An order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order (such as an order dismissing a case) is itself a final order and thus appealable; the aggrieved party is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the denial order within which to file the notice of appeal, pursuant to the "fresh period rule" established in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, which applies retroactively to pending cases.

The dispute originated from a 1979 Deed of Conditional Sale where Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold two parcels of land to Ramon Javellana. Payment was partially made upfront, with the balance due upon registration under the Torrens System, an obligation Margarita undertook. After Margarita and her son/attorney-in-fact Juvenal died, the obligation fell upon her daughter and sole heir, Priscilla Alma Jose, who allegedly failed to comply and instead started developing the properties, prompting Javellana to sue for specific performance.

• On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold two parcels of land in Bulacan to respondent Ramon Javellana via a deed of conditional sale for P160,000.00.
• The agreement stipulated an initial payment of P80,000.00 upon execution, with the P80,000.00 balance payable upon Margarita's registration of the land under the Torrens System within a reasonable time.
• The deed named Margarita's son Juvenal and daughter Priscilla as alternates to receive the balance and handle registration if Margarita became incapacitated.
• Javellana paid the initial P80,000.00 and took possession upon execution of the deed.
• Margarita died, and Juvenal subsequently died without issue, leaving Priscilla as Margarita's sole surviving heir.
• Javellana claimed he paid the balance to Juvenal on various dates upon representation that funds were needed for registration expenses.
• Priscilla allegedly failed to undertake the registration and instead began dumping filling materials on the properties to convert them into a subdivision.
• On February 10, 1997, Javellana sued Priscilla for specific performance, injunction, and damages in the RTC Malolos.
• Priscilla moved to dismiss, alleging prescription and failure to state a cause of action.
• The RTC initially denied the motion but later granted it upon reconsideration on June 24, 1999, finding Priscilla not bound by the deed and doubting the payment of the balance.
• Javellana moved for reconsideration, attaching receipts for payments made to Juvenal, which the RTC denied on June 21, 2000.
• Javellana filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, after receiving the denial order on July 13, 2000.
• While the appeal was pending, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari (SP No. 60455) with the CA challenging the same RTC dismissal orders.

• The CA erred in not dismissing Javellana's appeal because the RTC order of June 21, 2000 (denying the motion for reconsideration) was not appealable under Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
• Javellana's notice of appeal was filed three days late, as he only had the remaining three days of the original 15-day period after his motion for reconsideration was denied.
• Javellana committed forum shopping by filing both an appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259) and a petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455) assailing the same RTC orders.
• Even if the appeal was properly entertained, the RTC's dismissal should be upheld because Javellana's complaint stated no cause of action against Priscilla and the action had already prescribed.

• The issues raised by Priscilla involved questions of fact inappropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.
• The RTC order dated June 21, 2000, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, was a final order and therefore appealable.
• The appeal was perfected on time based on the "fresh period rule" established in Neypes v. CA, granting a new 15-day period from receipt of the order denying reconsideration.
• He was not guilty of forum shopping because the appeal (CV No. 68259) concerned the merits of the dismissal (error of judgment), while the certiorari petition (SP No. 60455) raised grave abuse of discretion and sought different objectives (preventing development/ejectment pending appeal).
• The CA correctly ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action and the action had not prescribed.

• Whether the RTC order denying Javellana's motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint was a final order and thus appealable.
• Whether Javellana's appeal to the CA was filed within the reglementary period.
• Whether Javellana committed forum shopping by filing both an appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing the same RTC orders.

• Yes, the RTC order denying the motion for reconsideration of the final order of dismissal was itself a final order, not interlocutory, because it confirmed the dismissal and left nothing more for the trial court to do regarding the case's merits; thus, it was appealable.
• Yes, Javellana's appeal was timely filed under the "fresh period rule" established in Neypes v. CA, which allows a fresh 15-day period from the notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment. This rule applies retroactively to pending cases, including this one, making the July 19, 2000 filing (within 15 days from the July 13, 2000 receipt of denial) timely.
• No, Javellana did not commit forum shopping. Although both remedies challenged the same RTC orders, the appeal sought to reverse the dismissal based on errors of judgment, while the petition for certiorari ostensibly aimed to prevent Priscilla from developing the property pending the appeal, alleging grave abuse of discretion and inadequacy of the appeal for that specific purpose. The objectives and grounds were distinct, mitigating the risks associated with forum shopping in this specific context. The petition for review was denied, and the CA decision remanding the case to the RTC was affirmed.

• Final Order vs. Interlocutory Order — A final order disposes of the subject matter entirely or terminates a particular proceeding, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters, leaving the main case to be decided. The Court applied this by classifying the RTC's denial of the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal as a final order because it definitively ended the case at the trial court level, making appeal the correct remedy.
• Fresh Period Rule (Neypes Doctrine) — An aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment within which to file a notice of appeal. The Court applied this rule retroactively to Javellana's appeal, deeming it timely filed even though it was beyond the remainder of the original 15-day period.
• Retroactivity of Procedural Rules — Procedural laws may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. The Court applied this principle to justify the application of the later-established 'fresh period rule' to Javellana's appeal, which was pending when the rule was adopted.
• Forum Shopping — The act of filing multiple suits in different courts or tribunals involving the same parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought, either simultaneously or successively, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. The Court found no forum shopping here, distinguishing the objectives of Javellana's appeal (reversal of dismissal on merits) and his certiorari petition (injunctive relief pending appeal based on grave abuse of discretion), despite both challenging the same RTC orders.

• "The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party's motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order."
• "The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final."
• "Henceforth, this “fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court." (quoting Neypes)
• "Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure." (quoting De los Santos)

• Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. (2004) — Cited to support the principle that the denial of a motion for reconsideration of a final order is appealable and that the prohibition against appealing such denials refers only to interlocutory orders.
• Neypes v. Court of Appeals (2005) — The source of the "fresh period rule," establishing a new 15-day period to appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration of a final order/judgment. This case was crucial for determining the timeliness of Javellana's appeal.
• Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo (2011) — Cited for its clear distinction between final and interlocutory orders and the corresponding remedies (appeal for final orders, certiorari for interlocutory orders under specific conditions).
• De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat (2007) — Cited to support the retroactive application of procedural rules like the "fresh period rule" to pending cases, as there are no vested rights in procedure.
• Young v. Sy (2006) & Zosa v. Estrella (2008) — Cited as examples where filing both an appeal and certiorari against the same orders was deemed forum shopping. However, the Court distinguished the present case based on the different objectives pursued by Javellana.
• In Re: Reconstitution...Rolando Edward G. Lim (2010) — Cited for its definition and explanation of forum shopping, including its elements (identity of parties, rights/causes of action, reliefs) and the requirement that judgment in one case would constitute res judicata in the other.

• Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 1 — Defines which orders are appealable (judgments or final orders completely disposing of the case) and explicitly states that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is generally not appealable. The Court clarified this prohibition applies only to denials of motions reconsidering interlocutory orders, not final ones.
• Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 3 — Specifies the 15-day period for ordinary appeal and states that this period is interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court applied the Neypes modification (fresh period rule) to this section.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 — Governs the special civil action of certiorari, used to correct errors of jurisdiction (lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion) when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Referenced in distinguishing the remedy sought by Javellana in his certiorari petition versus his appeal.