Arreza vs. Toyo

Foreign judgments and laws are not subject to judicial notice by Philippine courts and must be pleaded and proven as facts in accordance with the Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, before their legal effects can be recognized and extended to a Filipino spouse.

Genevieve Rosal Arreza, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo, a Japanese citizen, were married in the Philippines. After 19 years of marriage, they jointly obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan. Subsequently, Genevieve filed a petition in a Philippine Regional Trial Court to have the foreign divorce recognized and to be declared capacitated to remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. The core of the legal dispute arose from the trial court's assessment of the evidence presented to prove the existence and validity of the Japanese law that served as the basis for the divorce.

• On April 1, 1991, petitioner Genevieve Rosal Arreza (a Filipino citizen) and Tetsushi Toyo (a Japanese citizen) were married in Quezon City.
• On February 4, 2011, after 19 years of marriage, they filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which was received and recorded by the local government in Osaka, Japan.
• On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed a Petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and a declaration of her capacity to remarry before the RTC of Quezon City.
• To support her petition, she submitted documents including their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan.
• The RTC found that while the evidence proved the fact of their divorce agreement being accepted by Japanese authorities, the petitioner failed to prove the specific Japanese law on divorce.
• The RTC noted that the submitted copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs, as required by the Rules of Court.

• The trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication, which would make it a self-authenticating document under the Rules of Court.
• The petitioner contended that since the translation was printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice," it should be considered an official publication that does not require certification.
• The petitioner also argued that the trial court should have considered the English translation as a "learned treatise" and taken judicial notice of its authors' credentials.

• The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the RTC correctly denied the petition because proving a foreign law requires strict compliance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.
• Respondents asserted that the presumption of official publication under the rules only pertains to the "fact of printing and publication" and does not automatically mean it is an official publication by the Japanese government.
• Respondents maintained that for the English translation to be considered a learned treatise, the court must first take judicial notice that the author is an expert, or an expert witness must testify to that effect, neither of which occurred in this case.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court can resolve a question of fact, specifically the existence of a foreign law on divorce, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner sufficiently proved the national law of her foreign spouse, which is an indispensable element for the judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree under Article 26 of the Family Code.
  • Whether an unauthenticated English translation of the Japan Civil Code, published by a private company, can be considered an official publication or a learned treatise under the Rules of Evidence.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court ruled that a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to questions of law, and the existence of a foreign law is a question of fact. However, citing Section 6 of Rule 56 and the interest of substantial justice, the Court has the discretion to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action, including the reception of evidence to resolve the factual issues. The Court exercised this discretion and referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
• Substantive:
  • The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC's finding that the petitioner failed to prove the Japanese law on divorce. The English translation of the Japan Civil Code was not an official publication because it was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company, and not in the KANPO, Japan's official gazette. It was also not a learned treatise because the trial court did not take judicial notice of the translator's qualifications, nor was an expert witness presented to testify on the matter. Therefore, the document was a private document that required proper authentication under the Rules of Court, which the petitioner failed to provide.

• Proof of Foreign Law and Judgments — Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; they must be pleaded and proven as facts. The Court reiterated that to prove a foreign law, a party must present either (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, with a certificate from a Philippine diplomatic or consular officer authenticating the same.
• Self-Authenticating Documents — The Court clarified that a public document is self-authenticating due to its official or sovereign character. A translation of a foreign law published by a private entity, even if authorized by a foreign government ministry, does not possess this official character and is considered a private document requiring authentication before it can be admitted as evidence.
• Learned Treatise Exception to the Hearsay Rule — A published treatise may be admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents if (1) the court takes judicial notice of the author's expertise or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in their profession as an expert on the subject. In this case, neither condition was met.

• "Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be proven as fact under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign judgment, hence the indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse."

• Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas — Referenced as the foundational case establishing that foreign divorce judgments and the alien's national law must be proven as facts, as Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of them.
• Patula v. People — Cited to distinguish between a self-authenticating public document and a private document that requires authentication before being presented as evidence in court.
• Medina v. Koike — Used as the direct precedent for the Supreme Court's disposition to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. This case established that despite the procedural limitations of a Rule 45 petition, the Court may, in the interest of substantial justice, remand a case involving questions of fact (like proving foreign law) for further proceedings.

• Family Code, Article 26 — This is the substantive legal basis for the petition, as its second paragraph allows a Filipino spouse to have a divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse recognized in the Philippines, thereby granting the Filipino spouse the capacity to remarry.
• Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 — These sections detail the procedural requirements for proving an official record of a foreign country. The Court held that the petitioner failed to comply with these rules for proving the Japanese law on divorce.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 46 — This section provides for the "learned treatise" exception to the hearsay rule. The Court found that the submitted translation did not meet the requirements of this rule.
• Rules of Court, Rule 56, Section 6 — This provision grants the Supreme Court the discretion to refer an improper appeal that raises issues of fact to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action, which the Court invoked in its final disposition of the case.