Aberca vs. Ver

A civil action for damages based on violations of constitutional rights, as provided for under Article 32 of the Civil Code, may be filed against public officers, including military personnel, and is not barred by either the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the doctrine of state immunity. Furthermore, superior officers may be held liable as joint tortfeasors for the wrongful acts of their subordinates if they are found to be directly or indirectly responsible for the constitutional violations.

The case arose from a series of "pre-emptive strikes" ordered by then-General Fabian Ver against alleged communist-terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. These operations were carried out by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, collectively known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM). The petitioners were individuals whose homes were raided and who were subsequently arrested, detained, and subjected to various forms of abuse by TFM elements during these operations.

• Petitioners are individuals who were subjected to raids by Task Force Makabansa (TFM), a military intelligence unit, based on an order from respondent Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct "pre-emptive strikes" against alleged communist-terrorist underground houses.
• The raids were conducted using allegedly defective judicial search warrants, during which purely personal items belonging to the petitioners were confiscated.
• Petitioners were arrested without proper warrants and were subsequently detained in undisclosed "safehouses."
• During their detention, they were held incommunicado, denied visits from relatives and lawyers, and interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel.
• The military interrogators allegedly employed threats, torture, and other forms of violence to extract incriminatory information and confessions from the petitioners.
• Petitioners filed a civil action for damages against the military personnel and their superiors, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional rights.

• The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not bar a civil action for damages arising from illegal arrest, detention, and other constitutional violations.
• The doctrine of state immunity is not applicable because the respondents' acts of violating constitutional rights are not within the scope of their official duties.
• Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a clear statutory basis for holding public officers liable for damages for violating the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens.
• Superior officers should be held liable for the wrongful acts of their subordinates, as they are at least indirectly responsible for the violations committed pursuant to their orders or due to their failure to supervise.
• The trial court erred in declaring the dismissal final as to some petitioners, as the motion for reconsideration was filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, even if signed by only some of their lawyers.

• The damage suit is a mere circumvention of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as it seeks a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the petitioners' detention.
• As members of the Armed Forces performing their official duties to suppress rebellion under a presidential directive, they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit.
• The complaint states no cause of action, particularly against the superior officers, as there was no allegation that they directly participated in the alleged acts of torture or that they had vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
• The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to the relationship between superior officers and their subordinates in the military.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that its order of dismissal had become final with respect to some of the petitioners on the ground that their specific lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches, seizures, and other violations of constitutional rights.
  • Whether the doctrine of state immunity from suit protects military officers from liability for damages arising from acts that violate the constitutional rights of individuals.
  • Whether a superior military officer can be held liable for damages for the wrongful acts of his subordinates under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

• Procedural:
  • Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The motion to set aside the dismissal was clearly filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, and the authority of an attorney to appear for a party is presumed unless challenged. The court's reliance on a "contrived technicality" to declare the dismissal final for some plaintiffs was an infirm action that cannot be sanctioned.
• Substantive:
  • No, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not bar a civil action for damages. The suspension only affects the right of an individual to seek release from detention through the speedy remedy of habeas corpus; it does not validate an otherwise illegal detention or extinguish the cause of action for damages arising from that and other constitutional violations.
  • No, the doctrine of state immunity does not apply. The immunity of public officers from liability is limited to acts performed within the scope of their official authority. Violating the constitutional rights of citizens is not part of the official duties of any officer, and such transgressions are not shielded by state immunity. The Constitution is the supreme law that all officials must obey.
  • Yes, a superior officer can be held liable. While the doctrine of respondeat superior (master-servant liability) does not apply to the military command structure, Article 32 of the Civil Code holds liable any public officer who "directly or indirectly" obstructs, defeats, or violates the enumerated constitutional rights. This provision makes not only the direct perpetrator but also those indirectly responsible, such as superiors who order the illegal acts or fail in their duty to supervise, accountable as joint tortfeasors.

• Accountability of Public Officers under Article 32, Civil Code — This article provides an independent civil action for damages against any public officer or employee who directly or indirectly violates or impairs certain enumerated constitutional rights and liberties. The Court held this to be the primary basis for the petitioners' cause of action, emphasizing that it applies to military personnel and that liability extends to those who are "indirectly" responsible, thereby including superiors.
• State Immunity — This principle holds that the state cannot be sued without its consent. Respondents invoked this to argue that as public officers performing official functions, they were immune from suit. The Court rejected this, clarifying that immunity does not cover acts committed beyond the scope of an officer's authority, such as the violation of constitutional rights.
• Respondeat Superior — A common-law doctrine that holds an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent committed within the scope of the employment or agency. The Court agreed with respondents that this doctrine, in its traditional sense, does not apply to the military command structure, but it found a basis for the liability of superiors in the specific language of Article 32 ("directly or indirectly").

• "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls."

• Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco — Cited by respondents to support their claim of immunity. The Supreme Court distinguished this case by pointing out that the official in Forbes was held immune because he was acting within the scope of his legal authority, whereas the respondents in the present case were being sued for acts that transgressed their constitutional and legal authority.

• Article 32, New Civil Code — This is the central legal provision of the case. It establishes a cause of action for damages against any public officer, employee, or private individual who directly or indirectly violates, obstructs, or impairs enumerated constitutional rights, such as freedom from arbitrary detention and unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Article 1146, New Civil Code (as amended by P.D. No. 1755) — Cited by the Court to show that the law explicitly recognized a cause of action for damages arising from acts committed during the Martial Law period, establishing a one-year prescriptive period for such actions.

• Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — He concurred to emphasize that Article 32 makes all persons, including military officers, liable for infringing on constitutional rights. He clarified that while the ruling rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior, it gives a "caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinate," otherwise he risks being held indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.