issued under such circumstances ignores procedural due process, leading to the nullity of the decision. Also cited for emphasizing the mandatory nature of pre-trial and the requirement of notice to both parties and counsel.
• Lim vs. Animas (63 SCRA 408 [1975]): Cited within the Pineda quote to affirm that both parties and counsel must be notified of the mandatory pre-trial.
• International Harvester Macleod, Inc. vs. Co Ban Ling & Sons Co. (25 SCRA 612 [1968]): Also cited within the Pineda quote for the same principle regarding mandatory pre-trial and required notification to parties and counsel.
• Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Sison (124 SCRA 394 [1983]): Cited to establish that a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality.
• David vs. Aquilizan (94 SCRA 707 [1979]): Cited to support the principle that a void judgment can be attacked directly or collaterally, even after the period for appeal or review has lapsed.
• Tiglao vs. COMELEC (34 SCRA 456 [1970]): Mentioned within the Pineda quote as an example where decisions suffer from fatal infirmity due to lack of due process (notice and hearing).
• Makabingkil vs. Yatco (21 SCRA 150 [1967]): Also mentioned within the Pineda quote for the same due process principle as Tiglao.

• Rules of Court, Rule 20, Section 1: Cited as the provision mandating pre-trial and requiring the court to direct the parties and their attorneys to appear, forming the core basis for the ruling on necessary notice.
• Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 23: Cited to explain one reason why parties' presence at pre-trial is necessary – attorneys cannot compromise litigation without special authority, making party presence crucial for exploring amicable settlements.