Primary Holding

The defendant, Mayor Cornelius W. Lawrence, was not guilty of trespass because the destruction of the plaintiff's goods was a necessary and lawful act to prevent the spread of the Great Fire of 1835, justified under both a New York statute and common law necessity.

Background

In December 1835, a devastating fire broke out in New York City, rapidly spreading and threatening to consume a large portion of the city. Mayor Cornelius W. Lawrence, in consultation with city officials and military experts, ordered the destruction of several buildings using gunpowder to create firebreaks and halt the conflagration. Among the destroyed buildings were stores containing goods belonging to American Print Works.

Facts

• 1. The American Print Works owned goods stored in two stores, Nos. 48 and 52 Exchange Place, in New York City.
• 2. On December 17, 1835, these stores were destroyed by gunpowder explosions ordered by Cornelius W. Lawrence, Mayor of New York City.
• 3. The destruction was intended to stop the Great Fire of 1835, which was rapidly spreading and consuming a large portion of the city.
• 4. The fire was characterized by extreme cold, high winds, and a paralyzed Fire Department due to frozen equipment and lack of water.
• 5. Mayor Lawrence consulted with Aldermen and experts before ordering the destruction of buildings.
• 6. There was considerable debate during the trial regarding the necessity of blowing up stores No. 48 and 52, and whether goods could have been removed in time.
• 7. The plaintiffs claimed damages of $200,000 for the destruction of their goods, including prints, printed pieces, and drillings.
• 8. Witnesses for the defendant, including military engineers, firemen, and city officials, testified to the urgency of the situation and the necessity of the actions taken.
• 9. Witnesses for the plaintiff suggested that the destruction was unnecessary and that goods could have been saved.

Arguments of the Petitioners

• 1. Cornelius W. Lawrence committed trespass by ordering the destruction of American Print Works' goods.
• 2. The destruction was not absolutely necessary to stop the fire.
• 3. Lawrence exceeded the authority granted by the New York statute.
• 4. The statute, if interpreted to allow destruction of goods without compensation, is unconstitutional.
• 5. The defendant should be held liable for the full value of the destroyed goods, as the destruction was not justified.

Arguments of the Respondents

• 1. Mayor Lawrence acted lawfully under both a New York statute and common law necessity.
• 2. The destruction of the buildings was essential to prevent the fire from spreading and causing even greater devastation.
• 3. The Mayor consulted with city officials and experts and acted in good faith to protect the city.
• 4. The New York statute authorized the Mayor to order the destruction of buildings deemed hazardous during a fire.
• 5. Common law necessity justifies the destruction of property to prevent a greater calamity.
• 6. Lawrence acted as a public officer in the lawful discharge of his duty and should not be held personally liable for the unavoidable consequences of those actions.

Issues

• 1. Was the defendant, Cornelius W. Lawrence, guilty of trespass for ordering the destruction of the plaintiff's goods?
• 2. Was the destruction of the buildings and goods justified by a New York statute?
• 3. Was the destruction of the buildings and goods justified by common law necessity?
• 4. Did the New York statute, if authorizing destruction of goods without compensation, violate the constitution?
• 5. Was the immediate destruction of the buildings without waiting to remove goods absolutely necessary?

Ruling

• 1. The jury found in favor of the defendant, Cornelius W. Lawrence, concluding he was not guilty of trespass.
• 2. Judge Potts instructed the jury that if they believed the defendant acted necessarily to prevent the spread of the conflagration and save the city, he should be acquitted.
• 3. The ruling emphasized that the law of necessity justified the actions taken by Mayor Lawrence, and that the New York statute, in this context, was a regulation of that common law right, not a violation of constitutional principles.
• 4. The court highlighted that the defendant acted as a public officer in good faith and should not be held personally liable for the consequences of necessary actions during a public emergency.

Doctrines

• 1. Law of Necessity: Justified the destruction of property to prevent a greater harm, especially in emergencies like fire. This is a common law doctrine rooted in natural law and self-preservation, independent of statutory authorization.
• 2. Eminent Domain: The right of the sovereign to take private property for public use. The defense argued the statute was not an exercise of eminent domain but a regulation of the law of necessity. The court's dissenting opinion suggested the statute was an unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain because it did not provide compensation for destroyed goods.
• 3. Res Gestae: Mentioned in the context of admitting evidence about conversations during the consultation with the Mayor, deemed part of the "things done" in the situation.

Key Excerpts

• 1. "Everything comes to him who waits Except a loaned book." - Bookplate quote, tangentially related to the book's origin but not legally relevant.
• 2. Judge Randolph Opinion (referencing previous case): "In this suit, we only know the defendant; and if damages be recovered, they will be against him personally; and we know of no legal obligation in the city of New-York to relieve him—this, it is true, would be of no consequence in a clear case against the defendant, but in a case like the present, it is worthy of consideration." - Highlights the personal liability aspect.
• 3. Chief Justice Green (referring to the law of necessity): "It is both anterior and superior to the rights derived from the social compact. It springs not from any right of property claimed or exercised by the agent of de- struction." - Emphasizes the fundamental nature of the doctrine.
• 4. Lord Mansfield quote in Radcliffe vs. Eden case: "The whole is one act." - Used to argue the destruction of the building and goods should be considered a single, justified act.
• 5. Judge Carpenter quote: "The Supreme Court of the United States, in cases depending upon the laws of a par- ticular State, uniformly adopts the construction which the courts of the State have given to those laws." - Discusses the principle of deference to state court interpretations of state law.

Precedents Cited

• 1. Hoyt vs. Thompson: Used to demonstrate the principle of deference to state court interpretations of state law by federal courts.
• 2. Mostyn vs. Fabrigas: Cited to illustrate the principle that justification for an act is determined by the law of the place where it occurs.
• 3. Radcliffe vs. Eden: Used as an example of cases where the destruction of property (a house) and its contents are treated as a single act for liability purposes.
• 4. Martin v. Mott: Cited to support the idea that executive judgment in emergencies can be conclusive.
• 5. Russell vs. Mayor, &c.: A New York case related to similar claims from the Great Fire, where the court ruled against liability of the city corporation.
• 6. Dinsmore vs. Wilkes: A U.S. Supreme Court case used to support the principle that officials acting in good faith during emergencies are not liable for mere errors in judgment.
• 7. Bonaparte v. The Camden and Amboy R.R. Co., Scudder v. The Trenton Del. Falls Co., Beekman v. The Sara. and Sch. R. R. Co.: Cited in dissenting opinion regarding trial by jury, suggesting these cases relate to the procedural aspect of eminent domain.
• 8. The Governor, &c. v. Meredith, Sutton v. Clark, Boulton v. Crowther, Sinnickson v. Johnson, Ten Eyck v. The Del. and Rar. Canal Co.: Cases cited by Judge Potts to establish the principle of no liability for public officers acting in good faith and with due care during their public duty.
• 9. Malwerer vs. Spinke: Cited to illustrate common weal justification for destroying property in emergencies.
• 10. The Saltpetre Case: Mentioned to illustrate the common law principle of necessity in the context of public safety.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

• 1. Act of the Legislature of the State of New-York (1813), entitled "An Act to reduce several laws relating particularly to the City of New-York, into one Act," specifically section 81 regarding the Mayor's powers during fires.