The distribution of circulars advocating a general strike in ammunition factories during wartime, even if primarily motivated by a desire to protest U.S. policy towards Russia, constitutes sufficient evidence of an unlawful intent to curtail war production and hinder the prosecution of the war against Germany, thereby violating the Espionage Act and falling outside the protection of the First Amendment.

The case arose during World War I, shortly after the U.S. sent troops to parts of Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution, an action perceived by the defendants (Russian immigrants and self-proclaimed anarchists/revolutionists) as an attempt to crush the revolution. The Espionage Act of 1917, amended in 1918, criminalized various forms of dissent and anti-war expression deemed harmful to the U.S. war effort against Germany.

• The five defendants, Russian immigrants residing in the U.S. who identified as rebels, anarchists, or socialists, conspired to and did print and distribute approximately 5,000 circulars in New York City around August 22, 1918.
• One circular, printed in English and titled "The Hypocrisy of the United States and her Allies," denounced President Wilson and the U.S. government as hypocritical and capitalistic enemies of workers for intervening in Russia, calling on workers to "Awake! Rise! Put down your enemy and mine!"
• A second circular, printed in Yiddish and titled "Workers—Wake up," urged Russian immigrants to reject U.S. military propaganda, stating that money loaned to the U.S. would fund bullets to murder Germans and "Workers Soviets of Russia," and explicitly called for a general strike, particularly among ammunition factory workers.
• The defendants admitted to uniting to print and distribute the circulars; defendant Abrams purchased the printing outfit, and distribution occurred partly by throwing leaflets from a window and partly through secret distribution.
• Additional revolutionary writings were found at the defendants' meeting place and on the person of one defendant upon arrest.
• The defendants testified, with most avowing their revolutionary beliefs and opposition to the U.S. government's form, which they considered "capitalistic."

• The defendants argued that their actions were protected under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the press.
• They contended that the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended, was unconstitutional.
• They claimed there was no substantial evidence to support the guilty verdict, asserting that the government failed to prove the requisite intent to hinder the war effort against Germany.
• They argued their primary intent was solely to protest U.S. intervention in Russia and prevent harm to the Russian Revolution, not to interfere with the war against Germany.

• The United States argued that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the conviction under the Espionage Act, particularly on the third count (conspiracy to incite resistance) and the fourth count (conspiracy to advocate curtailment of essential war production).
• The government asserted that the language used in the circulars, especially the call for a general strike in munitions factories, clearly demonstrated an intent to provoke resistance and curtail production necessary for the war against Germany.
• It contended that the defendants must be held accountable for the natural and probable consequences of their actions, regardless of their stated ultimate motive concerning Russia.
• The U.S. maintained the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, citing prior Supreme Court decisions (Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs).

• Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain the defendants' conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended in 1918?
• Did the defendants' publication and distribution of the circulars, advocating resistance and a general strike, constitute an unlawful attempt to hinder the United States' war effort against Germany under the Espionage Act?
• Did the defendants possess the specific intent required by the Espionage Act, namely the intent to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war?
• Were the defendants' actions protected speech under the First Amendment?

• The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, upholding the defendants' convictions.
• The Court found sufficient evidence, particularly concerning the third and fourth counts of the indictment, to support the jury's verdict that the defendants conspired to incite resistance to the U.S. war effort and to curtail the production of essential war materials.
• The Court reasoned that the plain language of the circulars, especially the call for a general strike in ammunition factories, was clearly intended to provoke resistance and hinder the war effort.
• The Court held that individuals must be presumed to intend the clear and probable consequences of their actions; therefore, even if the defendants' primary motive was to aid the Russian Revolution, their chosen method (advocating strikes disrupting U.S. war production) necessarily involved an intent to hinder the U.S. war against Germany.
• The Court concluded that such speech, disseminated during wartime with the intent found, was not protected by the First Amendment, implicitly applying the standard established in prior Espionage Act cases.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court reviewed the evidence not to weigh conflicting testimony but only to determine if there was "some evidence, competent and substantial, before the jury, fairly tending to sustain the verdict." It found such evidence existed.
• Concurrent Sentence Doctrine: The Court stated that if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction on any single count of a multi-count indictment, the judgment will be affirmed provided the sentence imposed does not exceed that which could lawfully be imposed under that single count. Since the evidence supported counts 3 and 4, the overall conviction was upheld.
• Criminal Intent (Mens Rea): The Court applied the principle that individuals are held to intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts. The defendants' advocacy for a general strike, which would foreseeably hinder war production, was deemed sufficient proof of intent to hinder the war effort under the Espionage Act, despite their claims of a different primary motivation (protesting intervention in Russia).
• First Amendment Limitations (Wartime): The Court reaffirmed, by citing Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, that the First Amendment's protection of speech is not absolute, especially during wartime, and does not protect speech that intends to obstruct the war effort or incite unlawful actions harmful to national security. The majority implicitly found the defendants' speech posed such a danger.
• Conspiracy: The conviction was for conspiracy, requiring proof of an agreement to commit an unlawful act and overt acts in furtherance of that agreement. The Court found the defendants' admitted actions of uniting to print and distribute the leaflets satisfied these elements for violating the Espionage Act.

• "Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce."
• "...the plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe."
• (Holmes, J., dissenting) "But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market..."
• (Holmes, J., dissenting) "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned."
• (Holmes, J., dissenting) "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

• Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47: Cited as definitively rejecting the argument that the Espionage Act violated the First Amendment.
• Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204: Cited alongside Schenck as rejecting First Amendment challenges to the Espionage Act.
• Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211: Cited for the application of the concurrent sentence doctrine and as upholding an Espionage Act conviction.
• Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 608: Cited as authority for the concurrent sentence doctrine.
• Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140: Cited as authority for the concurrent sentence doctrine.
• Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 434: Cited for the standard of review regarding the sufficiency of evidence (requiring competent and substantial evidence tending to sustain the verdict).
• Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S. 222: Cited for the standard of review regarding the sufficiency of evidence.
• Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123: Cited for the standard of review regarding the sufficiency of evidence.
• Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375: Cited in Justice Holmes' dissent regarding the requirement of specific intent for attempt liability.

• Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, as amended May 16, 1918 (Act of May 16, 1918, c. 75, 40 Stat. 553), § 3, Title I: The statute under which the defendants were indicted and convicted.
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: Invoked by the defendants as protecting their speech; the Court found its protection did not extend to the defendants' actions under the circumstances.