Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

A decision of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of suspension for not more than one month is final, executory, and unappealable, which justifies direct resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, the condonation doctrine applies to an official elected to a different public office, provided that the electorate or "body politic" is the same for both positions.

Respondent Chito M. Oyardo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo for an alleged violation of law committed while she was serving as a Sangguniang Bayan Member of Caramoan, Catanduanes, from 2007 to 2010. This complaint led to the Ombudsman's investigation and subsequent decision finding her liable for simple misconduct.

• Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo served as a Sangguniang Bayan Member of Caramoan, Catanduanes, from July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2010.
• During her term, Chito M. Oyardo filed an administrative complaint against her with the Office of the Ombudsman.
• On January 6, 2010, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found Templonuevo guilty of simple misconduct and imposed a penalty of one-month suspension from office without pay.
• In the May 2010 elections, Templonuevo was elected as the Municipal Vice Mayor of the same municipality.
• Templonuevo received her copy of the Ombudsman's decision on September 27, 2010, after her term as Sangguniang Bayan Member had already expired and she was serving as Vice Mayor.
• Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Templonuevo directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.

• The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari on the ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration, as such a motion would be useless because the Ombudsman's decision was final, executory, and unappealable pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
• The Ombudsman's decision was a patent nullity because her subsequent election as Vice Mayor resulted in the condonation of her administrative liability for acts committed during her previous term as Sangguniang Bayan Member.

• The Ombudsman argued that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 allows the filing of a motion for reconsideration for decisions imposing a one-month suspension.
• The Ombudsman contended that the Condonation Doctrine applies only in cases where an official is re-elected to the exact same position, not to a different one.
• The private respondent, Chito M. Oyardo, was deemed to have waived his right to file a comment after failing to do so despite being given the opportunity.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's decision.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner's election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality operates as a condonation of her administrative misconduct committed during her prior term as Sangguniang Bayan Member, thereby precluding the imposition of the suspension penalty.

• Procedural:
  • No, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition. The Supreme Court held that a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non for filing a petition for certiorari when the assailed order is final and unappealable. Under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, a decision of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of suspension of not more than one month is final and unappealable. Therefore, Templonuevo was justified in directly resorting to a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals, as no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available to her.
• Substantive:
  • Yes, the petitioner's administrative liability was condoned. The Court ruled that the Condonation Doctrine applies even if the public official is elected to a different position, provided that the body politic that elected her is the same. In this case, the electorate for the Vice Mayor of the municipality of Caramoan is the same as the electorate for a Sangguniang Bayan Member. Since the doctrine's abandonment in the Carpio-Morales case was prospective in application, it still applied to Templonuevo's case. Her election as Vice Mayor served as a condonation of her previous misconduct, precluding the imposition of the administrative penalty.

• Condonation Doctrine (Aguinaldo Doctrine) — This doctrine posits that a public official's re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him for it. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to Templonuevo, who was elected to a different but higher office (Vice Mayor), because the "body politic" that elected her was the same as the one for her previous position (Sangguniang Bayan Member).
• Finality of Ombudsman Decisions — This principle, derived from the Ombudsman's procedural rules, states that decisions imposing penalties of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary are final, executory, and unappealable. The Court used this doctrine to rule that Templonuevo was correct in not filing a motion for reconsideration, as such a remedy was unavailable, making a petition for certiorari the proper recourse.
• Exceptions to the Rule on Motion for Reconsideration — The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before resorting to a petition for certiorari. However, this rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when such a motion would be useless. The Court found that this case fell under the exception because the Ombudsman's decision was already final and unappealable, rendering a motion for reconsideration futile.

• "In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same."

• Giron v. Ochoa — Cited as the controlling precedent establishing that the condonation doctrine can be applied to a public officer elected to a different position, as long as the body politic electing the person is the same.
• Conchita Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. — Referenced to acknowledge the abandonment of the condonation doctrine but to clarify that its application is prospective, meaning the doctrine was still valid and applicable to the facts of the present case, which occurred before the abandonment.
• Office of the Ombudsman v. Alano — Cited to support the interpretation that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, a decision of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of one-month suspension is final and unappealable.
• Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario — Referenced to explain that where an Ombudsman's decision is final and unappealable, the respondent is denied any corrective recourse within the Ombudsman's office, thus justifying a direct petition for certiorari to the courts.

• Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) — This was the central provision used to determine that the Ombudsman's decision was final, executory, and unappealable, which in turn justified the petitioner's direct filing of a petition for certiorari without a prior motion for reconsideration.
• Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — This rule governs petitions for certiorari and was the remedy availed of by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals to challenge the Ombudsman's decision on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
• Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — This rule governs petitions for review on certiorari and was the remedy used by the petitioner to elevate the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.